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“Humor is the great thing, the saving thing after all. The minute it crops up, 
all our hardnesses yield, all our irritations, and resentments flit away, and a 
sunny spirit takes their place.” 
      Mark Twain – What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us 
 
 
«Para combatir tantos males que afectan al mundo tan sólo dispongo de un 
arma, que es el humor».  
      Miguel Gila - Yo muy bien, ¿y usted?
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Resumen 
El humor es una de las formas de comunicación más complejas que existen 
(Veale, Brône, & Feyaerts, 2015). Algunas teorías lingüísticas sobre el humor tienen 
un enfoque semántico-pragmático, como la Semantic Script Theory of Humour 
(Raskin, 1984) o la General Theory of Verbal Humour (Attardo, 2001). Otras se 
inscriben en la Teoría de la Relevancia (Yus, 2016) y las hay también con una 
perspectiva más cognitiva (Giora, 1991, 2015; Coulson & Okley, 2005; Veale, 
Feyaerts, & Brône, 2006). Se han realizado varios estudios sobre los marcadores 
multimodales de la ironía o el sarcasmo, cuyos resultados son dispares (Attardo, 
Eisterhold, Hay, & Poggi, 2003; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, Wagner, & 
Urios-Aparisi, 2011). Sin embargo, el humor no irónico ha sido objeto de menos 
estudios. Además, la mayor parte de los análisis se circunscriben al humor ensayado, 
con pocos estudios sobre el humor producido de forma espontánea (Bryant, 2010, 
Feyaerts, 2013; Tabacaru, 2014, etc.) y menos aún que conjuguen la perspectiva 
multimodal con la cognitiva. 
En esta tesis se analizan 14 entrevistas extraídas de The Late Show with 
Stephen Colbert con vistas a explicar la comunicación espontánea del humor desde 
el punto de vista multimodal y cognitivo. Los enunciados se han identificado como 
humorísticos cuando el público reaccionaba riendo. El análisis multimodal se ha 
realizado en ELAN, con cinco niveles de anotaciones: transcripción, tipo de humor 
(Feyaerts et al., 2010), mecanismo conceptual subyacente (Croft & Cruse, 2004), 
gestos y prosodia. El estudio prosódico se ha llevado a cabo con Praat, a fin de 
determinar si había un mayor contraste prosódico en enunciados humorísticos. Los 
resultados muestran que los mecanismos multimodales y cognitivos analizados en el 
presente estudio no difieren entre enunciados humorísticos y no humorísticos. 
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Abstract 
Humour is one of the most complex instances of communication (Veale et al., 
2015). Different linguistic humour theories can be found in the literature, from Raskin’s 
Semantic Script Theory of Humour (1984), or Attardo’s General Theory of Verbal 
Humour (2001), adopting a semantic-pragmatic approach, to Yus’s Relevance Theory 
account of humour (2016), and falling under a more cognitive perspective (Giora, 1991, 
2015; Coulson & Oakley, 2005; Veale et al., 2006). In addition, many studies have 
been conducted on the markers of irony or sarcasm, with conflicting results (Attardo, 
Eisterhold, Hay, & Poggi, 2003; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, Wagner, & 
Urios-Aparisi, 2011). Less attention has been devoted to non-ironical humour and most 
of the literature is limited to staged humour, with just a handful of studies focusing on 
spontaneous humour (Bryant, 2010, Feyaerts, 2013; Tabacaru, 2014, etc.). To my 
knowledge, no previous study combines a multimodal and cognitive perspective. 
This dissertation revolves around the analysis of humorous instances selected 
in 14 interviews from The Late Show with Stephen Colbert. The aim of the analysis is 
twofold: to account for spontaneous humorous communication from a multimodal and 
cognitive perspective. Humorous instances have been identified based on laughter 
elicited in the audience. The interviews have been uploaded to ELAN and humorous 
utterances annotated on five tiers: transcription, humour type (Feyaerts et al., 2010), 
underlying construal mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004), gestures and prosody. 
Prosodic features have been extracted with Praat in order to look into prosodic contrast 
between humorous and non-humorous utterances. The humorous utterances 
identified in the sample rely on the same cognitive mechanisms and multimodal 
resources analysed than non-humorous utterances. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Humour in face-to-face interaction. A multimodal and 
cognitive study 
 
1.1 Scope of the study and rationale 
Humour is an inherent human quality, a form of play, and an aesthetic 
experience, insofar as it is an end in itself, carried out for the mere sake of 
enjoyment without the need for further justification (Morreal, 1983). It is a 
cognitive tool, enabling us to see something from a different perspective and to 
relish things which do not conform to our expectations (Forabosco, 2008; Dynel, 
2018). Humour is also a social instrument, which serves to reinforce ties with 
other human beings and to acknowledge like-minded people (Hay, 2001; Dynel, 
2009). Finally, it can be a coping strategy, as it helps us distance ourselves from 
a particular event, in order to approach and process it differently (Morreal, 1983). 
Hence, humour is part of what makes us human, a quality that sets us apart from 
other animals, along with language and rational thinking. That, in itself, makes it 
a fascinating object of study.  
From a linguistic point of view, humour is arguably one of the most complex 
instances of communication, both in terms of production and comprehension 
(Veale, Brône, & Feyaerts, 2015). Furthermore, although most people would be 
able to recognise humour, its very nature has proved elusive to be defined and 
grasped scientifically (Attardo, 1994). Any communicative event is grounded in 
discourse (Langacker, 2001), and can be approached from two points of view, 
namely, how it is conceptualised and how it is expressed. With that in mind, the 
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purpose of my study is to gain an insight into how humour is multimodally 
expressed and cognitively grounded, drawing both on the multimodal paradigm, 
in order to account for how humour is conveyed in face to face interaction, and 
on cognitive linguistics to explain how humour is construed.  
1.2 Humour studies 
Traditional humour theories fall under three main categories: superiority 
theories, release theories and incongruity theory, the latest being the most 
widespread paradigm applied in verbal humour studies (Attardo, 1994). Different 
humour theories can be found in the literature, from Raskin’s Semantic Script 
Theory of Humour (1985), or the General Theory of Verbal Humour (Attardo & 
Raskin, 1991; Attardo, 2001), adopting a semantic-pragmatic approach, to Yus’s 
Relevance Theory account of humour (2016), along with those falling under a 
more cognitive perspective (Giora, 1991; Veale, Feyaerts, & Brône, 2006; 
Coulson, 2015; Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015, etc.). I believe these approaches 
differ in perspective, but they share core principles which can be brought together 
and accounted for resorting to widely studied notions in cognitive linguistics, such 
as Faucounnier and Turner’s conceptual blending (2002) or Langacker’s current 
discourse space (2001). 
The notion of incongruity is largely behind almost every account of humour 
in linguistic theories (Raskin, 1985; Giora, 1997; Attardo, 2001; Veale et al., 2006; 
Yus, 2016, etc.). Incongruity arises when we are confronted to something that 
breaks our expectations and does not fit in our usual worldview. Incongruity is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to humour, as for incongruities to be 
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enjoyed, a certain humour-prone mood, devoid of immediate pressing needs is 
needed (Morreal, 1983).  
1.3 Multimodality 
Communication is inherently multimodal. A multimodal analysis of 
discourse and human communication brings in information conveyed through 
different modalities, such as gesture, gaze, prosody, posture, etc. (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2001; Norris, 2004a; Forceville, 2014; Adami & Kress, 2014; Adami, 
2016). Modality refers to the each of the various semiotic resources with meaning 
potential, i.e., affordances (Adami, 2016). A multimodal perspective assumes that 
all these modalities, and crucially, how they interplay, contribute to 
communication (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; Norris, 2004a). Therefore, a 
comprehensive account of communication can only be achieved through careful 
exploration of how these modalities operate and relate to each other. That is the 
paradigm shared by multimodal studies, which do not constitute a theoretical 
framework as such, but rather take a multidisciplinary approach drawing on 
different theoretical sources. Rooted in social semiotics (Kress & van Leuween, 
2001; Adami, 2016), multimodality has gradually adopted a more cognitive 
perspective (Forceville, 2016), especially when it comes to the study of co-speech 
gestures or prosody. Hence the relevance of combining both a multimodal and 
cognitive perspective in this thesis. Messages can be encoded verbally or non-
verbally, but speakers can communicate more effectively taking advantage of 
their full multimodal expressive potential to reinforce, complement, underline or 
even contradict information conveyed through different modes. 
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With regards to multimodality in face-to-face interaction, both gestures and 
prosody have been found to have discursive value (Wennerstrom, 2011; Müller, 
2013a). In addition, gestures can be referential (Kendon, 2004), and prosody, in 
turn, carries affective meaning (Cruttenden, 1986). Recent research has explored 
the extent to which recurrent form-function pairings in co-speech gesture occur 
in face-to-face communication, and to what degree these are conventionalised. 
Less research has been devoted to the interplay between prosody, gestures and 
spoken language (Muller, 2013b). 
1.3.1 Multimodal markers of humour 
Research has also taken an interest in studying how ─or if─ humour is 
multimodally marked (Pickering et al., 2009; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; 
Urios-Aparisi & Wagner, 2011; Attardo, Pickering, Lomotey, & Menjo, 2013; etc.). 
The aim of these studies was to determine whether there are certain gestures, 
face expressions, head movements, changes in gaze, intonation or prosody 
patterns invariably associated with humour. In addition, research has focused on 
establishing whether multimodal cues co-occurring with humour can be 
considered as markers. That is, if they help to predict humour, or if they are simply 
used as metamessages as in other forms of non-humorous communication 
(Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011). 
Many studies have been conducted on the markers of irony or sarcasm, 
with conflicting results (Rockwell, 2000; Attardo, Eisterhold, Hay, & Poggi, 2003; 
Bryant, 2010; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, Wagner, & Urios-
Aparisi, 2011; Tabacaru, 2014, etc.). Less attention, though, has been devoted 
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to non-ironical humour. Furthermore, most of the literature is limited to staged 
humour, with just a handful of studies focusing on spontaneous humour (Archakis 
& Tsakona, 2005; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Feyaerts, 2013, etc.).  
1.4 Cognitive linguistics 
Cognitive linguistics considers language to be a window to the mind, 
providing clues on processes whereby meaning is constructed. Meaning making 
in cognitive linguistics is based on usage and experience (Croft & Cruse, 2004). 
Meaning is conceptualisation, rooted in discourse, and conceptualisation is 
embodied (Johnson, 1987; Croft & Cruse, 2004; Geraeerts, 2008). Language 
structure is also to a great extent determined by our experience of the world 
(Langacker, 2001; 2008). This cognitive approach to language blurs the 
boundaries between traditional dichotomies in linguistics such as langue/parole 
(Saussure, 1993), performance/competence (Chomsky, 1965) or 
semantics/pragmatics, thus allowing for a more comprehensive account of 
communication.  
The world and our experience is conceptualised by means of construal 
mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004). Examples of construal mechanisms are 
viewpoint, metaphor, metonymy, etc. Construal mechanisms encompass 
elements in conceptualisation that do not stem from the object or event being 
construed as such, but from the conceptualiser’s experience, e.g., viewpoint, 
perspective, subjectivity, attention, etc. Consequently, they can be valuable 
analytic tools to determine how a given humorous utterance is construed in order 
to render it humorous. Conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) is a 
further cognitive linguistic theory that has been recruited to account for humour 
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(Coulson, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Dynel, 2011). Blending refers to the process of 
merging various input mental spaces, which are partial representations of an 
event, in order to create new meaning. Therefore, it can yield insights into how 
humour is produced. 
1.5 Research questions 
In my view, a survey of the literature clearly points to a gap in current 
research. Further studies are needed to explore spontaneous humorous 
communication, as opposed to staged humour, from a multimodal and cognitive 
perspective, in order to gain an insight into how humour is multimodally signalled 
and cognitively motivated. The purpose of this dissertation is, mainly, to take one 
step towards filling that gap. I believe the focus on spontaneous communication 
is relevant, as humour is based on familiarity (Flamson, Bryant, & Barret, 2011). 
Due to the fact that posed humour needs to reach a wide audience, it may be 
delivered in an exaggerated manner, which can yield different multimodal 
resources than those employed in naturally-occurring, non-scripted humorous 
utterances (Rockwell, 2000; Urios-Aparisi & Wagner, 2011). 
In light of the above, the aim of my research is twofold. On the one hand, 
I look into how prosody, gestures, and speech interplay in the production of 
spontaneous humorous utterances in English, focusing specifically on co-speech 
spontaneous and non-representational gestures and intonation patterns. On the 
other hand, I analyse humorous instances in an attempt to unearth the main 
underlying construal mechanisms at play in their production. I will try to answer 
the following questions: (i) Are there multimodal cues that contribute to signal the 
humorous nature of an utterance? If so, (ii) can they be considered markers, i.e., 
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are they consistently associated with humour and do they help to predict it? (iii) 
What are the cognitive mechanisms involved in the production of humour? And 
finally, (iv) where does the humorous nature of an instance of communication lie? 
In addition, I provide a cognitive account of humour relying on the notions of 
current discourse space (Langacker, 2001) and conceptual blending (Fauconnier 
& Turner, 2002; Coulson, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Furthermore, I bring together 
current cognitive theories of humour, highlighting their similarities and trying to fit 
them within a simple, and broader account based on the two notions referred to 
above. 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 offers a review of humour studies, with special emphasis on 
linguistic and multimodal humour studies. First, a broad definition of humour is 
provided (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1994), before giving a brief account of traditional 
humour theories as background for the later development of multimodal and 
linguistic approaches to humour. The chapter includes a detailed review of 
multimodal studies of humour, listing findings on the prosody of irony, sarcasm, 
and humour (Haiman, 1998; Rockwell, 2000; Attardo et al., 2003; Cheang & Pell, 
2009; Bryant, 2010, etc.), along with other multimodal cues in humorous 
communication (Attardo et al., 2003; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; 
Tabacaru, 2014; Tabacaru & Lemmens, 2014; etc.). 
The chapter then delves into linguistic humour studies. From a semantic-
pragmatic approach, both the Semantic Script Theory of Verbal Humour (SSTH) 
(Raskin, 1985) and the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH) (Attardo & 
Raskin, 1991) are reviewed, as two highly influential theories, focused on humour 
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competence (as opposed to performance). Then, a full account of an approach 
based on Relevant Theory (Curcó, 1997; Yus, 2016) is included. Finally, the 
survey encompasses humour theories with a more cognitive stance (Giora, 1991, 
1997; Clark, 1996: Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Kyratzis, 2003; Coulson, 2005a; 
Coulson & Oakley, 2005; Tabacaru, 2014; Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015, etc.), 
before concluding with a review of cognitive analyses of humour in interaction. 
Chapter 3 revolves around multimodal studies. It lays out the major 
assumptions shared by this wide-ranging analysis approach (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2001; Norris, 2004a; Adami, 2016). It reviews how this paradigm is 
shifting from a purely semiotic perspective into a more cognitive view (Forceville, 
2009). In addition, the chapter explores the link between multimodality and other 
disciplines, such as cognitive linguistics, providing the grounds and rationale for 
combining both paradigms in a comprehensive study of humorous 
communication. Finally, the chapter offers a survey of the literature on gestures 
and prosody, as the two main modalities co-occurring with speech in face-to-face 
interaction. The different parts of prosody, as well as its value and functions are 
reviewed (Brazil, 1984, 1997; Bolinger, 1986; Cruttenden, 1986; Wennerstrom, 
2001). After examining what is known to date about the relation between prosody 
and gestures (McClave, 1998; McNeill, 2000; Kendon, 2004; etc.), the chapter 
moves onto exploring the interplay between gestures and speech (Kendon, 2002; 
2004; McNeill, 2005; 2008; 2013; Muller, Ladewig, & Bressem, 2013; Muller, 
Cienki, Ladewig, McNeill, & Teβendorf, 2013; Ladewig, 2014a, 2014b; Muller, 
Ladewig, Cienki, Fricke, Bressen, & McNeill, 2014). It also includes a brief 
overview of major classifications of gestures, widely acknowledged in the 
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literature (Efron, 1941; Ekman, 1979; Kendon, 1980; McNeil 1992). Additionally, 
an overview of the uses and functions of gestures is provided.  
Chapter 4 addresses cognitive linguistics. Its basic tenets and notions are 
briefly reviewed to lay the ground for the subsequent analysis of humorous 
utterances. It endorses the claim that people with different bodies have different 
experiences (Casasanto, 2013), which means that they may think differently, as 
meaning and conceptualisation are rooted in our experience of the world 
(Johnson, 1987; Croft & Cruse, 2004; Geraeerts, 2008). The chapter offers an 
overview of Langacker’s current discourse space (Langacker, 2001), as the 
framework where a multimodal and a cognitive analysis of communication can 
converge. Furthermore, it goes through the list of construal mechanisms 
employed as a core element of the cognitive study conducted for this dissertation, 
providing definitions illustrated by examples from the analysed sample when 
possible. 
The results of the empirical study are presented in Chapter 5. I have 
conducted a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a sample of 14 interviews 
extracted from the Late Show with Stephen Colbert (videos freely available on 
YouTube). The videos feature 7 women and 7 men at different ages and from 
different ethnic and professional backgrounds. 109 humorous instances have 
been identified in the sample, using laughter in the audience as the criterion to 
judge on their humorous nature. They have been transcribed, imported, and 
annotated in ELAN on five tiers: transcription, humour type, construal 
mechanism, gestures (head and face movements), and prosodic values. Mean 
pitch and mean intensity values have been obtained in Praat for every humorous 
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instance identified. In addition, a set of non-humorous utterances have also been 
selected to seek whether there is prosodic contrast between humorous and non-
humorous utterances. A control study comparing only non-humorous utterances 
has also been conducted. 
Chapter 6 focuses on an analysis of face expressions and head 
movements in humorous utterances, on the basis of the gestures with the highest 
number of occurrences in the sample. I explore the relationship between these 
multimodal cues and the construal mechanism and humour type identified in the 
instance in which they occur. The chapter ends with a critical review of the study 
conducted, clearly stating challenges encountered, as well as setting the results 
against the backdrop of previous studies in the literature. 
Chapter 7 offers a cognitive analysis of humour. I bring together current 
theories of humour (Attardo, 2001; Coulson, 2015; Veale, 2015; Giora, Givoni, 
Heruti, & Fein, 2017; Gibbs, Sammermit, & Karzmak, 2018) under the umbrella 
of cognitive linguistics. In addition, I provide a model to account for humorous 
communication based on Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) conceptual blending, 
and Langacker’s (2001) current discourse space. On the basis of the quantitative 
results presented in Chapter 5, in Chapter 7 I provide detailed analyses of several 
examples of humorous utterances extracted from the sample, accounting for their 
main construal mechanism and the humour type employed in each case. This 
chapter concludes with an attempt to disentangle where the humorous nature of 
an utterance lies. 
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Finally, Chapter 8 includes a summary of the conclusions reached in each 
chapter, along with the major findings of my study with regards to the research 
questions included in this introduction. Suggestions of possible future research 
lines are made to put an end to the chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
       Review of humour studies 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Humour is an inherently human quality (Morreal, 1983; Moran, Wig, 
Adams, Janata, & Kelley, 2004) and an extremely complex phenomenon (Veale 
et al., 2015). Despite being an intuitive notion, as most people could recognise 
humour even when they do not find it funny, it has proved difficult to be 
scientifically defined and explained (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1994).  
Humour studies go back to Plato and Aristotle, and have been approached 
from various disciplines: education, philosophy, literature, anthropology, 
psychology, linguistics, etc. (Attardo, 1994). In this chapter, I provide a brief 
overview of major theories and inputs in the field of linguistics. This overview is 
focused on those studies and authors that have had a major influence on current 
research on verbal humour (for a comprehensive review of verbal humour studies 
see Attardo, 1994, Morreal, 2009a, and Tabacaru, 2014).  
I briefly touch upon traditional general humour studies before moving on 
to multimodal and linguistic approaches to verbal humour. First, an outline of 
multimodal approaches to humour is included, along with the use prosody and 
gestures as possible markers of humour. As for linguistic theories, the semantic-
pragmatic approaches are reviewed first, followed by the application of 
Relevance Theory (RT) to verbal humour, before looking into humour studies 
from a cognitive linguistics perspective. The chapter ends looking into humour in 
interaction from a cognitive perspective. 
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2.2 The definition of humour 
Morreal (1983) considered humour to be an aesthetic experience, pursued 
or enjoyed for the sake of the experience itself. Raskin (1985) broadly defined 
humour as anything that triggers laughter or is considered amusing or funny. 
Attardo (1994) pointed to the difficulty of pinpointing the notion of humour. He 
reviewed various attempts throughout history to conclude that a more detailed 
definition or categorization is impossible to provide. He accepted Raskin’s above-
mentioned broad definition as the best starting point to undertake linguistic 
studies on verbal humour. 
2.3 Traditional humour studies 
Plato is widely considered to be the first theorist of humour. He considered 
humour to be a mixture of pleasure and pain (Attardo, 1994). Plato would 
therefore be the first to comprehend humour as arising from two opposing or 
contrasting feelings, thus setting a long tradition which continues to our days 
whereby humour is based on ambivalence or incongruity (Morreal, 2009a).  
Aristotle also delved into this link between humour and incongruity. He 
considered humour to be a rhetorical tool to serve a speaker’s power of 
argumentation, and drew a line between inappropriate jokes and those 
mechanisms suitable for the purposes of the speaker, such as irony (Attardo, 
1994). 
Cicero also proposed his own theory of humour, largely drawing from 
Aristotle’s. He was the first one to establish a difference between referential 
humour, i.e. humour about what the text is referring to, and verbal humour, i.e. 
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humour about what is being said (Tabacaru, 2014). Two other elements of 
Cicero’s approach to humour stand out from the viewpoint of linguistics: a 
taxonomy of humour based on the above-mentioned distinction, and the use of 
translation as a test to determine whether a given instantiation of humour can be 
classified as verbal or as referential. According to Cicero, if a humorous text can 
be translated, then the humour lies in the semantic value ─referential humour─ 
(Attardo, 1994). If, on the contrary, the text does not withstand translation without 
losing its humorous effect, it can be argued that humour relies on the form of the 
sign ─verbal humour─ (Morreal, 2009a; Tabacaru, 2014). 
As opposed to the classical theories mentioned above, which attempted at 
providing a global account of humour, modern theories of humour are invariably 
created within a certain discipline (Attardo, 1994). It is widely accepted in the 
literature that theories of humour fall into three major categories: (a) incongruity 
theories (cognitive perspective); (b) superiority theories (social perspective); (c) 
tension release theories (psychological perspective). 
2.3.1 Incongruity theories 
Kant (Morreal, 2009a) and Schopenhauer (Raskin, 1985) are credited as 
the first authors to lay down an incongruity theory of humour (Attardo, 1994), 
although this notion goes back to Greek times, as explained before. They related 
humour to a sudden breach of expectations, a momentary deception of the 
audience, and a contrast between two opposing ideas (Morreal, 1983; Attardo, 
1994). Incongruity-based theories are the current most widespread paradigm in 
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linguistic theories of humour (Raskin, 1985; Giora, 1997; Attardo, 2001; Veale, et 
al., 2006; Yus, 2016). 
2.3.2 Superiority theories 
This type of theories is also referred to as aggression or hostility theories. 
This notion goes back to the earliest theories of humour (Plato, Aristotle), and 
was forcefully advocated by Hobbes, who argued that laughter and humour 
implied a sense of superiority of the creator of humour with regards to the object 
of humour (Attardo, 1994; Morreal, 2009a). As shown in example (1) below, 
analysed in Veale et al. (2006, p.315), aggressive humour is therefore exclusive, 
as opposed to humour which is used to reinforce bonding between those 
individuals participating in it. Superiority theories place the focus on the social 
function of humour. 
(1) G. B. Shaw (S):  Here is an invitation to the opening night of my new 
play. Bring a friend, if you have one. 
 Churchill (H):  I’m afraid I can’t make it on the opening night. But I 
may attend on the second night, if there is one. 
As noted by Veale et al. (ibid.), humour in (1) was used both by G.B. Shaw 
and Churchill to attack each other. 
2.3.3 Tension release theories 
Release theories rely on the psychological aspect of humour. Tension 
release theories establish that humour is used to release tension, energy or to 
free oneself from inhibitions, norms and conventions (Morreal, 1983, 2009a). 
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Freud was the most influential proponent of this theory (Attardo, 1994). Release 
theories are interesting from a linguistic point of view, as the idea of liberation 
applies also to the rules of language, i.e. creative use of language, puns, word-
play, etc. (Morreal, 1983; Attardo, 1994). 
Morreal (1983), focusing on laughter ─not necessarily humorous 
laughter─, blended all three approaches and concluded that for laughter to occur 
a sudden shift in psychological state is needed, which can be cognitive ─related 
to the detection and resolution of incongruities, therefore humorous in nature─, 
affective ─to release energy or as an expression of superiority─ or both, in the 
case of hostile humour.  
2.4 Humour and multimodality 
Research has taken a recent interest in studying how and if humour is 
multimodally marked in order to determine if there are certain gestures, face 
expressions, changes in gaze, intonation or prosody patterns which are invariably 
associated with humour, and, if so, whether they are markers, i.e. they predict 
humour, or they are simply co-occurring with humour (Attardo et al., 2003; 
Pickering et al., 2009: Bryant, 2010; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, 
Wagner, & Urios-Aparisi, 2011; Attardo et al., 2013; Tabacaru & Lemmens, 2014, 
etc.). 
Attardo, Wagner, and Urios-Aparisi (2011) drew a line between markers, 
i.e., intentional signs used by the speaker to communicate metamessages and 
mark the humorous, ironical, etc. nature of the utterance, and indices, understood 
as involuntary indicators of humour. They acknowledged, though, that some 
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behavioural cues such as laughter can be either a marker or an index. 
Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between 
what is intentional or involuntary when it comes to gestures or prosody (Ekman, 
1979). Although at times it is straightforward to point at a gesture as intentional, 
such as with gestures used in mimicking or emblems, which are highly 
conventionalised gestures; e.g. the thumbs up gesture (Kendon, 2004), most 
instances would be far more ambiguous (Ekman, 1979).  
If we admit that raised eyebrows, for example, may be a recurrent gesture 
paired with spontaneous humour ―although not exclusive to humour, as it can 
also signal surprise, for example (Ekman, 1979)―, it is difficult to determine 
whether this gesture is intentional or not. We may raise eyebrows because we 
mean to signal the humorous nature of our utterance, but it can also just be a 
deeply embedded gesture coming out naturally (either as a result of a multimodal 
metaphor or a highly conventionalised cultural gesture). As for prosodic cues, we 
may intentionally decide to raise our voice to warn someone of danger, but I hold 
questions about the extent to which we can intentionally monitor and produce 
every element in our prosodic delivery to showcase a certain aspect of our 
speech. 
Many studies have been conducted on the markers of irony, with 
conflicting results (Attardo et al., 2003; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, 
Wagner, & Urios-Aparisi, 2011). Less attention has been devoted to non-ironical 
humour and most of the literature is limited to staged humour, with just a handful 
of studies focusing on spontaneous humour (Attardo, Pickering & Baker, 2011; 
Flamson, Bryant, & Barret 2011).  
Humour production in face-to-face interaction: A multimodal and cognitive study 18
 
Attardo, Wagner, and Urios-Aparisi (2011) linked multimodality in humour 
to underlying cognitive processes, such as metaphor or blending. In fact, under 
cognitive linguistics, any instance of communication is related to those cognitive 
processes and our conceptualisation of the world as the bases to produce 
linguistic units with meaning. Multimodal communication should be no different. 
It just brings in other channels of communication, i.e. modes or modalities, more 
explicitly, apart from the segmental channel (see Langacker, 2001). 
2.4.1 Prosody, gestures, and humour 
2.4.1.1 Prosody and humour 
To date, no consistent prosodic markers associated with humour have 
been found (Attardo et al., 2003; Pickering et al., 2009; Attardo, Pickering, & 
Baker, 2011; Bertrand & Priego-Valverde, 2011; Urios-Aparisi & Wagner, 2011; 
Attardo et al., 2013). Pickering et al. (2009) found that punch lines in humour 
narratives were delivered at a lower pitch, but concluded that it was due to the 
fact that they occurred at the end of a paratone, thus following usual narrative 
intonation patterns. However, a similar study conducted on jab lines (Attardo, 
Pickering, & Baker, 2011) defined as one-liners occurring anywhere in the 
conversation and not as the final part of a narrative structure, concluded that they 
were not prosodically marked. Furthermore, they found no statistically significant 
differences between narrative, ironical, and conversational humour in terms of 
pitch or volume. Punch lines, however, seem to be delivered at a lower speech 
rate, while ironical humour is delivered at a slightly higher pitch. In the same 
study, Attardo, Pickering, and Baker (2011) pointed to smiles and laughter as 
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possible indices of humour, and as differential elements between punch and jab 
lines. They found that whereas punch lines were delivered with a deadpan face 
and acknowledged with a smile or laughter (Hay, 2001), jab lines were always 
delivered with a smile or laughter. 
On the contrary, Archakis, Giakomelou, Papazachariou, and Tsakona 
(2010), who looked into the prosodic cues used to mark humorous turns, 
concluded that jab lines in humorous narratives are marked by pauses, slower 
pace and higher intensity. However, methodological issues arise from their study 
(Attardo et al., 2013; Gironzetti, 2017), as they used pause-based intonational 
units to segment speech. In addition, they set the lower limit for pauses at 0.3 
seconds, which is defined as very short pauses (Brown et al., 1980), thus not 
significant enough to mark a conspicuous silence.  
Bird (2011) found certain prosodic features associated with riddles that tell 
them apart from non-humorous conversational Wh-questions. Prosody can also 
be used for humorous effects (Wennerstrom, 2001, 2011; Wennerstrom & Siegel, 
2003). For example, using changes in key and paratones, or using lower pitch to 
play down the importance of certain elements to later maximise the humorous 
effect. The intonation of contrast and the intonation of given information contribute 
to the humorous effect of jokes, as cohesive devices of discourse which enable 
the listener to track down cohesive links that may not be obvious in the purely 
linguistic form of the utterance (Wennerstrom, 2011). Punch lines are funnier 
when there is a mismatch between linguistic and intonational cohesion signals, 
which contributes to heightening the incongruity underlying humour. 
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2.4.1.2 Prosody and irony 
A survey of the literature, then, shows that most studies have found no 
consistent markers of humorous speech, as compared to serious discourse. This 
is a counterintuitive notion, especially given the abundance of studies claiming 
that irony, for instance, is associated with certain intonation patterns (Rockwell, 
2000; Attardo et al., 2003; Cheang & Pell, 2009; González-Fuente, Escandell-
Vidal, & Prieto, 2015; etc.). These studies have yielded a wide range of often 
conflicting results, whereby irony is associated with flat (Haiman, 1998), rising 
intonation (Schaffer, 1982), higher (Rockwell, 2000) and lower pitch (Haiman, 
1998; Anolli, Ciceri, & Infantino, 2000), heavy exaggerated pitch (Adachi, 1996) 
and relatively monotonous intonation (Haiman, 1998), etc. Given this varied array 
of results, the question arises as to what extent we can consider any of those 
intonation patterns to be a marker of irony. In fact, Attardo et al. (2003) claimed 
that there is no such thing as an ironic intonation, but rather that pitch and 
changes in prosody are just contrastive markers.  
Cheang and Pell (2009) conducted a study on prosodic markers of 
sarcasm in Cantonese and English. They found differences in speech rate, voice 
quality, frequency, and resonance between sincere and sarcastic utterances. 
However, prosodic patterns were not the same in both languages, which led the 
authors to claim that prosody is key to show non-literal intention in speech, but 
conventions vary among languages. They also argued that certain sarcastic 
expressions were so entrenched in the language/culture ─what Haiman (1998) 
refers to as enantiosemantic expressions─ that they became markers of sarcasm 
themselves without the need of any underlying prosodic cue.  
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González-Fuente et al. (2015) found that some ironic utterances are 
punctuated by audiovisual behaviour that they call “gestural codas”, which greatly 
facilitate the comprehension of the utterance by the hearer as ironic. They 
considered irony to be a phenomenon beyond the traditional view based on the 
opposition between what is said and what is meant, as there are instances in 
which the speaker means what they say and still wants to be ironic. Therefore, 
they endorsed a more comprehensive approach to irony as a phenomenon in 
which discrepancies between expectations and reality are showcased. Their 
study bore out former claims made by Attardo et al. (2013) pointing to the lack of 
markers of irony, which can be signalled by speakers relying on different verbal 
and non-verbal clues, not just specific to irony. González-Fuente et al. (2015) 
frame the use of these cues, and in particular of gestural codas, within a 
Relevance Theory account of humour (Yus, 2003, 2016), as tools to reduce the 
cognitive effort required from the hearer to interpret the ironic nature of the 
utterance. Prosody and gesture, according to them, are just pragmatic facilitators. 
Along this line, Tabacaru (2014) found a correlation of prosodic patterns with 
humorous, mostly sarcastic, utterances, whereby words allowing for a number of 
implicatures are stressed.  
Haiman (1998) explained that sarcasm is a form of metalanguage, as it 
conveys the speaker’s feelings about the utterance rather than its propositional 
content. A series of what he called indices are used to signal that the utterance 
has to be interpreted as sarcastic. He listed the following mechanisms as possible 
cues to underline the sarcastic metamessage of a given utterance (1998, pp. 30 
– 33): sneers and laughter (linked to nasalisation); inverse pitch obstruction, i.e. 
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the stressed syllable uttered at a lower pitch than the surrounding material; 
intonational misfits, defined as inappropriate intonation, such as exaggeration or 
caricature, falsetto, heavy sarcasm ─combination of stress and relatively 
monotonous intonation─, separation by heavy pauses or sing-song intonation. 
Haiman acknowledged, though, that these indices are not exclusive to sarcasm; 
they point to the insincerity of what is being said, or to the discord or distance 
between the speaker’s real feelings and the utterance, so we could assume that 
they could be indices for any utterance in which the propositional content cannot 
be taken at face value, therefore, they could apply to non-ironical humour as well. 
Rockwell (2000) found out that sarcastic utterances are delivered at a 
lower pitch, slower tempo and higher intensity than non-sarcastic utterances. It is 
interesting to note, though, that while in her study participants were able to 
recognise posed sarcasm just by means of vocal cues, they were unable to tell 
spontaneous sarcasm apart from non-sarcasm. This suggests that posed, i.e. 
staged, sarcasm is delivered with exaggerated features, which may be the case 
also for gestures. Hence the importance of working with spontaneous, natural 
speech despite the obvious difficulties. Finally, she saw sarcasm as an 
expression of mild negative emotions, arguing that for stronger negative emotions 
speakers may resort to stronger verbal and vocal tools, e.g. insults, starker 
changes in F0, etc. She also recognised that studies linking emotion to prosodic 
features are often inconsistent regarding their findings. 
Attardo et al. (2003) established three broad categories of prosodic 
patterns in ironic utterances: 
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a) Strong within-statement contrast: characterised by consecutive 
phrases with extremely high and extremely low pitch range 
respectively. In the literature, extreme contrast is linked to high 
emotional meaning, so this pattern could be explained so as to 
convey the feelings of the speaker rather than the literal meaning of 
the utterance. Following Rockwell (2000), this could point to 
stronger feelings in the speaker requiring more exaggerated 
features. 
b) Compressed pitch pattern: little change in pitch; flat intonation. 
Wennerstrom (2001) associates compressed intonation to 
parenthetical remarks, so it could be used to show that the sarcastic 
utterance is not really part of the normal flow of speech, and 
therefore its communicative value lies elsewhere. 
c) Pronounced pitch accents: all content words heavily stressed by 
means of higher pitch. As high pitch is generally accepted to be 
used to underline certain words, it could be argued that this 
intonation pattern would signal that special attention is required 
from the listener to process the sarcastic utterance. 
As hitherto explained, Haiman’s (1998) hypothesis, fully in line with Attardo 
et al.’s (2003) findings, is borne out by empirical studies regarding irony and 
sarcasm, as the common thread of the various intonation patterns found in the 
literature point to the notion of exaggeration and fake. Nevertheless, no such 
patterns have empirically been associated to non-ironical and non-sarcastic 
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humour, which most linguistic theories base on some form of incongruity; that is, 
a clash between the expectations held on an utterance and its actual instantiation 
(Attardo, 1994; Giora, 1998; Attardo, 2001; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Forabosco, 
2008; Veale, 2015; Dynel, 2018, etc.). For example, in Alec Baldwin’s interview, 
upon taking his seat, right after being welcome by the host and by the audience 
with a very big round of applause, he thanks the audience and stresses that they 
are very nice people. Then he utters: “It’s nice and chilly in here”, which causes 
a bout of laughter in the audience. I posit that humour in this utterance arises 
from a clash in expectations about what he was supposed to say, e.g. “it’s nice, 
what a warm welcome”, etc., and the fact that he actually states that it is “chilly”. 
Furthermore, ‘chilly’ is reinforced with higher pitch, a nod and a smile.  
One possible explanation of the absence of markers in humour as opposed 
to irony may be that prosodic cues are used only as metalanguage showing 
affect, that is, the position and feelings of the speaker with regards to the 
utterance. In the case of humour, it can be argued that there is no such 
detachment between the speaker and the humorous text. Both sarcastic/ironical 
and humorous utterances are manipulated by the speaker, but in two distinct 
ways. Sarcastic/ironical utterances are manipulated to show what the speaker 
thinks about the utterance. Humorous speech, on the other hand, is manipulated 
to mislead the hearer to a false interpretation to be subsequently proved wrong 
in order to achieve the humorous effect (Tabacaru, 2014), as in example (2) 
below, in which General Hayden gives the impression that he is going to tell a big 
secret only to reverse that idea and make clear that he will not. If that is the case, 
we are confronted to two different phenomenon and there is therefore no reason 
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to expect they are conveyed resorting to the same kind of metalinguistic or 
multimodal mechanisms (Bryant, 2010).  
(2) General Hayden:  Can you keep a secret? 
Stephen Colbert:  Turn off the cameras…I can keep a secret. 
General Hayden: Me too. 
Another explanation put forward to account for the difference between 
ironic and non-ironic humour in terms of multimodal marking associates the lack 
of markers to signal humour with an in-group expression of bonding on the part 
of the speaker, as relying on the common ground assumed to be shared with the 
interlocutors, and necessary for humour to be comprehended, thus 
demonstrating the affinity between participants (Tabacaru, 2014). 
2.4.1.3 Contrast as a marker 
Bryant (2010) rejected the existence of consistent prosodic patterns for 
ironic utterances. First, he established that since different subtypes of irony 
convey different affective states, e.g. sarcasm – negative; jocularity – playful, etc., 
it is only to be expected that prosodic features will be different for each of those 
types. He linked irony utterances to prosodic contrast, regardless of what acoustic 
variables change. Prosodic contrast was defined as “a statistically reliable shift 
between adjacent phrasal units in at least 1 of 5 acoustic dimensions (mean 
fundamental frequency, fundamental frequency variability, mean amplitude, 
amplitude variability, and mean syllable duration)” (Bryant, 2010, p. 545). His data 
suggested that ironic utterances are delivered with greater contrast from adjacent 
phrases, but that contrast is varied with regards to the parameters changed and 
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the direction of those changes. The only consistent feature linked to ironic 
utterances is that they are delivered at a significantly slower rate, which may be 
explained as a way to facilitate processing by the listener, as more cognitive effort 
is needed to interpret this type of utterances (Sperber & Wilson, 2004).  
Nevertheless, Bryant (2010) acknowledged that contrast is not exclusive 
to irony. It is a prosodic tool at the speaker’s disposal to help disambiguate 
meaning. Prosody may be used to convey or stress linguistic meaning (focus, 
stress) and affective meaning (the speaker’s attitude). But in any speaking 
context, the interplay between verbal and vocal communication is highly complex, 
and trade-offs may be needed, as the prosodic features necessary to mark 
linguistic and affective information may conflict with each other.  
The notion of contrast (Attardo et al., 2003; Bryant, 2010) was also 
advocated by Urios-Aparisi and Wagner (2011) as the motivation underlying the 
use of prosody for humorous purposes. They argued that there are not prosodic 
markers of humour as such, but rather that prosody is used for the performance 
of humour, as opposed to competence, and therefore cannot be dissociated from 
its pragmatic value. I argue that all communication is inherently multimodal and 
that both the production and comprehension of utterances, whether humorous or 
not, inevitably hinge upon a wide range of multimodal, cognitive, and 
communicative tools at hand: language, prosody, gestures, background 
knowledge, context, and discourse (Langacker, 2001). An illustration can be 
found in example (3) below, where Daniel Kaluuya is teasing Stephen Colbert by 
mimicking a previous remark made by the host. The humorous nature of (3) can 
only be understood in the context of the interview, knowing what Stephen Colbert 
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had said first, why it had been picked up by Daniel Kaluuya to mock the host, i.e. 
because it showcased a certain awkwardness due to racial differences, being 
aware that racial issues was the main topic in the film they are discussing, starred 
by Daniel Kaluuya. Crucially, only by seeing and listening to Daniel Kaluuya’s 
speech and multimodal behaviour (mimicking gestures, smile, etc.), can the 
humorous intent be fully apprehended.  
(3) Daniel Kaluuya:  It’s like…What would I say…If I was 
white…What would I…? 
 
   
      Figure 1. Daniel Kaluuya mocking Stephen Colbert. 
 
Interestingly, Flamson et al. (2011) argued that as humour comprehension 
is influenced by context, the more background information is shared by the 
participants in the interaction, the less marking would be necessary for humour 
to be interpreted. In other words, the larger the intended audience of the 
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humorous utterance, the more salient this humour will need to be made in order 
to ensure it is successfully conveyed (Attardo et al., 2003).  
This is precisely one of the reasons why I believe that staged humour 
cannot always be taken as a reliable proxy of spontaneous humour. Humour 
needs to be marked ostentatiously to make sure the audience will not miss it. 
Furthermore, actors do not improvise humour, they enact rehearsed and carefully 
scripted situations. Therefore, the cognitive processes involved in this enactment 
of humour are arguably not the same as the ones involved in the production of 
spontaneous humour, therefore drawing on a different kind of multimodal 
devices. 
In light of the above, there seems to be no consistent markers of humour. 
Instead, prosodic and gestural cues, not specific to humour utterances, are 
sometimes used to communicate humour more effectively. The patterns and 
salience of the indices involved will eventually depend on the pragmatic context 
in which humour is conveyed. As Bryant (2011, p.306) puts it, “prosodic 
production […] can only be understood in the larger framework of language use, 
vocal signalling, and the evolution of communication and cognition”. 
2.4.1.4 Gestures and humour 
As mentioned before, Attardo et al. (2003) pointed to the blank face as a 
possible marker of irony or sarcasm. However, they placed special emphasis on 
drawing a distinction between marker and phenomenon: an ironic utterance will 
be ironic even in the absence of any marker: blank face or prosodic cues, etc. In 
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other words, the markers associated with irony in the literature do not confer the 
ironic character to the utterance.  
Attardo et al. (2003) further claimed that there seems to be a hierarchy of 
cues leading to successful communication: behavioural, e.g. laughter, smile, 
gestures in general; intonational, and semantic. However, this hierarchy has not 
yet been conclusively borne out or rejected by research (Attardo et al., 2003, p. 
4). They added that these cues have metacommunicative, i.e. communicate 
about the utterance, or paracommunicative, i.e. communicate besides the 
utterance, value, insofar as that they alert the hearer about a certain non-regular 
interpretation of what is being said (ironic, humorous). They posited that both 
intonational cues and gestures, such as a blank face, function as contrastive 
markers signalling irony. 
Attardo, Wagner, and Urios-Aparisi (2011) compiled different ironical 
gestural cues appearing in the literature (Muecke, 1978; Attardo et al., 2003): 
eyes (wide open, squinting, rolling, winking); nodding; lip tightening; smiling; 
blank face, prosody-face incongruity; gaze aversion. It is not clear whether these 
are intentional or involuntary signals. Only intentional ─albeit maybe unconscious 
as entrenched conventionalised forms of communication─ signs can be 
considered as markers (Attardo et al., 2003). Non-intentional signals are defined 
as leaks (Ekman, 1979). Leaks are just giveaways showing the speaker’s attitude 
and feelings. Furthermore, the mere co-occurrence of gestures/prosodic patterns 
with humorous utterances is not enough to consider them markers, especially if 
they also co-occur with non-humorous communication (Attardo, Pickering, & 
Baker, 2011). For example, in Attardo et al. (2013), laughter and smile are used 
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to frame humorous turns or chunks of speech, but they cannot be considered 
markers, as they are not consistently associated with humour nor do they 
integrate with the humorous part, namely, the punch line. They are just used by 
the interlocutors as switches from non-humorous to humorous communication. 
Tabacaru and Lemmens (2014) argued that raised eyebrows are gestural 
triggers prompting the hearer to take the utterance as humorous, ironic, or 
sarcastic. Gestural triggers co-occur with humour and contribute to meaning 
making. They placed gestural triggers among the discourse gestures defined by 
Müller (2004), used to punctuate speech, favouring the pragmatic analysis over 
the semantic view that this gesture would be associated with an expression of 
human emotion, namely surprise, as far as raised eyebrows are concerned 
(Guaiatella et al., 2009). 
2.4.1.5. Markers, indices, and indicators 
A terminological clarification is needed with regards to the different terms 
used in the literature to refer to the multimodal cues used to possibly signal 
humour, irony, sarcasm, etc. Analysing multimodal markers of irony and sarcasm, 
Attardo (2000b) first established a difference between factors, as necessary 
constituents of irony the lack of which implies there is not irony, e.g. contextual 
inappropriateness, the presence of two distinct meanings, etc. (Attardo, 2000a; 
Attardo et al., 2003), and markers, which can help to signal irony and facilitate its 
understanding, but that are not essential to the phenomenon. In other words, 
irony will still occur even if those markers are removed.  
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Markers mainly serve to communicate the metamessage that a certain 
utterance or turn is intended as ironical, or humorous (Attardo, Pickering, & 
Baker, 2011). Multimodal cues can only be considered as markers if they are 
intentional, which does not necessarily mean that they are made consciously. 
Attardo, Wagner, and Urios-Aparisi (2011) argued that markers need to be “at 
least implicitly intended by the speaker to facilitate the recognition of the 
humorous/ironical intention” (p. 196). That is, a signal can be made unconsciously 
to mark humour as a result of deeply entrenched conventionalisation, but it would 
still be considered intentional in the weak sense just described, as it is precisely 
its use as a marker of humour what has been conventionalised and embedded in 
our behaviour.  
Unintentional cues, such as spontaneous laughter, are named indicators 
(Attardo et al., 2011, p. 197). The authors considered that this is a very significant 
difference, as indicators would not fall within ostensive communication from a 
pragmatic point of view. A further distinction is drawn between indices, as 
unintentional leaks (Ekman, 1979) of humour, and indicators, the difference being 
that the latter would always co-occur with humour (Gironzetti, 2017).  
In my view, this classification does not bode well with a multimodal 
perspective. First, following the definition and the few examples of factors offered 
by Attardo (Attardo, 2000; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011), I argue that they 
are semantic-pragmatic in nature, consequently not relevant for a strictly 
multimodal analysis of humour. In addition, no indicators have been found in the 
literature so far (Gironzetti, 2017), so their existence is not warranted empirically. 
With regards to the distinction between markers and indicators/indices, I find that 
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it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to judge on the intentionality of the 
multimodal cues produced by speakers, leaving aside highly symbolic and 
language-like signs, such as emblems or sign language (cf. Chapter 3).  
The line between intended but unconscious markers and unintentional 
indices on the basis of deeply entrenched conventionalisation is too thin. No 
criteria to differentiate what is the product of embedded culture from what is fully 
spontaneous, to the extent that is unintended, are provided. I have found none in 
the literature. Finally, if a certain multimodal behaviour to signal humour had 
become entrenched and conventionalised precisely for that particular purpose, 
one could expect to find such behaviour recurrently associated with humour. The 
fact that no multimodal cue has to date been consistently and unequivocally 
linked to humour leads me to at least question Attardo’s premise.  
As a matter of fact, I claim that the intended/unintended distinction is 
irrelevant for a multimodal analysis (Ekman, 1979), as unintentional signs do not 
need to be excluded from the study of communication. Regardless of whether 
multimodal signs are intended or unintended, they contribute to facilitating 
communication and comprehension of the message by the hearer, i.e. meaning 
is attributed to these signals whether they have been intentionally produced or 
not (Flecha-García, 2010). 
2.5 Linguistic humour studies 
Linguistic humour studies have been undertaken from different 
perspectives. What follows is an account of those theories and authors that have 
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had a major influence on current research, either in support or against such 
approaches. A critical analysis is provided as the theories are presented. 
Before explaining the most influential theories more in detail, I would like 
to touch upon a recurrent topic in linguistic theories of humour, as it is dealt with 
and referred to in many of the approaches which will be subsequently explained: 
humour as a violation of Grice’s maxims (1989).  
In his paper “Logic and Conversation” (1989), Grice described certain 
parameters (maxims) governing conversation, understood as a rational process, 
falling under a general Cooperative Principle (CP). He stated that as rational 
beings, humans could be expected to want to actually communicate ─be 
cooperative─ and follow certain guidelines when speaking to each other, which 
can be summarised as follows: 
a) Maxim of quality: be truthful. 
b) Maxim of relation: be relevant, thus informative. 
c) Maxim of quantity: say no more nor less than what is required to be 
informative. 
d) Maxim of manner: be clear, avoiding ambiguity and obscurity. 
He also claimed that speakers could flout, i.e. intentionally violate, some 
of those guidelines, in order to point to the need of inferring non-literal meaning, 
thus creating implicatures. He further classified implicatures into conventional 
implicatures, i.e. inherent to the utterance, detachable but not cancellable, and 
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conversational implicatures, i.e. cancellable but not detachable, as no other way 
of saying the same thing could be found. 
A widespread assumption in the literature is that humour involves the 
violation of one or more of Grice’s maxims (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1994; Yus, 
2016). Grice established that in order to maintain the cooperative principle and 
achieve communication, a maxim can be ‘flouted’ by the speaker to lead to a 
given implication. But maxims are violated only when the speaker’s 
communicative intention is not cooperative. However, humour scholars argue 
that humour does imply the violation, and not just mere flouting, of Grice’s maxims 
(Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 2001). This would therefore result in the paradox that 
humour is not cooperative in terms of communication, so this apparent paradox 
in humour communication must be accounted for (Attardo, 1994). 
One explanation put forward by Sperber and Wilson (1986), followed-up 
later by Yamaguchi (1988), is the mention theory, claiming that in the case of 
humorous texts, the violation of Grice’s maxims is not real, but enacted (Attardo, 
1994). According to this theory, the speaker would pretend to be violating the 
cooperative principle by just mentioning the utterance or echoing the violation 
committed by a character in the joke. However, this mention theory does not 
withstand many examples of jokes, such as the following, extracted from Attardo 
(1994, p. 285): 
(4)  Have you heard the latest? 
 No? Well, neither have I. 
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In this example it cannot be said that the speaker is just mentioning the 
utterance or echoing a character in the joke, as there is no assumption of a role 
or clear referent to be mentioned. Therefore, the violation of Grice’s maxim of 
relevance is not enacted (Attardo, 1994). 
Another attempt to resolve the paradox comes from Raskin (1985), 
supported by Attardo (1994). They set a difference between bona fide (BF) 
communication, to which Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP) applies, and non 
bona fide (NBF) communication, with its own CP and set of maxims, under which 
humour falls.  
a) Maxim of quality: say only what is compatible with the world of the joke. 
b) Maxim of quantity: give exactly as much information as is necessary for the 
joke. 
c) Maxim of relation: say only what is relevant to the joke. 
d) Maxim of manner: tell the joke efficiently. 
NBF differs from Grice’s flouting in that in NBF a maxim is not violated to 
implicate information, but because a different CP is followed. 
As further explained in section 2.5.2, Yus (2003, 2016) rejected this claim 
and went around the paradox of the seemingly non-cooperative nature of humour 
appealing to Relevance Theory (RT). He argued that the humorous intention is 
mutually manifest to the interlocutors, who then cooperate to achieve relevant 
communication. Relevance, in this case, lies on the eventual positive 
interpretation of the humorous text and the amusement, laughter, etc. entailed. 
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He further claimed that inferential strategies must be the same for humorous and 
non-humorous texts alike, as humans can resort to one single ability to interpret 
and comprehend any given input.  
Using RT terminology, I argue that communication occurs even when it is 
not ostensive. We cannot help but to communicate by means of gestures, facial 
expressions, gaze, etc. even if we do not mean to. Therefore, any account of 
communication including only those instances in which interlocutors clearly show 
they want to communicate is leaving aside many instances of communicative 
situations in which that desire to communicate is neither ostensive nor manifest.  
In fact, this is precisely where cognitive linguistics and semiotics intersect, 
understanding semiotics as the science exploring meaning-making resources, 
intentional or not. However, whereas semiotics places emphasis on how meaning 
is produced and interpreted through signs, cognitive linguistics is more concerned 
with how meaning is created as a result of conceptualisation (Croft & Cruse, 
2004; Evans & Green, 2006). Signs are just the visible results of embodied and 
experiential cognitive processes allowing us to apprehend the world around us. 
We conceptualise such world in domains leading to meaning-units, eventually 
shaped into multimodal signs, which can ultimately be multimodally, 
pragmatically, and semantically interpreted by an audience.  
Grice’s account of communication applies to prototypical rational 
conversations between mainly cooperative beings. If we admit that humour is 
produced and enjoyed as a liberating aesthetic experience (Morreal, 1983), we 
may assume that it is not entirely rational ─understood as governed by the laws 
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of logic─. Consequently, Grice’s theory may not be the best suited to account for 
humorous communication. 
2.5.1 Semantic-pragmatic approach 
2.5.1.1 Raskin’s Semantic Script Theory of Humour 
The Semantic Script Theory of Humour (SSTH) (Raskin, 1985) was 
designed to explain the speaker’s humour competence in an idealised 
communicative (humorous) situation. Therefore, it is rooted in Chomky’s 
generative grammar (Attardo, 1994). 
SSTH is based on the notion of ‘script’, that is, a set of organised 
prototypical contextual and lexical information in the mind of the speaker and 
addressee. Yus (2016) argued that scripts are merely sequences of actions, but 
Attardo’s accounts of SSTH (1994, 2001) included information such as place, 
time, and related vocabulary linked to those actions. Attardo (1994, p.199) 
equated the notion of script to that of Fillmore’s ‘frames’, among other terms used 
to refer to this kind of cognitive structures, stating that the difference is merely 
terminological. Scripts link to form semantic networks including lexical and non-
lexical scripts as well as all the links. Semantic networks contain all the 
information a speaker has about their culture (Attardo, 1994). 
SSTH applies solely to single jokes, not to larger texts or other types of 
humour. Raskin’s theory predicts humour will occur if the following conditions are 
met: (a) the joke text is compatible with two different scripts, which fully or partially 
overlap; (b) both scripts are opposite. 
Humour production in face-to-face interaction: A multimodal and cognitive study 38
 
Scripts may be combined in different ways leading to various meanings. 
Coherent interpretations yielded by these combinations will be stored as the 
meaning of the text, which is then considered to be well-formed (Attardo, 1994). 
Occasionally, texts may be compatible with different scripts. When the scripts 
overlapping are opposed to each other, humour occurs, as in example (5), taken 
from Raskin (1985, p.11): 
(5)  “Is the doctor at home?”, the patient asked in his bronchial whisper. 
“No”, the doctor’s young and pretty wife whispered in reply. “Come 
right in”. 
In (5) two possible scripts are elicited by the joke. One, more salient (Giora, 
1991) script, in which the patient goes to the doctor’s house to seek medical 
assistance. Another, less salient script, in which the patient is seeking to spend 
time alone with the doctor’s wife. In the latter, intimacy is conveyed through the 
whispering tone of the conversation. The patient whispers because he has chest 
infection; the doctor’s wife whispers as a sign of intimacy. The hearer is 
compelled to switch scripts by a section in the text which acts as a script-switch 
trigger. In (5), this trigger would be the “Come right in” invitation by the doctor’s 
wife.  
Script-opposition may be of three different categories: actual/non-actual; 
normal/abnormal; possible/impossible. Raskin went one step further and broke 
down these three categories into 5 types of instantiations: good/bad; life/death; 
obscene/non-obscene; money/no-money; high/low-stature (Raskin, 1985). I 
agree with Attardo (1994) when he claims that this is a rather limited list of 
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instantiations, and that it may be expanded and changed depending on cultural 
differences. Furthermore, Raskin (1985) argued that jokes only seem to violate 
Grice’s maxims, whereas they followed a different set of maxims defining non-
bona fide communication (NBF), whereby speakers are not committed to telling 
the truth. 
Attardo (2003) claimed that SSTH fully integrates semantics and 
pragmatics, but I argue that it is essentially a semantic theory, as the humorous 
nature of the text ―namely, the joke― is eventually placed on the text itself and 
not on the context or the communicative situation. Also, as one of its main 
premises is to account for the speaker’s humorous competence and its object of 
study is an idealised communicative situation, it explicitly leaves out the 
pragmatic value of context in the production of humour. 
As I see it, the complex nature of humour makes any analysis based on a 
single approach incomplete. The SSTH constitutes a valid first-step analysis. 
Humour may lie, among other things, in the semantic value of texts (or 
utterances).The SSTH provides a valid framework to start to grasp how humour 
is created. In fact, Attardo (2001) stressed the semantic-pragmatic value of SSTH 
in his own revision of the theory, his General Theory of Verbal Humor (GTVH), 
explained in section 2.5.1.2, pointing that text-processing occurs simultaneously 
at syntax, semantic and pragmatic level.  
2.5.1.2 Attardo’s General Theory of Verbal Humour 
Attardo (1994) portrayed his General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH) 
(Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Attardo, 2001) as a revision of Raskin’s SSTH, in order 
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to account for any kind of humorous texts, including larger texts. GTVH goes 
beyond semantics to become a linguistic theory at large. 
GGTV considers script opposition to be just one of 6 knowledge resources 
(KR) necessary to produce humour (Attardo, 1994, p.27): 
a) SO – Script Opposition: taken from SSTH. 
b) LM – Logical Mechanism: the logical relation between both scripts (false 
analogies, juxtaposition, etc.). This is the cognitive mechanism used to 
solve the incongruity leading to humour. 
c) TA – Target: the target of the joke (in aggressive humour; non-aggressive 
humour have a 0 value in this parameter). 
d) NS – narrative strategy: the structure of the text (narrative, dialogue, etc.). 
e) LA – language: the information necessary to place language elements in 
the right place and correctly verbalise the text.  
f) SI – situation: the situation in which the text is placed (participants, 
settings, etc.). 
According to GTVH, humour arises from different combinations of the 
values assigned to KR. Attardo’s theory establishes a hierarchy whereby each 
parameter is constrained by those above and determines those below: 
SO → LM → SI → TA → NS → LA 
Veale et al. (2006), however, argued that KRs cannot be analysed in 
isolation and that they interplay all along the humour interpretation process. For 
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Brône and Feyaerts (2003), GTVH is essentially a cognitive theory, as it aims at 
explaining humorous use of language drawing on parameters of different kinds, 
among which the LM is cognitive in nature. They argued that the broader 
cognitive semantic notion of mapping can take Attardo’s LM even further in order 
to account for humour. Attardo (2001) states that the LM presupposes a playful 
logic which may not exist outside the joke, and that it embodies the resolution of 
such joke (ibid. p.25). Finally, although GTVH aims at being a comprehensive 
linguistic theory of verbal humour, expanding its scope beyond canned jokes to 
include larger texts, Attardo himself acknowledged that “its application to 
conversational humour is less than straightforward” (ibid. p. 68). 
2.5.2 Relevance theory applied to humour studies  
Yus (2016) defined Relevance Theory as a cognitive pragmatic theory of 
human communication, aiming at explaining the mental process undertaken by 
speakers in the production of utterances, as well as the inferential strategies 
allowing addressees to process and interpret those utterances. He argued that 
the mental mechanisms at stake are universal, and are therefore applicable also 
to humorous communication. This claim is tantamount to saying that humorous 
discourse is not interpreted by means of special procedures, but on the basis of 
a “single cognitive criterion” (Yus, 2016 p. xv). 
Curcó (1997) also framed her study on humour within Relevance Theory. 
She disagreed with the traditional claim that humorous discourse is somehow 
deviant from the standard use of language. She argued that texts are not 
humorous per se, and that the humorous effect lies in the mental processes 
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undertaken by the hearer during the interpretation phase. Interpretation of an 
utterance hinges on two stages: decoding the lexico-semantic component and 
inferences made on the basis of ostensive communication. The intended 
meaning of an utterance may be made ostensive by the speaker through various 
verbal and paraverbal means, such as multimodal cues (gestures, intonation, 
gaze, etc.). 
In humorous communication the speaker clearly marks some sort of 
detachment from what they are uttering. While acknowledging the incongruity-
based nature of humour, Curcó (ibid.) argued that humour does not stem from 
incongruity-resolution, but from the inferential process triggered by its production 
and the cognitive effects on the hearer.  
Relevance Theory (RT) (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) claims that human 
cognition is set to maximise relevance; that is, to obtain as much information as 
possible from inputs received in a communicative situation, verbal or otherwise, 
with as little cognitive effort as possible.  
In humorous communication, though, it is clear that jokes or other forms of 
humorous utterances are not necessarily very informative, as in (6), already 
presented above: 
(6)  Have you heard the latest? 
 No? Well, neither have I. 
Furthermore, humour comprehension does take additional cognitive effort 
on the part of the hearer. This additional effort, though, is compensated by the 
humorous effect: pleasure in incongruity resolution, laughter (tension release), 
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group bonding, etc. RT is based on three major theoretical assumptions: that all 
humans seek the maximum relevance in communication, that inputs in ostensive 
communication are presupposed to be optimally relevant, and that all utterances 
are less informative than what they are meant to communicate (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986). In other words, the pragmatic value of an utterance always goes beyond 
its semantic value. 
RT also claims that humans are endowed with a mind-reading ability (Yus, 
2016) enabling speakers to make predictions about how their utterances will be 
interpreted. This is crucial for the production of humour, as the speaker can 
foresee what interpretation is more likely to be favoured by the hearer, i.e. the 
most relevant, to use it as a bait to mislead the hearer toward it before producing 
the humorous effect, associated with a less likely ─a priori less relevant─ 
interpretation.  
For RT, the process of coding and decoding utterances, humorous or not, 
is just a first step in communication, which relies mainly on inferences; that is, the 
interpretation of that utterance, or, as Yus (2016, p. xvii) put it: “turning the 
schematic coded discourse into meaningful and relevant interpretations”.  
We can also state, using standard RT terminology, that interpretation of an 
utterance involves for the addressee first to work out the explicature, decoding 
the semantic value, and, when necessary, move on to infer the implicature of that 
utterance, i.e. what is not explicitly said but implicated by the speaker. A further 
distinction is drawn between implicature ─intended to be communicated by the 
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speaker, albeit not explicitly─ and implication, understood as what can be inferred 
but was not intended to be communicated.  
Yus (2016) pointed to two universal cognitive systems leading to two 
different types of inferences: inferential, to process the utterance, and social, to 
compare inferences made with stored cultural information. He claimed both 
systems are activated simultaneously and argued that the social system is 
culture-specific.  
To me, our conceptualisation of the world ―which cannot be dissociated 
from our experience of it, and is therefore necessarily embodied and culture-
bound― affects how we communicate in general: how we produce and interpret 
communicative inputs, verbal or otherwise. In my view, there is only one cognitive 
system allowing us to process communication through the combination of 
semiotic, semantic, pragmatic and cognitive elements.  
RT is only concerned with the pragmatic analysis of ostensive 
communication; that is, communication in which there are both a communicative 
intention on the part of the speaker and an informative intention, referring to the 
actual information that is meant to be conveyed. Accidental, non-ostensive 
communication is excluded from RT analysis (Yus, 2016). However, I argue that 
humorous communication may sometimes be non-ostensive, and still achieve to 
convey a humorous effect retrieved by the hearer. An example is an utterance 
whose humorous effect is only apparent to the interlocutors after it has been 
produced. In this case, the context renders that particular utterance humorous. 
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As a result, the utterance is a valid object of study for pragmatics. Let’s consider 
(7) below: 
(7) Susan Sarandon [in the middle of the interview, as she was talking 
about one of her films]:  And then, various other scripts…Oh, my 
god, look at your ceiling! 
In this case, there is no ostensive intent to produce humour on the part of 
the speaker; Susan Sarandon had been really taken aback by the ceiling when 
she accidentally looked up and saw it, but the effect of such statement ends up 
being humorous for the audience, which reacts to it laughing, as a result of the 
incongruity of making an out-of-place remark on the ceiling while in the middle of 
the interview. To me, the humorous effect in this case is grounded in the context, 
and not on the speaker’s ostensive humorous intention. 
In his Relevant Theory account of humour, Yus (2016) endorsed the 
incongruity-resolution theory, whereby the speaker manipulates the hearer to 
guide them to take a series of steps toward a given interpretation. This is possible 
because the speaker, as mentioned above, can predict what inferential strategies 
will be used by the hearer. That path is eventually reversed and the incongruity 
exposed in order to produce a humorous effect. 
As explained above, different humour theories (Raskin, 1985; Giora, 1991; 
Attardo, 1994, among others) assume that the incongruity arises from the clash 
between two opposing interpretations of the humorous utterance or text, 
depending of the theory. Those interpretations, in turn, are based on a certain 
mental representation of the situation elicited by the humorous input, which draws 
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on previously stored lexical and encyclopaedic information. Furthermore, Yus 
(2016) categorised humorous incongruity into two types: discourse-based and 
frame-based. Discourse-based incongruities relate to the inferential strategies 
applied to the input as such in order to retrieve the explicature, whereas frame-
based incongruities link to the situation mentally represented by the hearer on the 
basis of that input.  
Yus (2016) proposed an Intersecting Circles Model to account for 
humorous communication, whereby all humorous input involves predictions 
made by the reader about possible interpretations made by the audience on the 
basis of three areas or circles, namely utterance interpretation, make-sense 
frames and cultural frames. Although this new approach has the merit of doing 
away with a clear cut divide between verbal and cultural jokes found in previous 
research, I do not see the need to establish those distinct, possibly overlapping 
areas or circles. In my view, at any given time there is only one mental 
representation elicited by the communicative input including inseparable linguistic 
and cultural elements. I agree with Yus, though, that the cognitive processes 
involved in the production and comprehension of any kind of communication are 
the same, whether the purposes of communication are humorous or not.  
2.5.3 Humour and cognitive linguistics 
Meaning making in cognitive linguistics is based on usage and experience 
(Evans & Green, 2006; Geraeerts, 2008). Language structure is to a great extent 
determined by our experience of the world. Cognitive linguists consider that 
language is embodied and grammar is conceptualisation (Croft & Cruse, 2004). 
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Language and cognition, therefore, cannot be separated, and are influenced by 
the interplay between social, cultural, psychological, communicative and 
functional elements (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003).  
In cognitive linguistics, artificial boundaries between syntax, semantics 
and pragmatics disappear, and humour is considered as a phenomenon in which 
the same cognitive-semantic strategies underlie its different instantiations: verbal 
and non-verbal humour, puns, etc. (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003). Cognitive linguistics 
provides a holistic umbrella for the study of humour, which cannot be considered 
as an isolated phenomenon arising from the non-prototypical use of language (or 
other modes of communication), but as part of a cognitive system in which 
humour is processed beyond mere linguistic mechanisms. In cognitive linguistics 
meaning stems from conceptualisation. A given situation may be conceptualised 
in different ways, which in turn leads to different semantic structures. Meaning is 
attained through construal operations (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Langacker, 2008). 
Conceptualisation is based on our experience of the world, which is categorized 
in frames. Frames are mental representations of the kind of experience elicited 
by a given sign or code (i.e., language, gestures, etc.) allowing us to produce and 
comprehend language mainly by means of analogy and comparison of the input 
received against that frame. In light of the above, humour related-incongruity 
involves two different mental representations or frames, compatible with the 
same input. This is the same idea underlying in Raskin’s SSTH and Attardo’s 
GTVH explained in previous sections, in which humour arises from the switch 
between frames or scripts in Raskin and Attardo’s terminology. 
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Following up on the same notion, Giora (1991) introduced the concept of 
salience in her theory of humour, in which the shift occurs from a more salient, 
foregrounded ―hence, prototypical, more conventionalised― interpretation of 
the humorous text to a second unexpected one. She developed the graded 
salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997), whereby there is always a more salient 
interpretation to an utterance, which is activated and accessed first. Only when 
that salient interpretation is not appropriate given the communicative context is 
the less salient meaning elicited. Humour arises from the ambiguity between the 
more salient interpretation and the actual, less salient, one leading to the 
humorous effect.  
Giora (1991) stated that the humorous input must be sufficiently innovative 
to surprise, but at the same time allow for an automatic retrieval of the less salient 
interpretation (optimal innovation hypothesis). Although this could be applied to 
many instances of jokes and humorous utterances, it does not account for absurd 
humour, which precisely draws on completely unintended interpretations. 
Therefore, it can hardly fall within a more or less salient representation of any 
given situation. Furthermore, in her studies on negative sarcastic she 
acknowledged that her graded salience hypothesis cannot account for the direct, 
or default in her own terms, interpretation of such utterances, e.g. ‘Punctuality is 
not his forte’, without the need to access the most salient, non-sarcastic 
interpretation first (Giora, Drucker, Fein, & Mendelson, 2015; Giora, Givoni, & 
Fein, 2015). Giora’s (1997) hypothesis can be linked to incongruity-resolution 
theories of humour through her optimal innovation hypothesis (Giora et al., 2017). 
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She argued that humour must imply a balanced processing difficulty, i.e. 
maximum possible relevance with the least possible cognitive effort. 
Meaning in cognitive linguistics is dynamically construed (Brône & 
Feyaerts, 2003). Construal mechanisms are used in humour, usually distorting 
some element in order to produce the humorous effect. According to these 
authors, humour research will be enhanced when considering construal 
mechanisms widely accounted for in cognitive linguistics literature, such as 
framing, metaphor, metonymy, conceptual integration, figure-ground patterns, 
etc.  
Coulson (2005a) and Coulson and Oakley (2005) focused on blending as 
one major process underlying humour. Blending, also called conceptual 
integration, involves the combination of elements from different cognitive 
representations or mental spaces. Typically, there is at least two input spaces, a 
generic space ─a representation of an underlying structure common to all 
spaces─ and the blended space, with elements from all input spaces and which 
can develop a semantic structure of its own (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002). 
Coulson (2005b) argued against Sperber and Wilson (1986) echoic 
mention to explain sarcasm, whereby sarcastic utterances are not used, but 
mentioned, thus signalling the distance between the speaker and what is being 
said. Speakers are just recalling a previous event, statement, etc. to convey their 
attitude towards it. Coulson claimed, however, that the echoic mention cannot 
account for all instances of irony, such as insincere questions or overpolite 
requests. She then moved on to assess pretence theory: previous statements, 
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norms, etc. are not echoed but alluded. The pretence space is shared by 
interlocutors and communication is based on Clark’s (1996) model of layered 
meaning: one layer being the actual communication space, the other the pretence 
space. She finally proposed a variant of pretence theory: the space structuring 
model (Coulson & Oakley, 2005), which accounts for irony resorting to blending, 
considering that Clark’s layers are very similar to Fauconnier’s mental spaces.  
Sarcasm and irony are explained by the fact that the listener is confronted 
to a blend which needs to be separated into the two input spaces: an expected 
reaction and a counterfactual trigger space (Coulson, 2005b). This is similar to 
Kyratzis (2003) notion of de-blending referring to metaphors. Coulson (2005b) 
further argued that humour and sarcasm are indirect forms of communication 
which trigger multiple mental spaces at the same time. Humorous or sarcastic 
blends usually foreground less salient constituents of the input spaces. This 
disanalogy is based on what’s expected/unexpected in humour, and what is 
normative/non-normative in sarcasm. Coulson claimed that this interplay clearly 
points to the fact that language use is not limited to the transfer of linguistic signs, 
but is rather based on human experience and interaction. Humorous, i.e. 
insincere, NBF communication, is possible because meaning is dynamically 
construed in large conceptual structures.  
The relation of metaphor and humour has also been explored under 
cognitive linguistics. Metaphor is a conceptualisation mechanism, whereby we 
assign features of a familiar phenomenon to a less well-known one in order to 
better comprehend the latter, a process known as mapping (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). Source and target domains are therefore blended, whereas in humour the 
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opposite ─often, but not always─ occurs, and attention is precisely drawn to the 
boundaries between both domains in a process of de-blending (Kyratzis, 2003). 
Analysing GGTV from a cognitive perspective, Attardo et al. (2003) considered 
structure mapping to establish similarities between opposing scripts as the key 
element allowing incongruity resolution.  
Other construal operations such as metonymy or viewpoint can also be 
resources drawn upon in order to produce humour. Different viewpoints imply 
different conceptualizations, therefore different mental spaces (Brône & Feyaerts, 
2003). Hyper-understanding and misunderstanding are hailed as examples of 
humour based on a shift in viewpoint. At the same time, these phenomena are 
accounted for as instantiations of figure-ground reversal mechanisms. 
Metonymy, as yet another construal mechanism underlying humour, is thoroughly 
explained in Brône and Feyaerts (2003). Their analysis relied on the “image-
schematic value of metonymy as a prominent reference-point phenomenon” (p. 
22). They drew on Langacker’s (2008) reference-point notion as a salient easily 
coded concept used to access another less salient one, as well as on the non-
bona-fide nature of humorous communication to identify four different strategies 
whereby metonymy-based reasoning is used for humorous communication: 
profiling of non-salient referent points, suppression of salient reference points, 
compression of two conceptual entities into a single reference point, and 
distortion of the prototypical causal logic.  
This brief overview shows how the notion of meaning construal 
mechanisms, along with key notions in cognitive linguistics such as mental 
spaces, frames, blending, mapping, etc., can be used to shed light on the 
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production and comprehension of humour providing an overarching framework in 
which previous theories of humour can be brought together. Regardless of the 
approach taken to tackle humour studies, certain recurrent shared notions 
emerge: 
a) The need for ambiguity based on the interplay between two different 
possible interpretations of the humorous text. This ambiguity may rely on 
lexical, semantic or pragmatic processes, but can ultimately be accounted 
for resorting to the notion of mental spaces, triggered by any previously-
listed process. Varied terminology is used depending on the theoretical 
approach taken: scripts (Raskin, 1985), frames (Fillmore, 1976), image-
schemas (Cienki, 2007), make-sense frame (Yus, 2016), reference-points 
(Langacker, 1987), etc. Despite the varied terminology used, the 
underlying principle is basically the same (Raskin 1985; Giora, 1991; 
Attardo, 2001; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003, etc.). 
b) One of those spaces is more salient, i.e. more easily accessible or more 
prototypical (Giora, 1991, 1997, 2002; Coulson, 2005b). 
c) Incongruity arises from the mapping of elements from the salient space 
into the less salient one (or vice-versa), or as a result of foregrounding 
disanalogies in an emergent blended space in which the incongruity is 
resolved (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Coulson, 2005b, 2005c; Veale et al., 
2006; Yus, 2016). 
2.5.3.1 Humour in interaction from a cognitive perspective 
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The social function of humour is widely acknowledged in the literature 
(Morreal, 1983; Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 2001; Hay, 2001; Dynel, 2009). Although 
utterances and texts may be created with a humorous intent, this humour will 
ultimately be realised only upon perception as such by the hearer (Hay, 2001). 
The interactional value of humour has received much attention in recent literature 
(Holmes, 2000; Hay 2001; Baxter, 2002; Holmes & Marra, 2002; Archakis & 
Tsakona, 2005, etc.). Baxter (2002) classifies broad categories of humour in 
interaction, which she refers to as conversational joking types: joking (jab lines), 
teasing and self-denigrating joking. Different types of humour in interaction have 
been studied. What follows is an account of the most relevant literature on 
interactional humour from a cognitive perspective.  
Hyper-understanding (Veale et al., 2006) and misunderstanding (Brône, 
2008) are hailed as two major kinds of interactional humour. Hyper-
understanding stems from the speaker’s ability to reverse the intending meaning 
of the previous speaker’s utterance, exploiting weak points found in it to achieve 
a humorous effect. Misunderstanding was defined by Brône (2008, p. 2027) as a 
“genuine misinterpretation of a previous utterance by a character in the fictional 
world”. I hold the view, however, that misunderstanding may arise and have an 
(unintended) humorous effect in any given situation and not necessarily in the 
fictional world. Both phenomenon imply a conflict between different viewpoints. 
Brône (2008), Feyaerts (2013), and Tabacaru and Lemmens (2014) 
resorted to Clark’s layering model of communication (1996) to account for these 
two phenomena. It is argued that Clark’s model can be used to explain any type 
of non-serious language, such as fiction, irony, sarcasm, over- and 
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understatements, rhetorical questions, etc. Clark’s model depicts discourse as 
multiple layers sharing a surface represented by the communicative situation.  
Brône combined this layered-meaning structure of discourse with 
Fauconnier’s Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier, 1994). Fauconnier’s mental 
spaces are “small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for 
purposes of local understanding and action” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003, p. 58). 
They allow us to structure discourse. Brône argued that the mental spaces 
elicited in humorous communication are distinct but connected across the 
discourse layers. In Brône’s view, Clark’s layer 1 (the communicative situation) is 
equivalent to the discourse base space in Mental Space Theory.  
Both models are combined to account for the conflict of viewpoints in 
hyper-understanding and misunderstanding. The humorous effect of 
misunderstanding is explained by means of the clash between the salient 
interpretation favoured by contextual elements, and the misinterpretation (non-
salient interpretation) of one of the participants in the interaction. Hyper-
understanding, in turn, is explained resorting to a figure-ground reversal 
mechanism (Croft & Cruse, 2004), whereby weak points in the previous speaker’s 
utterance are exposed to achieve a humorous effect. Both phenomena are 
metarepresentations of discourse: hyperunderstanding involves the creation of a 
pretence space in which the speaker dissociates him or herself from what has 
been said by their counterpart. Misunderstanding, on the contrary, relies on 
erroneous mapping of features to the interlocutor’s own space. 
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Coulson (2005a) resorted to blending and mental spaces to account for 
conversational humour. She argued that humorous blends are shaped by the 
demands of conversation: the need to maintain relevance implies that speakers 
must take at least one element of the input blend created by the previous speaker. 
On the other hand, the requirement to contribute new information is met by 
bringing in a new input within the activated shared larger cognitive structure to 
produce a new blend.  
Feyaerts (2013) tackled spontaneous conversational humour from a socio-
cognitive perspective as the background for the collection of the CORINTH 
corpus of interactional spontaneous humour in Flemish (Feyaerts, Speelman, 
Brône, & Oben, 2010). He argued that meaning is not just a process of 
conceptualisation but is also the result of interactive negotiation between 
interlocutors in conversation. He focused on the intersubjective aspects of 
meaning, defined by the interaction between interlocutors.  
He defined intersubjectivity as the ability to figure out the mental spaces 
represented by our interlocutors. Meaning construction in interaction will largely 
depend on the common ground shared by the interlocutors (Clark, 1996). The 
mind-reading ability advocated by Yus (2016) is reminiscent of this idea. 
Veale et al. (2006) argued that humour is first and foremost a social-
interactional phenomenon. They focused on adversarial humour, studying it from 
a cognitive perspective. They defined trumping as a series of humorous 
exchanges subverting the use of language, whose interpretation involves 
thorough knowledge of the interlocutors, therefore representing a highly complex 
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form of interactional humour. They drew on previously studied mechanisms to 
account for adversarial humour: Attardo’s GTVH figure-ground reversal 
mechanism (2001) and Langacker’s conceptual profiling (Langacker, 1991). 
These mechanisms are general meaning construal mechanisms, not only 
applying to humour.  
The vast shared knowledge required for adversarial humour to occur is 
explained by means of the Current Discourse Space (CDS), defined by 
Langacker (2001, p. 144) as “the mental space comprising those elements and 
relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for 
communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse”; that is, the 
background setting containing all shared information and cognitive structures that 
will be rearranged as communication flows leading to the dynamic creation of 
meaning through different construal mechanisms.  
Meaning, therefore, is dynamically created relying on the relation between 
the profile (figure) and the base (ground) of the conceptual structure linked to a 
linguistic unit. Profiled, more salient aspects of a given conceptual structure can 
be manipulated by speakers to initially mislead the hearer before achieving a 
humorous effect surprising them with the non-profiled elements of the structure 
(ground). 
On a more social-based perspective, Archakis and Tsakona (2005) 
considered humour to be an expression of identity, understood as a dynamic 
process linked to discursive strategies whereby speakers construct their social 
identity in that particular situation (Holmes & Marra, 2002). Holmes (2000), in 
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turn, argued that humour has a social function of marking solidarity, and can also 
serve either to strengthen or level out power imbalances. She studied humorous 
interaction at the workplace.  
Whenever interaction takes place among interlocutors, a negotiation 
process is entailed whereby turn-taking is organised and each speaker’s 
discourse structured for communication to be successful. Humorous 
communication is no exception, all the more so as for humour to be realised, it 
must be somehow acknowledged by the counterpart in the conversation. The 
strategies implemented to acknowledge humorous utterances are called humour 
support (Hay, 2001). Hay listed the following humour support strategies: (a) 
laughter, (b) echoing the humorous utterance, (c) contribute to humour (with a 
new humorous turn), (d) offer sympathy or contradict self-deprecating humour, 
(e) overlap and heighten involvement in the conversation. 
I endorse the view that cognitive linguistics provides the best framework to 
account for humorous communication (Veale et al., 2006). In my opinion, most of 
the work on humour reviewed above can be brought together and explained 
resorting to the following cognitive linguistics notions: (a) Langacker’s Current 
Discourse Space (CDS) (Langacker, 2001), (b) Fauconnier and Turner’s 
Conceptual Integration Theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), (c) Construal 
mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004). 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature and current state of the art 
on verbal humour studies. First, a brief overview of classical humour theories has 
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been provided, outlining the three major approaches to humour: incongruity, 
superiority and release theories (Attardo, 1994). Then, a review of multimodal 
humour studies is also included (Attardo et al., 2003; Pickering et al., 2009; 
Bryant, 2010; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, Wagner, & Urios-
Aparisi, 2011; Attardo et al., 2013; Tabacaru & Lemmens, 2014, etc.), in which a 
clear gap emerges with regard to the study of multimodal markers ─intentional 
signals─ or indices ─unintentional cues─ of humour in spontaneous 
communication, as opposed to staged humour.  
With regards to the multimodality of humour in interaction, the literature 
offers conflicting results, with no multimodal cues consistently associated to 
humour found to date, despite the intuitive belief that humour should be delivered 
as a highly marked form of discourse (Gironzetti, 2017). Having said that, the idea 
of contrast, signalled through prosody or gestures in order to mark humour, 
emerges from different studies as a way to showcase certain utterances, as 
compared to the speaker’s baseline, in order to convey the metamessage that 
they must not be taken at face value, and that they are ironical, humorous, etc. 
(Attardo et al., 2003; Bryant, 2010; Urios-Aparisi & Wagner, 2011). 
Subsequently, linguistic theories of humour are reviewed. Raskin’s (1985) 
Semantic Script Theory, with a clear semantic-pragmatic perspective, is 
described. Two main notions underpin this theory: that of script, as a pre-
structured knowledge unit, and the concept of script-opposition, which in turn 
draws on the idea of incongruity-based humour. The chapter then explores 
Attardo’s (2001) General Theory of Verbal Humour, which expands Raskin’s 
SSTH to include a more pragmatic and cognitive perspective, laying down six 
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knowledge resources around which humorous texts revolve: script opposition, 
target of the joke, narrative strategy, language, situation, and logical mechanism. 
The latter is considered to be the link to a more cognitive-based approach of 
humour (Veale et al., 2006).  
The idea of opposition, ambiguity in interpretations or incongruity-
resolution is also present in other theories of humour mentioned, both from a 
Relevance Theory point of view (Yus, 2016) and with a more cognitive stance 
(Giora, 1991; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Coulson, 2005b; Veale et al., 2006). This 
cognitive perspective is favoured in the subsequent review of studies concerning 
humour in interaction (Holmes, 2000; Hay, 2001; Holmes & Marra, 2002; Archakis 
& Tsakona, 2005; Veale et al., 2006; Feyaerts, 2013; Tabacaru & Lemmens, 
2014), as the standpoint taken by this thesis, with the aim to conduct a multimodal 
and cognitive analysis of spontaneous humorous communication.  
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  Chapter 3 
       Multimodality 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Multimodality refers to the combination of different semiotic resources or 
modes/modalities in communicative events (Adami, 2016). A multimodal analysis 
of discourse and human communication brings in information conveyed through 
different modalities, such as gesture, sound, proxemics, etc. All these modalities, 
and crucially, how they interplay, contribute to communication, which is never 
monomodal. In addition, each modality has its own affordances. Therefore, a 
comprehensive account of communication can only be achieved through careful 
exploration of how these modalities operate and relate to each other (Kress & 
van Leeuwen, 2001; Norris, 2004a; Adami & Kress, 2014; Forceville, 2014; 
Adami, 2016). 
Multimodality is not a theoretical framework as such, but rather an 
approach or perspective applied to the study of communication at large, e.g. 
language, pictures, films, multimedia resources, etc. The main basis of this 
paradigm is that all modalities through which information is conveyed must be 
accounted for in a comprehensive analysis of communication. Furthermore, 
overall multimodal meaning is larger than the sum of the meaning communicated 
by each single modality, as their interplay also plays a role in meaning production 
and interpretation. 
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3.2 Multimodality 
Kress and van Leeuwen (2001, p. 20) defined multimodality “as the use of 
several semiotic modes in the design of a semiotic product or event, together with 
the particular way in which these modes are combined”. They defined modes as 
“semiotic resources which allow for the simultaneous realisation of discourses 
and types of interaction” (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 21). However, multiple 
and divergent definitions of mode (or modality) have been proposed in the 
literature. Adami (2016, p. 451) alluded to modes as resources “to make meaning 
and to express and shape values, ideologies, and power relations”. Given the 
lack of widespread agreement on a single definition of mode ―or modality, as 
both terms are used interchangeably in the literature― multimodal studies draw 
on categories of modes/modalities (Forceville, 2009, 2014), among which written 
and spoken language (e.g.; Pennock-Speck & Del Saz-Rubio, 2009; Bryant, 
2010; Attardo, Wagner, & Urios-Aparisi, 2011), visuals (e.g. Del Saz-Rubio & 
Pennock-Speck, 2009; Forceville, 2009, 2014, 2015), gestures (e.g. Muller & 
Cienki, 2009; Wagner, Malisz, & Kopp, 2014), olfactory stimuli (Velasco-
Sacristán & Fuertes-Olivera, 2006), etc.  
Multimodal studies share four major assumptions (Adami, 2016 p. 451): 
a) Communication is always multimodal. 
b) Language-only analyses cannot fully explain meaning. 
c) Each mode has specific affordances, stemming from the nature of 
the mode (“their materiality”) and the socio-cultural background 
against which they have develop their communicative value. 
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d) All co-occurring modes simultaneously contribute to meaning-
making. 
Although rooted in social semiotics and currently leaning towards cognitive 
linguistics, multimodal analyses are also linked to conversation analysis of social 
interaction (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992; C. Goodwin, 2013; Goodwin & Cekaite, 
2013), within the framework of conversational analysis (Depperman, 2013a, 
2013b). A multimodal interaction analysis focus on how interlocutors 
communicate, making and expressing semantic and pragmatic meaning resorting 
to different modes, as raising eyebrows to mark sarcastic speech (Tabacaru & 
Lemmens, 2014), changing prosody to signal irony or sarcasm (Cheang & Pell, 
2009; Bryant, 2010), punctuating speech with head movements (Hadar, Steiner, 
Grant, & Clifford, 1983; Hadar, Steiner, & Grant, 1984; Hadar, Steiner, & Clifford, 
1985), using their hands (Kendon, 2004; McNeil, 2014), etc. 
3.3 Multimodality and semiotics 
Adami (2016) defined multimodality as the combination of various semiotic 
modes or meaning-making resources in a given communicative event (still or 
moving images, colour, speech, gestures, etc.). Semiotics can be defined as the 
general science of representation (Bergman, 2007), whereas semiology 
“occupies the part of semiotics which relates either to conventional 
communication, or intentional communication” (Daylight, 2012 p. 37). Syntax, 
semantics and pragmatics can be viewed as three branches of semiotics, 
although this discipline, in the Peircean tradition, is not restricted to language 
(Bergman, 2007). It includes any sign with communicative potential, and from this 
perspective, it could merge with multimodal studies of communication. That is 
Chapter 3 – Multimodality 63  
 
 
precisely the approach taken by Bezemer, Jewit, Diamantopolou, Kress, and 
Mavers (2012). With regards to the relation between linguistics and semiotics, 
most semioticians accept the view held by Saussure (1993), placing linguistics 
as a branch of semiotics, with “language as the semiotic system par excellence” 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1972, p. 48), which leads to semiotics considerably drawing on 
linguistic concepts to analyse and study other semiotic systems (Chandler, 2007). 
Multimodality was traditionally grounded in semiotics before gradually 
adopting a more cognitive linguistics perspective (Zlatev, 2012; Cienki & Muller, 
2014; Forceville, 2015). Feng and O’Halloran (2015) drew an interesting 
distinction in their study of multimodal metaphor, claiming that a cognitive 
linguistic approach takes it as the expression of metaphorical thinking, whereas 
semioticians focus on how these metaphors are visually expressed. 
If we understand modes or modalities as realms in which different types of 
meaning-motivated signs with communicative potential are made, there is a clear 
intersection between semiotics, cognitive linguistics and multimodality, where 
each of these disciplines would apply a different approach to analysing a 
communicative event. Semiotics is concerned with the nature of the signs, 
whereas cognitive linguistics looks into how meaning conveyed through those 
signs is construed and motivated, and multimodality addresses how meaning is 
conveyed through the various modes through which signs are expressed and 
how they interplay. 
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3.3.1 Semiotics vs semiology 
Semiotics, as understood in the Peircean tradition, is the general science 
of representation, including as potential objects of study “all sensory stimuli that 
could create another idea in the receiver’s mind.” (Daylight, 2012 p. 37). 
Saussure’s semiology (1993), on the other hand, is concerned primarily, albeit 
not exclusively, with the study of language as a code system, and more broadly 
with intentional signs. In addition, semiology limits itself to the study of signs 
representing idealised concepts, i.e. in Saussure’s terms langue, as opposed to 
parole1, whereas semiotics is grounded in our experience of the world, delving 
into how signs found in the environment are perceived consciously (Daylight, 
2012). 
Another difference lies in the structure of the sign. Whereas signs in 
semiology are dual, made of a signifier ─the expression of the sign─ and a 
signified ─the concept represented by the signifier─, in Peircean semiotics 
(Peirce, 1965) signs have a tripartite configuration, made of a) the 
representamen: the expression of the sign; b) the interpretant: the interpretation 
of the sign by the receiver; c) the object: what is represented by the 
representamen. 
Its abstraction of meaning from the real world and our own experience of 
it excludes semiology as a valid approach for my study, as I intend to disentangle 
                                            
1 Saussure defines langue as “a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection 
of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to 
exercise that faculty” (1966. p. 9), whereas parole refers to the various manifestations of speech 
(ibid.). For Saussure, only langue can be studied, as the “norm of all other manifestations of 
speech” (ibid. p.9). Saussure argues that speech, on the contrary, is too heterogeneous to 
constitute a valid object of study, as its unity cannot be discovered. 
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how humour is multimodally conveyed in actual spontaneous communication, 
thus falling within the realm of parole. As for semiotics, while some of its 
fundamental tenets mentioned above are fully compatible with the theoretical 
framework applied in this dissertation, I cannot share the need for a tripartite 
structure of the sign, insofar as the interpretant presupposes the existence of a 
receiver. This could be accommodated if, as claimed by Brandt and Brandt 
(2005), communication includes those situations in which the receiver and the 
producer of the sign are the same person; that is, instances of inner thoughts. 
Some authors, though, do not consider this situation to involve semiotics and 
advocate for the need of three separable constituents of the sign (Deely, 1990; 
Dalylight, 2012). 
3.3.2 Multimodal social semiotics 
Bezemer et al. (2012) defined multimodal social semiotics as follows: 
It is a theoretical perspective that brings all socially organized 
resources that people use to make meaning into one descriptive and 
analytical domain. These resources include modes such as image, 
writing, gesture, gaze, speech, posture; and media such as screens, 
3 D forms of various kinds, books, notes and notebooks. (p. 1) 
Together with Kress (2015), they are major advocates of applying this 
multimodal social semiotic approach to the study of communication. A social 
semiotic approach considers signs to be socially shaped and motivated. Signs 
are not arbitrary, and as such they provide insight into the sign-maker 
motivations, views, context, etc. (Adami, 2016). 
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Multimodal social semiotics draws on Halliday’s (1978) systemic functional 
linguistics (Adami, 2016), where language is conceived as a network of related 
systems, subject to choice, serving three metafunctions: ideational meaning, 
interpersonal meaning, and textual meaning (Feng & O’Halloran, 2015). The 
ideational metafunction is related to the way we conceive and represent the 
world; the textual meaning refers to verbal expression (Halliday, 1978; 2004); 
finally, the interpersonal, or inter-subjective, metafunction lies on the relationship 
between interlocutors and their communicative role (Zlatev, 2008). Social 
semioticians argue that these principles apply to non-linguistic resources as well. 
Kress (2015) considered each modality as a partial means of 
communication with its own affordances, which leads him to claim that language 
(speech and writing) is also partial and does not always meet all communication 
needs alone. He therefore resorted to multimodality as the best approach to 
account for different forms of meaning-making. He further argued that as 
meaning-making is driven by semiotic entities, processes and relations, the 
theories and tools necessary to study this phenomenon can be drawn from social 
semiotics. In his vision, multimodality is a domain of study or application of the 
larger framework provided by social semiotics (Adami, 2016; Bezemer et al., 
2012). 
3.4 Multimodality and pragmatics  
Wilson and Sperber (2004 p. 607) defined Relevance Theory as follows: 
Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail 
one of Grice’s central claims: that an essential feature of most 
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human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the 
expression and recognition of intentions (Grice 1989: Essays 1-7, 
14, 18; Retrospective Epilogue). In developing this claim, Grice laid 
the foundations for an inferential model of communication, an 
alternative to the classical code model. According to the code model, 
a communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which 
is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code. 
According to the inferential model, a communicator provides 
evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is 
inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided. 
Arguably the most comprehensive attempt so far to apply Relevance 
Theory ─hereinafter RT─ (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) to multimodal communication 
has been undertaken by Forceville, who has mainly focused on visual 
communication (see Forceville, 2014), although he believes his reasoning can be 
extended to other modes or combinations thereof (Forceville, 2014). He argued 
that RT can account for multimodal communication provided the specific 
affordances of each modality are taking into account.  
Although Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1986) aims at 
accounting for any instance of ostensive communication, it is primarily based on 
the verbal modality. If we accept face-to-face communication as prototypical, it 
seems clear that inferences to arrive to explicatures and implicatures will be 
derived not only from verbal messages, but also from other modalities such as 
prosody, gestures, facial expressions, etc. When communication occurs in less 
prototypical settings, e.g. telephone, email, voicemails, etc., the modes through 
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which inferences are made are significantly reduced. Things are even more 
complex in cases of mass communication, where there are at least two 
simultaneous addressees as an audience (Forceville, 2014). Each addressee will 
draw their own inferences according to their cognitive environment, which may 
differ from one addressee to another.  
Forceville (2014) proposed to discard cases of given-away information 
from the phenomenon of communication, as they are not ostensive, and just 
happen to convey information without the sender being aware of it. However, I 
hold the view that unintended messages do not necessarily have diminished 
communicative value. I argue that non-intentionally conveyed information is 
indeed communication, and that excluding it as an object of study undermines 
our comprehension of the phenomenon as a whole, all the more so when studying 
multimodal communication, whose aim, by definition, is to provide a holistic 
analysis of the phenomenon of communication regardless of the modality in 
which it occurs.  
In Forceville’s (2014) view, multimodal communication falls within RT 
insofar as it is ostensive ―produced intentionally by the maker of the picture, 
sound, etc.―, and it reflects the desire of the communicator to convey information 
at no great cognitive effort on the part of the audience. Therefore, it is a case of 
relevant communication. 
He further claimed that, in the case of visuals, explicatures can be inferred, 
as there is a number of propositions arising from the non-verbal elements 
encoded in a given picture which can be judged as true or false. Implicatures, in 
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turn, arise from the context provided by the genre to which a particular modality 
is ascribed. Addressees will derive implicatures matching the visual with the 
expectations and knowledge they have of the appropriate genre (Forceville, 
2009, 2014; Forceville & Clark, 2014). 
Although he made a strong case regarding the potential of pictures to yield 
both implicatures and explicatures, I find his initial claim that his analysis could 
be further extended to other modes more problematic. I strongly believe that 
gestures and prosody do play a major role in allowing for the inference of 
implicatures, as when a change in voice quality or a gesture may signal a 
humorous or ironic statement (Cheang & Pell, 2009; Bryant, 2010; Tabacaru & 
Lemmens, 2014; etc.). As for explicatures, if we understand them as propositions, 
as explained by Sperber and Wilson (1986), I wonder to what extent we can 
derive them from intonational cues, for example. Or whether a gesture or facial 
expression can be said to give rise to true/false propositions.  
Given that each modality has difference affordances, and therefore 
different communicative value, I doubt that general claims applicable across the 
board can be made. Having said that, Forceville’s (Forceville, 2009, 2014; 
Forceville & Clark, 2014) pioneer work raises valid and interesting questions for 
multimodal research. Clearly, further work is needed to disentangle the role 
played by modalities based on their respective affordances and how that role is 
transformed when several modalities simultaneously interplay. 
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3.5 Multimodality and cognitive linguistics 
As seen before, multimodality is concerned with the analysis of 
communication from the point of view of how different semiotic modes interact 
(Pinar Sanz, 2015). A multimodal study of interaction addresses what is 
expressed and perceived in a communicative event through different modes, e.g. 
gaze, posture, gestures, etc. (Norris, 2013). Norris further claimed that a full 
account of human interaction is not possible if the mind is not considered, as “a 
person always thinks, perceives, and/or feels something when interacting with 
others, and at least some of these thoughts, perceptions, and/or feelings are 
communicated through a person’s actions” (Norris, 2004a, p. xi). Given that 
cognitive linguistics addresses the “interrelation between thought, meaning, and 
linguistic structure” (Lee, 2001 p.1), the relevance of conducting both a cognitive 
linguistic and multimodal analysis for my present research on spontaneous 
communication is warranted.  
Although a bias towards the study of conceptualisation and categorization, 
to the detriment of discourse or interaction has been raised concerning cognitive 
linguistics (Nuyts, 2007), there is a clear link between thought patterns in the mind 
and their linguistic and discursive representations, based on the dynamic 
construction of meaning and conceptual frames in language-use events (Cap, 
2017). 
Furthermore, Langacker (2001) himself rejected the claim that a cognitive 
approach to language involves a lack of concern for social interaction and 
discourse (p.185). He argued that, in fact, a cognitive approach to language 
presupposes a close relation between linguistic units and discourse, as the 
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former are “abstracted from usage events, retaining as part of their value any 
recurring facet of the interactive and discourse context” (p.143). He continued to 
mention that conceptualisation occurs through multiple channels, including 
vocalization, which, again, to my view, supports my stance of combining a 
multimodal and cognitive linguistic analysis for the purposes of this dissertation. 
One of the major tenets of cognitive linguistics is that meaning is 
conceptualisation, and that conceptualisation stems from our experience of the 
world, which is necessarily embodied (Johnson, 1987; Croft & Cruse, 2004; 
Geraeerts, 2008). Therefore, it can be assumed that people with different bodies 
will have different experiences, and they will consequently think differently 
(Casasanto, 2013). In fact, McNeill (2013, p.29) claimed that it is possible to “see 
someone’s thought in gesture”. Gestures (face and body movements), along with 
prosody and speech, conform the various modalities that interplay in face-to-face 
interaction, and that we can resort to in order to try to ensure successful 
communication (Stivers & Sidnell, 2005; Poggi, 2013). 
3.6 Multimodality in face-to-face interaction 
Gestures and prosody are two main modalities interplaying in face-to-face 
communication. Two major influences in gesture studies are Adam Kendon 
(2002, 2004, 2013) and David McNeill (1985, 1992, 2000, 2005, 2013, 2014). 
Both argued that gestures point to a representation of meaning at multiple levels 
simultaneously, expressed by means of co-speech gestures and speech. McNeill 
(2013) claimed that gestures and speech are co-expressive, representing the 
same idea but not necessarily the same aspect, each drawing on its own semiotic 
value. Gestures are the expression of imagistic thinking, while language draws 
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on analytic thought (McNeill, 2005). Intonation, in turn, provides observers with 
the possibility to gain an insight into the mind, feelings, and attitudes of speakers 
(Cruttenden, 1986; Wennerstrom, 2001). As Bolinger (1986, p. vii) put it, 
“intonation is the spoken counterpart of facial expression and physical gesture”. 
In this section, I provide a review of the literature pertaining studies into 
prosody and gestures, placing special emphasis on their interplay with speech. 
3.6.1 Prosody 
Prosody can be defined as the set of vocal features such as intonation, 
pause, stress, tempo, loudness, rhythm, and voice quality (Wennerstrom, 2001). 
According to this definition, intonation, i.e. changes in pitch as we speak, is 
therefore just one of the features of prosody, but both terms are often used 
interchangeably in the literature. Hirst and Di Cristo (1999) defined intonation ─in 
its broadest sense; that is, understood as prosody─ as the most universal, yet 
language-specific, feature of human language. For them, its universality lies in 
the fact that intonation is a characteristic of all languages, whose functions seem 
to be roughly the same across a wide spectrum of very different languages. 
Wennerstrom (2001) argued that it would not be surprising to find common 
features in the intonation of different languages, as intonation may be the 
“grammaticalisation of the prosodic features of the cries of our pre-linguistic 
ancestors” (ibid., p. 7). 
The literature widely acknowledges prosody as having discursive value, 
and as primarily conveying the speaker’s feelings (Bolinger, 1986; Brazil, 1997; 
Wennerstrom, 2001, etc.). This function is rooted in our biological origins, in our 
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need to read other people’s feelings and behavioural cues in order to avert 
potential danger, but it has reached a certain degree of conventionalisation. 
Prosody may also have a syntactic function (Halliday, 1976), albeit subordinate 
to the emotional one (Bolinger, 1986, 1989; Wennerstrom, 2001). Brown, Currie, 
and Kenworthy (1980), however, pointed to the difficulty to systematically 
attribute affect-meaning to prosody, when attitude is expressed by means of 
lexical words as well. Furthermore, considering intonation in its restricted sense, 
they claimed that voice quality, i.e. a set of prosodic features other than pitch 
patterns, whereby the voice may change into coarse, whisper, etc., is a far more 
effective way of conveying attitude. 
No significant differences have been found in the pragmatic use of prosody 
related to dialect or gender. Beyond the obvious differences in terms of pitch 
range between men and women or dialectic prosodic patterns, the fundamental 
principles of the pragmatic value of prosody stand more or less universally, even 
across languages (Bolinger, 1989). 
3.6.1.1 Prosody and its parts 
As said before, prosody can be defined as a set of suprasegmental oral 
features stretching over one or more than one consecutive utterances 
(Cruttenden, 1986). The prosodic features most frequently used for linguistic 
analysis are pitch, defined as the varying height of the voice tone over one or 
more syllables; loudness, i.e., changes in volume and intensity over one or more 
syllables; and length, understood as the relative duration of one or more than one 
consecutive syllables as compared with their immediate environment or with that 
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set of syllables in other context. Pauses, tempo, rhythm and voice quality are also 
considered prosodic features (Cruttenden, 1986). 
3.6.1.1.1 Pitch 
Pitch is the most salient feature of intonation. The most widespread 
acoustic measure used for pitch is fundamental frequency (F0), resulting from the 
repetitions of waveforms created by the vibration of the vocal cords. This implies 
that voiceless sounds do not produce fundamental frequency, although this does 
not affect the overall perception of the pitch of what is being said (Cruttenden, 
1986). Intonation stems from upward and downward changes in pitch, and it is 
responsible for the melody of speech (Bolinger, 1986). 
Pitch-accented words stand out from the utterance baseline. Humans are 
very sensitive to changes in frequency, so pitch changes need to be abrupt but 
not necessary long to be perceived. Also, they can occur in either direction, with 
higher or lower F0 values, as what matters to place emphasis is the pitch 
obstruction, i.e. the shift, rather than its directionality. Pitch is the most prominent 
characteristic of intonation patterns. In fact, intonation arises from the succession 
of pitch patterns (Cruttenden, 1986; Wennerstrom, 2001). The curve resulting 
from changes in pitch over a period of time is called pitch contour. The pitch range 
used at the onset of an utterance is named key. It may be high, to draw attention 
or to express emotion; low, showing boredom and lack of interest, or mid key, 
where there is no change in pitch (Wennerstrom, 2001). Of particular interest is 
the concord tone, which refers to a key, i.e. onset pitch, at the same F0 as the 
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terminal pitch used by the interlocutor’s previous utterance. It signals agreement, 
understanding, engagement, or lack thereof (Wennerstrom & Siegel, 2003).  
Intonational features form intonation groups, which loosely correspond to 
constituents of the utterance. These, in turn, link to form paratones, which can be 
defined as intonational paragraphs. Wennerstrom and Siegel (2003) 
distinguished between high paratones, to mark changes in topic, and low 
paratones, signalling digressions or side remarks. Both paratones and intonation 
groups tend to start with rising intonation and end in falling intonation. Finally, 
intonation phrases include a more or less continuous pitch contour with at least 
the following features: onset key, pitch boundary and a number of pitch accents. 
Intonational phrases decline in pitch, and are slower towards the end. They are 
also known in the literature as tone units, intonational units, or intonation group. 
With regards to the study of spontaneous speech, it is highly difficult to define 
boundaries between intonation phrases (Brown et al., 1980; Wennerstrom, 
2001).  
3.6.1.1.2 Pauses 
One element used in the literature to delimit intonation phrases is pause 
(Brown et al., 1980; Archakis et al., 2010). Brown et al. define substantial pauses 
(0.6 – 0.8 sec) for boundaries as opposed to short pauses (0.4 – 0.6) to allow 
time for mental processing. Pauses can be filled, e.g. with sounds like “uh”, or 
unfilled, i.e. silent. According to Cruttenden (1986), pauses tend to occur in three 
different instances: at major constituent boundaries, e.g.: between subject and 
predicate; before words of high lexical content ─Cruttenden linked these pauses 
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to the need for speakers to stop to find a word─, and right after the first word in 
an intonation group, due to errors in performance. In order to establish the 
boundaries of intonation groups, a number of elements have to be simultaneously 
taken into account: pause, syntactic and semantic utterance constituents, and 
length of syllables, as the last syllable of an intonation group tends to be 
lengthened. A revealing indicator of boundaries between intonation groups is any 
change in pitch level and direction when occurring in non-stressed syllables. 
Boundaries at the end of intonation phrases are characterised by falling pitch and 
longer final syllables. Rising boundaries usually yield turn. Pitch at boundaries is 
known as terminal pitch (Bolinger, 1986; Cruttenden, 1986; Wennerstrom 2001). 
3.6.1.1.3 Pitch accent and stress 
While some authors (Bolinger, 1986; Cruttenden, 1986) argued that there 
is usually just one prominent pitch accent in an intonation phrase, usually 
occurring towards the end of the sentence, Wennerstrom (2001) claimed that 
several pitch accents can occur in one intonation phrase. Accented words are 
associated with new information, whereas the baseline represents previously-
known information. The nucleus is the most prominent pitch accent in a sentence, 
where the speaker wants to place the focus. It corresponds to the pitch accented 
syllable of the most prominent word in an intonation phrase. Accent is different 
from stress, which refers to the prominence given to an element in an utterance 
not through pitch, but by means of loudness, or changes in speech rate 
(Cruttenden, 1986). Furthermore, certain qualifiers may contribute to nuance 
messages even more, such as using whispering for confidence, a husky voice for 
sexual appeal or tremolo voice for uncontrolled emotions (Bolinger, 1986). 
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3.6.1.2. Prosody and its uses 
Wennerstrom (2001) borrowed from the work of three major previous 
references in prosody studies (Halliday,1976; Pierrehumbert, 1980; Brazil, 1984; 
1997) to conclude that prosody is compositional, given that it encompasses 
different features; cohesive, for it is used as a main tool to structure both 
information and discourse in an oral text; interactional, as it is a mechanism 
employed in conversation for turn-taking, endorsing or rejecting other speaker’s 
speech; and expressive, because it is a conduit through which we express and 
acknowledge feelings.  
Prosody mainly conveys meaning at discourse level, and it also carries 
affective meaning (Cruttenden, 1986; Wennerstrom, 2001; Pennock-Speck & Del 
Saz-Rubio, 2009). Prosody, as gestures or body movements, is used to 
foreground part of what is being communicated (Rockwell, 2000; Bryant, 2010; 
Muller, 2013a). It is also related to grammar, although more on the basis of 
correlation than on a univocal relation or dependence. It often contributes to 
establishing segments of speech, marking the limits between constituents, and 
underlining major constituents apart from secondary ones, thus helping to 
structure information (Wennerstrom & Siegel, 2003).  
Falling pitch, pauses and lower speech rate are usually indicators of the 
end of an utterance, although they are not in themselves defining elements of 
such boundaries. In fact, pauses may occur when speakers stop to retrieve a 
certain word, and falling pitch may be used to draw attention to a particular 
element of the utterance. Only in combination with other cues, e.g. syntactic 
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and/or semantic, or gestures, can they be taken as markers of a speech-segment 
end (Brazil, 1997; Wennerstrom, 2001). 
Cruttenden (1986) associated prosody to the pragmatic, rather than the 
literal, meaning of an utterance. However, Wennerstrom (2001) wondered 
whether prosody has in fact pragmatic or semantic value, as it is encoded in the 
verbal message, although it does not affect propositional meaning. In my opinion, 
semantic and pragmatic meanings are not two distinct separable entities. I 
believe meaning and conceptualisation are grounded in discourse and our 
experience of the world (Langacker, 2001), which blurs the boundaries between 
semantics and pragmatics (Croft & Cruse, 2004).  
Prosody is one modality that can be recruited for the purposes of 
communication (Forceville, 2009), which serves to reinforce a certain layer or 
aspect of meaning in a given utterance, such as when a husky voice is used to 
signal sexual appeal (Bolinger, 1986). The same way that, according to 
Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), humans are endowed with the 
ability to read minds in terms of assuming what inferences are meant by the 
communicator or will be made by the listener (Yus, 2003, 2016), our ability lies in 
processing the different multimodal inputs available in a given communicative 
situation to ultimately understand what is being communicated, through 
inferences, taking utterances at face value or (un)consciously decoding 
multimodal signs such as prosody or gestures (Coulson & Wu, 2014). 
One of the most straightforward pragmatic uses of intonation is to ease the 
cognitive effort needed from the listener to process what is being said by 
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showcasing the most relevant part of the utterance (Bolinger, 1989; 
Wennerstrom, 2001). Low pitch is associated with known or previously given 
information, requiring less saliency as more easily retrievable by the listener. 
Wennerstrom and Siegel (2003) considered this feature to be a window onto the 
mind of the speaker to determine what assumptions are made during 
communication in terms of what knowledge is shared with interlocutors.  
Intonation also contributes to increasing the illocutionary and 
perlocutionary effects of speech. When searching for this effect, stress words and 
syllables tend to be terminal, that is, to occur at the end of an utterance, as last 
impressions are remembered best (Cruttenden, 1986). As for the affective value 
of prosody, rising intonation is linked to emotion, and excitement; it has an 
emphatic value. Falling intonation, on the contrary, is related to rational, 
controlled, unemphatic statements and boredom (Wennerstrom, 2001). A wide 
pitch range points to a fluctuation of feelings (Bolinger, 1986; Brazil, 1997; 
Wennerstrom, 2001).  
Bolinger (1986) explained the emotional function of intonation as evolving 
from biological needs. He claimed that “intonation is a part of a gestural complex 
whose primitive and still surviving function is the signalling of emotion” (1986, p. 
195). Therefore, both intonation patterns and gestures serve to convey and 
recognise behavioural cues. Given the link between intonation, gestures and 
language, though, the question that arises is to what extent intonation patterns 
and gestures have become conventionalised. Since it is possible to mimic and 
fake intonation and gestures to resemble spontaneous communication, it seems 
clear that despite their biological origin, both gestures and intonation have also 
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evolved into culture-bound conventionalisations, at least in part (Bolinger, 1986; 
Attardo, Wagner, & Urios-Aparisi, 2011). I believe that exploring the interplay 
between prosody, verbal language and gestures can lead to a better 
understanding of human communication (Pennock-Speck & Del Saz-Rubio, 
2009; Mondada, 2013). 
3.6.1.3 Prosody and gestures 
According to Forceville (2009), prosody is one of the many modalities 
through which messages are conveyed. Although recent studies have shown that 
each mode plays an important role in communication, the interplay between 
different modes remains largely unexplored (Muller, 2013b). In Chapter 2, I 
reviewed studies delving into the relationship between prosody, gestures, and 
humorous communication. This section deals with literature covering the link 
between prosody and gestures at large, e.g. head movements, face expression, 
body posture, etc. 
Kendon (2004) and McNeill (2000) have both studied how prosody and 
gestures align, finding a close relationship in terms of timing in the realisation of 
gestures and prosody. Gesture strokes, for example, defined as the phase 
involving the highest effort and an information density peak (Kendon, 2004), are 
completed either shortly before or at the same time that stressed syllables (Loehr, 
2004; Cvejic, Kim, & Davis, 2010; Flecha-García, 2010). Bolinger (1986) went as 
far as to suggest that both gestures and intonation move in parallel, following the 
up and down metaphor, but this claim has not been supported empirically by later 
studies (McClave, 1998; Loehr, 2004).  
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McClave (1998) showed that gestures and intonation may correlate in 
terms of direction to mark salience of a certain point in the utterance, but that 
such correlation is not automatic. He did find that the stroke of propositional 
gestures tends to coincide with the most prominent pitch-accented syllable of a 
tone unit, i.e. the nucleus. McClave’s findings are in line with Loehr’s (2004; 
2012), who concludes that intonation and gesture patterns, regardless of their 
nature, tend to co-occur. He found that gestural apex, i.e. the point of maximal 
gestural excursion (Wagner et al., 2014) tend to coincide with pitch accents, and 
that gestural phrases typically align with intermediate intonational phrases, with 
gestural boundaries slightly preceding intonational ones. Furthermore, Loehr 
posited that gesture and intonation occasionally express the same pragmatic 
meaning and are rhythmically linked. However, yet again no correlation was 
found between gesture and intonation type, or between gesture and pitch upward 
or downward movement. Loehr further claimed that these findings support the 
theory of a common origin for gesture and speech, co-occurring as expressions 
of an idea unit, similar to Kendon’s (2004) idea unit or McNeill’s (2014) growth 
point. Ultimately, speakers have several modalities at their disposal for 
communication, which may not always surface or co-occur. When they do, 
though, they are connected in terms of timing, structure and meaning. 
The close link between prosody, face gestures, and head movements was 
also showcased by Cvejic et al. (2010), who argue that people can draw prosodic 
information from face and head movements alone, and found out that even just 
nods and tilts were reliable cues for prosodic information. Cavé et al. (1996) 
considered that gestures and prosodic features cannot be semiotically analysed 
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as independent items. The authors claimed that they form a global semiotic 
modality leading to intertwined meaning conveyed by both modes. Their findings 
are consistent with more recent studies into the correlation between, for example, 
eyebrow movements and prosody (Guaiatella, Santi, Lagrue, & Cavé, 2009; 
Flecha-García, 2010; Tabacaru, 2014). 
 Loehr (2014) showcased what the literature has so far shown regarding 
the interplay between prosody and gestures. First, both are synchronised at 
certain unit levels, e.g. pitch accent with gestural apex (Kendon, 2004), 
intonational phrases with gesture phrases (Loehr, 2004), etc. Furthermore, both 
modalities serve to regulate discourse and interaction. The interaction between 
prosody and gesture involves many parts of the body, such as hands, head, face, 
torso, etc. (Loehr, 2014). To conclude, language, gestures and prosody clearly 
seem to coordinate, although to date, no recurrent, one-to-one pattern governing 
relations between these modalities has been found (Bohle, 2014). 
3.6.2 Gestures and speech 
Gestures and speech are the moment-by-moment thinking that takes 
place while one speaks (McNeill, 2005); different modes of thinking are 
expressed in both modalities: imagistic in gestures, and analytic in language 
(McNeil, 2008). For McNeill (2005), it is possible to see someone’s thought in 
gesture. He defines gesture as “an unwitting, non-goal-directed action 
orchestrated by speaker-created significances, having features of manifest 
expressiveness” (McNeill, 2013, p. 29). In other words, gestures are expressive 
actions which enact imagery. Notice that he excludes emblems, i.e. highly 
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conventionalised gestures; e.g. the thumbs up gesture, from his definition. 
Gestures and speech are co-expressive, but not necessarily conveying the same 
aspect of one particular idea. In their respective semiotic ways, though, they 
express the same underlying notion (McNeill, 2007). In any communicative 
situation, speakers choose characteristics that fit the conceptualisation of the 
event and that are encodable by language (Slobin, 1987, p. 435), which also has 
an impact on their gestures (McNeill, 2008). 
In order to avoid confusion as a result of the polysemy of the term gesture, 
Kendon (2004) resorted to the term visible utterance action, to include the various 
ways in which bodily movement can contribute to the creation of utterances. In 
the same vein, Lapaire (2011) referred to gestural actions. Kendon (2013) related 
gestures to cognitive linguistics, as they are considered representations of image-
like meaning. Visible utterance actions, therefore, point to a mental multileveled 
representation of meaning, organised simultaneously and expressed by way of 
speech and co-speech gestures. Utterances, therefore, are expressed both 
through speech and visible bodily action. Larger segments of discourse are 
typically marked by sustained changes in posture or head movements, while 
shorter segments are associated with shorter movements (Kendon, 2013). 
Delving into the relation between speech and gestures, Müller and Cienki 
(2009) claimed that gestures are used for spatial expressions, re-enactment, 
shape and motion, whereas speech is favoured to refer to complex situations and 
to convey abstract ideas and arguments. In addition, they posited that gestures 
may be used to explicit the pragmatic value of verbal speech. Magno-Caldogneto 
and Poggi (1997) listed several functions governing the relation between speech 
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and gesture as follows: (a) repetition or redundancy, when different modalities 
contribute to the same meaning, e.g. a raised eyebrow coinciding with a stress 
word; (b) substitution, when a signal is used in place of another, as when a raised 
eyebrow marks a question that has not been syntactically formulated; (c) 
contradiction, when co-occurrent modalities express opposing meanings, such 
as shaking the head while saying ‘yes’; (d) addition, when the signals add 
meaning to each other, e.g. pointing in a given direction while saying “there”. 
Ladeweig (2014a) established a continuum of integrability between gestures and 
speech depending on the type of integration, the distribution of information over 
different modalities, and the order in which speech and gestures are deployed. 
Referential gestures are the most often used to replace speech (Muller & Cienki, 
2009). In sum, gestures can take either a syntactic or semantic function; they can 
be either co-expressive or redundant, and complementary to the verbal message. 
While the relation between form and meaning in language is 
conventionalised and arbitrary, gestures are motivated signs, whose meaning is 
based on form (Müller, Ladewig, & Bressem, 2013). Cognitive linguistics is the 
framework in which that motivation may be thoroughly explained, seeing gestures 
as part of construal mechanisms such as viewpoint, metaphor, metonymy, etc. 
(Mittelberg, 2008; Zlatev, 2008; Cienki, 2013a; Cienki & Müller, 2014; Gibbs et 
al., 2018). Cienki (2013a) argued, for example, that speakers may access image 
schemas to produce and understand gestures. A higher level of specification in 
the motivation of gestures is found in Zlatev mimetic schemas (2008), defined as 
“preverbal concepts which possess a number of properties which can help 
explain the emergence of language as a conventional-normative semiotic 
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system” (ibid. p. 123), and which involve actions such as EAT, CRAWL, SIT, etc. 
Zlatev propounded that they serve to structure our thought, and therefore can 
also underlie gestures as their motivation. 
Most gesture studies concerned with the relation between gestures and 
speech fall into two broad perspectives: cognitive-psychological or functional-
communicative (Lapaire, 2011). This also implies the following distinction: for 
some authors, gestures are produced for the benefit of the hearer, to facilitate 
comprehension (Kendon, 1980; Clark, 1996; C. Goodwin, 2013; etc.), while other 
scholars favour the view that gestures are mainly produced for the benefit of the 
speaker, and that they point to the mental processes undergone (Alibali, 1999; 
Alibali, Kita, and Young, 2000, Hostetter & Alibali 2008, etc.). Lapaire (2011) 
argued that both strands can be combined into a cognitive-functional approach, 
taking gestures as having representational as well as discourse and pragmatic 
functions. McNeill (2008) posited that this dichotomy is unfounded, and that 
gestures serve both purposes. He considered an individual social duality to be 
inherent to gestures, which are a link between individual cognition and social 
interaction (McNeill, 2008, p. 54). Every thought goes through a social filter, so 
they are two inseparable dimensions.  
With regard to the interaction between speech and gesture, the hand-in-
hand hypothesis claims that gestures reflect what is simultaneously expressed in 
speech (So, Kita, & Goldin-Meadow, 2009). Others consider, on the contrary, that 
gestures and speech are complementary in terms of meaning production, and 
that the less costly channel in terms of production is favoured to convey a given 
idea (de Ruiter, Bangerter, & Dings, 2012). The proponents of the Lexical 
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Retrieval Hypothesis (Kraus & Hadar, 1999) posit that gestures help retrieve 
words (Wagner et al., 2014), whereas in an alternative view, the Information 
Packaging Hypothesis (Kita, 2000; Alibali et al., 2000), authors argue that speech 
and gestures interact earlier, at a stage in which information is packaged and 
distributed across different modalities. In other words, in the IPH gestures are 
part of the process of conceptualising something for speaking (Wagner et al., 
2014). Another cognitive model of the speech-gesture relation links 
conceptualisation to the creation of multimodal messages (Kopp, Bergmann, & 
Kahl, 2013; Bergmann, Khal, & Kopp, 2013). On this account, visuo-spatial and 
propositional representations are both simultaneously activated and dynamically 
linked while thinking for speaking.  
3.6.2.1 The growth point hypothesis 
McNeill approached gestures from the point of view of psychology. He 
conceived gestures as “ingredients in an imagery-language dialectic that fuels 
speech and thought” (McNeill, 2008, p. 3), where the dialectic occurs between 
two different modes of thinking: analytic (language) and synthetic (gestures). The 
difference lies in the fact that while language combine semantic units to produce 
a whole meaning, gestures are not divisible but constitute a single symbolic unit. 
For McNeill, language is both static and dynamic, and the dialectic 
between these dimensions give rise to an unstable state where an idea is 
represented in two different forms simultaneously. That is what he called the 
growth point (McNeill, 2013), which must be unpacked into a linguistic form to 
resolve the dialectic. A growth point must explain speech and gesture synchrony, 
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and co-expressiveness (McNeill, 2013). In his hypothesis, McNeill presupposes 
that speech and gestures express the same idea in different semiotic modes. 
They are synchronous precisely at the exact point where they are co-expressive 
(McNeill, 2008), which for him proves that the mind is doing the same thing in two 
different ways.  
He further argued that the semiotic value of gestures only comes into play 
when an observer is taken into account. In the absence of such an observer, 
gestures are “part of the speaker current cognitive being” (McNeill, 2008 p. 42). 
That is, they are a window to the mind showcasing the speaker’s mental 
processes. In McNeill’s view, communication occurs when the context in which 
the speaker is embedded is shared with an interlocutor, who will in turn also draw 
from that context. He proposed the growth point hypothesis to explain how 
utterances are created and expressed by means of different modalities, namely 
gestures and speech. Recurrent-gesture features point to recurrent imagery in 
the speaker’s thought and they show cohesive links in discourse (McNeill & Levi, 
1993). 
3.6.2.2 Types of gestures 
3.6.2.2.1 Early classifications 
The first classification of gestures goes back to Efron (1941), later 
expanded and developed by Ekman and Friesen (1971), and Ekman (1979). 
Efron drew a line between discursive and referential gestures, which has since 
been widely acknowledged in the literature (Ekman, 1979; McNeill, 1992; 
Kendon, 2004; Bohle, 2014, etc.). For Efron, gestures can be logical-discursive, 
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such as baton-like or ideographic gestures, which are not referential and are 
linked to the conceptualisation process. The second broad category of gestures 
established by Efron is that of objective gestures, i.e. referential, which include 
deictic, iconographic, and emblematic gestures. These three types, in turn, differ 
in their degree of conventionality, with emblems as the most conventionalised 
gestures with the status of stand-alone symbols.  
Ekman and Friesen (1971), and Ekman (1979) later expanded and refined 
Efron’s classification to set up one of the most influential gesture categories in 
gesture studies (Bohle, 2014). They divided gestures into five broad types: a) 
emblems, as highly conventionalised and symbolic gestures, which can be 
produced and understood without speech; b) illustrators: referential, non-
conventionalised, always co-occurring with speech; v) regulators, with a 
discourse-management function; d) affect displays, including mainly facial 
expressions; e) adaptors, with no communicative meaning, such as touching 
one’s hair or nose, manipulating an object, etc. 
3.6.2.2.2 Kendon’s continuum 
Kendon (1980) identified different types of gestures along a continuum, 
which McNeill would later call the Kendon’s continuum (McNeill, 1992). As we 
move along the continuum, there is less need for accompanying speech, and 
gestures increasingly show analytic properties as those typical of language. 
 Gesticulations 
Gesticulations are co-speech gestures made unwittingly by the speaker. 
They are by far the most common type of speech in conversation. They are 
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synchronous or slightly precede the co-expressive part of speech they match. 
Gesticulations have universal and language-specific features. Typically, raised 
eyebrows, head tilts or deictic hand movements fall into this category. 
 Speech framed gestures 
Speech framed gestures are part of the sentence; they fill a grammatical 
slot. In other words, speech framed gestures complete the structure of that 
sentence. As opposed to gesticulations, they do not synchronise with co-
expressive speech, but rather fill a gap (McNeill, 2008). For example, if we call 
someone and then motion for them to approach with our hands, we would be 
performing a speech framed gesture. 
 Emblems 
Emblems are conventionalised, culture-bound gestures, which are 
interpretable without speech by a certain cultural or social group (Teβendorf, 
2013). Although these gestures are meaningful without the need for speech, they 
can co-occur with it too (McNeill, 1992). E.g., the thumbs-up gesture (Kendon, 
2004). 
 Pantomime 
Gestures produced without speech for the purposes of telling a story, a 
narrative, as those performed by mimes during a show. 
 Signs 
Signs as used in signed language. They are lexical words with their own 
structure, grammar, morphology, etc. (McNeill, 2008). 
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3.6.2.2.3 McNeill’s classification 
McNeill’s (1992) classification of gestures is widely acknowledged in the 
literature (Bohler, 2014). He categorised gestures on the basis of three criteria: 
form, meaning, and communicative function. McNeill considered that gesture 
types are dimensions (2008) rather than categories, as a gesture can belong to 
more than one type simultaneously without any hierarchy involved. All these 
gestures are either gesticulations or speech-frame gestures.  
 Iconic gestures 
Iconic gestures are referential and imagistic; they represent physical 
entities or concrete actions. They are semantically and pragmatically co-
expressive with speech, being not just redundant, but complementary to it 
(McNeill, 1992, pp. 12-13). An example could be a hand gesture signalling a 
downward movement when speaking of a fall, or shaping a certain volume, etc. 
 Metaphoric gestures 
They are similar to iconic gestures insofar as they are referential and 
imagistic, but metaphoric gestures represent abstract ideas (ibid., p.14). E.g., a 
tight-fist gesture to refer to someone as stingy. 
 Deictic 
Deictic gestures can be both referential and discursive; they are used to 
refer to physical entities and abstract ideas (ibid., p. 18), such as when pointing 
to an object or backwards and forward to signal past and future. 
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 Beats 
Beats have discursive value. They are used to punctuate or emphasise 
parts of speech in terms of their pragmatic-discourse value (ibid., p. 15), as when 
hitting a palm with the other hand to stress a particular idea or word. 
 Cohesive gestures 
They are used to link parts of the conversation which are on the same 
theme but may be temporally separated (ibid. p 16). E.g. moving a hand away 
and backwards when drawing on something that had been said before in 
conversation. 
Müller (as cited in Ladewig, 2014b) introduced a new type of gesture: 
recurrent gestures, different from iconic or metaphorical gestures due to their 
conventional character and pragmatic function. Conventionalisation of recurrent 
gestures relies on the pairing of the basic form of that gesture with a semantic 
value (Kousidis, Malisz, Wagner, Schlangen, & Ladewig, 2014). They are 
recurrent across different speakers in a given speech community. They differ from 
emblems, though, in that their meaning is schematic and the form-based 
motivation of the gesture is still apparent (Ladewig, 2014b). Cyclic gestures 
(Ladewig, 2014b), the holding away gesture (Bressem & Muller, 2014), or the 
palm up open hand gesture (Kendon, 2004), are examples or recurrent gestures.  
3.6.2.3 Functions of gestures 
As seen in the previous classifications, broadly speaking, gestures can 
perform the following functions: discursive, referential, conversational, and 
interactional (Ladewig, 2014a). Kendon (2013) claimed that longer segments of 
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discourse are associated with changes in posture or head movements, while 
shorter segments are linked to shorter movements. According to Kendon (2004), 
gestures may serve to add semantic value, make meaning more specific, 
represent an object or spatial relationships, or act as deictics. In addition, 
gestures can have semantic, syntactic, and discursive functions. Referential 
gestures, for example, can be used to replace speech taking over the syntactic 
function of the linguistic element replaced (Müller et al., 2013; Lapaire, 2011). 
Lausber (2013) argued that right-handers use the right-hand for concrete, 
pictorial representations, while left-hand gestures are linked to prosodic function, 
emotional processes and metaphoric thinking. This lateralisation would be 
reversed for left-handers (Casasanto, 2013). 
Regarding facial expressions, Poggi and Pelachaud (1998), drawing on 
previous literature (Ekman 1979, 1982; Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990) 
distinguished the following functions: (1) affective display, with seven possible 
prototypical face expressions for emotions, i.e. happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
disgust, surprise and embarrassment; (2) syntactic function, to emphasise words, 
questions, etc.; (3) dialogic function with regards to turn taking, signalled with eye 
and head movements; (4) referring function, to allude to an emotion that is not 
currently being felt by the speaker, with deictic gaze, or facial emblems, even 
iconic eye movements, e.g. squinting as opposed to wide open; (5) attitude 
display, to convey social attitude towards the addressee, e.g. anger, ordering, 
imploring, etc. 
In addition, gestures may be used to reinforce the expression of abstract 
ideas (McNeill, 1985; Cienki & Muller, 2008; Wagner et al., 2014). As seen before, 
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gestures also contribute to organising speech and to structure the information 
being conveyed (McNeill, 1992). Very often, the interactional value of gestures 
will merge with their function as supporting more abstract ideas (Wagner et al., 
2014). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter devoted to multimodality has addressed the basic tenets of 
this broad perspective of analysis (Adami, 2016), as well as its link to various 
related disciplines. It begins with an introduction on multimodality, outlining the 
shift this discipline has sustained from its roots in semiotics (Kress & van 
Leeuwen, 2001) towards a more cognitive stance (Forceville, 2009). 
Multimodality is defined as the study of communication that brings together all 
modes or modalities (Forceville, 2009) through which information is conveyed 
(Adami, 2016), with modes or modalities ─used interchangeably─ understood as 
semiotic channels. 
Next, the relation between multimodality and semiotics is explored, taking 
semiotics as the general science of representation (Bergman, 2007), and 
concerned with the study of any sign with communicative potential (Kress & van 
Leuween, 2001). The difference between semiotics and semiology is briefly 
covered, before moving on to explaining the field of multimodal social semiotics, 
as the approach favoured to study communication by pioneer advocates of 
multimodality (Bezemer et al., 2012; Kress, 2015). 
The chapter moves on to address how multimodality and pragmatics have 
been brought together in studying communication, where Forceville’s (2014; 
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Forceville & Clark, 2014) research clearly stands out. His work on pictures applies 
Relevant Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) to account for implicatures and 
explicatures of the visual modality. This account is followed by a section exploring 
the link between multimodality and cognitive linguistics, which warrants the 
relevance of combining both approaches to look into any instance of 
communication.  
In this chapter, I have also surveyed the literature on the multimodality of 
face-to-face interaction, which, by definition, is inherently multimodal, focusing on 
prosody and gestures as two of the main modalities at play. I have explored the 
role of prosody as contributing to information-structure and having discursive and 
affective value (Cruttenden, 1986; Bolinger, 1986; Brazil, 1997; Wennerstrom, 
2001; Pennock-Speck & Del Saz-Rubio, 2009). Furthermore, as explained 
above, ample evidence points to complex and fine-tuned coordination between 
language, prosody, and gestures, with users exploiting the different affordances 
entailed in each modality (McNeill, 2000; Kendon, 2004; Loehr, 2004; Cvejic et 
al., 2010; Flecha-García, 2010; Ladewig 2014a, 2014b; Tabacaru, 2014, etc.). 
Gestures are a window onto the mind (McNeill, 2008), and a review of 
authors supporting the idea of a close interplay of linguistic and imagistic 
conceptualisation has been included (Kendon, 2004, 2013; McNeill, 2005, 2008; 
2013; Muller, 2009; Lapaire, 2011, etc.). Gestures and language are intertwined 
in early stages of conceptualisation, as encapsulated in McNeill’s growth-point 
hypothesis (McNeill, 2013). Both speech and gestures activate conceptual 
representations and hearers can apprehend information from both modalities to 
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form a cognitive model of the referents included in discourse (Coulson & Wu, 
2014). 
As with the previous chapter, the overview offered here points to the need 
to apply a holistic view to analysing face-to-face communication. Human 
interaction can only be fully comprehended taking into account elements from 
multimodal discourse pragmatics and the “physical, contextual, and sociocultural 
anchoring of human cognition and situated meaning-making” (Mittelberg, 2017, 
p. 203). 
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Chapter 4 
             Cognitive linguistics 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Cognitive linguistics emerged as a distinct field in the mid-80’s (Evans & 
Green, 2006), as a reaction against Chomskyan Generative Grammar linguistics 
(Chomsky 1957, 1965, 1986), contested on the basis of two main issues: that 
language is an independent module separated from other cognitive functions, 
and that language is best understood at the level of competence (as opposed to 
performance2), thus taking as an object of study people’s abstract, idealised, 
linguistic knowledge (Geraeerts & Cuyckens, 2007; Ibarretxe & Valenzuela, 
2012). Seminal publications and the work of key authors such as Langacker 
(1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987) and Talmy 
(2000a, 2000b) pictured language and its study in a very different light. They 
argued that linguistic structure stems from cognition, in the sense that a given 
linguistic expression is associated with a particular way in which a situation is 
conceptualised (Lee, 2001, p.1). In other words, cognitive linguists endorse the 
idea that thought, meaning, and linguistic structure are closely intertwined. In fact, 
cognitive linguistics gives meaning a central role in language, as opposed to the 
                                            
2 Chomsky (1965) establishes that “[l]inguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal 
speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language 
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, 
distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his 
knowledge of the language in actual performance.” (p. 3). He further posits a distinction between 
competence as “the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of their language” (p.4) and performance, 
understood as “the actual use of language in concrete situations” (ibid.). 
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formalist and structuralist view held by Generative Grammar (Talmy, 2000a, 
2000b; Geraeerts, 2008).  
Cognitive linguists advocate for a bodily and experiential basis of meaning, 
cognition and language (Ziemky, Zlatev, & Roslyn, 2007); i.e. our way of 
conceptualising the world is determined by the nature of our body and how we 
physically interact with our environment (Johnson, 1987). Furthermore, this 
embodied perspective of meaning and cognition entails a deviation from logical 
or truth-conditional semantics, whereby meaning is assessed in terms of its true 
or false representation of an objective reality in the world (Croft & Cruse, 2004). 
Alternatively, cognitive linguists argue against this objectivist approach, as we 
can only construe that reality through our bodily experience (Evans & Green, 
2006; Geraeerts & Cuyckers, 2007). 
Cognitive linguistics is not a theoretical framework, but rather an umbrella 
linguistic research approach encompassing various sub-fields, theories, and lines 
of research sharing the previously explained assumptions, including, but not 
limited to, cognitive semantics (Talmy 2000a, 2000b), conceptual metaphor 
theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), mental spaces, conceptual integration 
networks, and blending (Fauconnier, 1981; 1994; Fauconnier & Turner 1998, 
2002, 2003; Coulson, 2005a; Coulson & Oakley, 2005), cognitive grammar 
(Langacker, 1987), construction grammar (Goldberg, 2006), frame semantics 
(Fillmore, 1976), etc. Broadly speaking, all cognitive linguistic areas are held 
together by the “belief that linguistic knowledge involves not only knowledge of 
the language but knowledge of the world as mediated by language”. (Geraeerts 
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& Cuyckens, 2007, p.7). From this assumption, a series of cognitive linguistics 
basic tenets emerge (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Geraeerts, 2008 pp. 4-5): 
a) Language is part and parcel of our cognitive system and it is therefore 
not autonomous nor unrelated to other cognitive functions. Linguistic 
meaning is encyclopaedic, encompassing our bodily experience of the 
world, as well as our social and cultural identity. 
b) Meaning (ultimately prefiguring language units and structure) is 
perspectival, as it stems from our conceptualisation of the world, which 
is necessarily embodied and experiential. 
c) Linguistic meaning is, therefore, necessarily usage-based. 
d) As a result, linguistic meaning is dynamic and flexible. 
This cognitive approach to language blurs the boundaries between 
traditional dichotomies in linguistics such as langue/parole, 
performance/competence or semantics/pragmatics3. 
4.2 Key concepts in cognitive linguistics 
 Certain basic elements are at the core of cognitive semantics (as the 
foundation of cognitive linguistics). Clausner and Croft (1999, p. 3) summarised 
them as follows. 
a) Concept: a concept is a unit of mental representation. For example, 
‘laughter’ would be a concept, as it elicits a mental representation of a 
                                            
3 The dichotomy holds for traditional views which restrain semantics to the meaning of 
linguistic units, whereas pragmatics is concerned with meaning in context. 
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piece of reality we ascribe to the category of laughter. In cognitive 
semantics, categorization is based on prototypical features of the given 
category, as boundaries are not always clear cut (Evans & Green, 2006). 
For example, laughter may be fake or spontaneous, or have different 
acoustic properties (Bryant & Gibbs Jr., 2015). In spite of the various 
manifestations of laughter possible, they would be ascribed to the same 
category and belong to the same concept. 
b) Domain: knowledge structure that provides background information 
allowing us to comprehend concepts, as they do not occur in isolation. 
Clausner and Croft (1999) equate this term to Fillmore’s (1968, 1975) 
frames or Lakoff’s (1987) idealised cognitive model. Langacker (1987) 
posited that domains may combine in larger, more complex structures 
called domain matrices. Broadly speaking, domains are mental 
schematisations of specific situations or experiences (Cienki, 2007; 
Ibarretxe & Valenzuela, 2012). For example, in order to understand 
concepts such as ‘far’ or ‘near’, we need the larger knowledge structure 
of SPACE. Drawing on the previous example of ‘laughter’, to understand 
it we need to relate to domains such as FACE or SOUND. 
c) Construal: operation whereby our experience of the world is 
conceptualised (Croft & Cruse, 2004). Examples of construal 
mechanisms are metaphor, metonymy, etc. In fact, so-called figurative 
language is no longer considered figure of speech, but figure of thought 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Construals encapsulate elements of the 
conceptualisation that cannot be fully grasped exclusively resorting to 
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the properties of the object conceptualised, e.g. perspective, subjectivity, 
etc. Construals invariably invoke the agent of conceptualisation as an 
input to the meaning being construed (Verhagen, 2007).  
Consider example (8) below, extracted from the sample under study. 
Alec Baldwin was speaking about not being able to go to fancy parties 
due to his tight work schedule. To the remark made by the host, Stephen 
Colbert, alluding to Baldwin’s hard life conditions, he replies construing 
the situation from the point of view of his wife, not his own, which is clear 
through the use of ‘you’ and the vocative ‘Alec’ to refer to himself. Instead 
of referring to his wife’s comments as indirect speech, e.g. ‘my wife would 
say no one feels sorry for me’, he assumes his wife’s viewpoint. That 
introduces a different perspective to the communicative event: 
(8) Stephen Colbert:  What a hard life you have. 
Alec Baldwin:  But, but, but my wife would say “Nobody feels 
sorry for you, Alec”. 
d) Category: a group of concepts, more or less prototypical, with relations 
established between the central (prototypical) members ―e.g., a 
mockingbird, for the category “bird”― and those at the periphery (less 
prototypical) of the category ―e.g. a hen or an ostrich, for that same 
category of “bird”―. (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Langacker, 1987)  
4.2.1 Mental spaces 
Mental spaces are defined as “small conceptual packets constructed as 
we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action –they are very 
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partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive 
models” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003, p. 58). Mental spaces are therefore 
dynamic and change as thought and discourse progress.  
Crucially, these spaces can be conceptually blended in order to process 
thought and language. Blending is a basic mental operation, whereby new 
meaning is created through the merging and combination of at least two mental 
spaces. An often-quoted example of blending is (9) below (Grady, Oakley, & 
Coulson, 1999; Brandt & Brandt, 2005; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002): 
(9) This surgeon is a butcher.  
In (9), two mental spaces are blended, i.e. one of a surgeon, another of a 
butcher. To illustrate it briefly, the process of conceptual integration in the blend 
involves the surgeon’s space, probably with an operation theatre, and the scalpel, 
with the aim of healing a patient, whereas the butcher’s would have a knife, a 
butcher’s shop and the objective of cutting meat. Elements from both spaces map 
onto the new, blended space, with the surgeon trying to pursue their aim with the 
butcher’s tools. In addition, the blend includes the new emergent feature of 
incompetence, resulting from a clash in surgeon’s and butcher’s objectives 
(Grady et al., 1999) not available in any of the input spaces (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002). 
Therefore, any blended space is linked to the input spaces through the 
mapping, or correspondence, of selected source features into the blended space, 
which may have its new distinct emergent structure. According to Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002, 2003), mental spaces are blended and connected in integration 
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networks, containing at least four mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic 
space with the structure shared by those inputs, and the resulting blended space. 
Brandt and Brandt (2005, p. 232) argued, however, that the shared structure 
captured in the generic space “is specified by what is situationally relevant. It is 
thus not cognitively realistic that this structure exists in the mind as a definite list 
of entities and relations independent of a goal, a purpose, motivating the 
conceptualizer to evoke these similarities”.  
Blended spaces can in turn serve as input spaces leading to multiple 
blends and highly complex integration networks. Finally, an important property of 
blending networks is the Access Principle, whereby an element in a space may 
be accessed by naming or describing their counterpart in another space 
(Fauconnier, 1997; Coulson & Oakley, 2005). 
4.2.2 Conceptual mapping 
The process whereby features of a source domain are assigned to a target 
domain. Mapping can be achieved by way of metaphor or metonymy, for 
example, although it can also account for other figures of thought such as irony, 
hyperbole, etc. (Ruiz de Mendoza, 2014). 
4.2.3 Image schemas 
Cognitive linguistics posits that our knowledge is grounded in our 
perceptual interactions, manipulation of objects and bodily experience. This, in 
turn, structures that knowledge through recurrent patterns, which are experiential 
gestalts; e.g. our experience of volume, weight, speed, distance, etc. (Hampe, 
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2005a). Image schemas are those experiential gestalts. The term was coined by 
Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987). Johnson (2005, p.19) defined them as follows: 
[I]mage schemas are the recurring patterns of our sensory-motor 
experience by means of which we can make sense of [our] 
experience and reason about it, and that can also be recruited to 
structure abstracts concepts and to carry out inferences about 
abstract domains of thought.  
Image schemas can include information in different modalities, which can 
be tapped into for abstract conceptualisation and reasoning (Cienki, 2005). They 
are a basic tenet of cognitive linguistics insofar as they explain how meaning and 
reasoning are rooted in our embodied experience. Body and mind, i.e. sensory-
motor experience and thought, cannot be separated. In other words, our construal 
of the world around us is shaped by the way we interact with it through our body 
and perception. Image schemas are schematic pre-conceptual structures 
stemming from that interaction, i.e. our experience of the world, basically drawing 
on motion and spatial relations (Talmy, 2000a, 2000b; Hampe, 2005b). The 
inventory of image schemas identified in the literature is by no means a closed 
list, but some of the core elements put forward by Lakoff (1987) and Johnson 
(1987), and supported by later studies (Lakoff &Turner, 1989; Cienki, 1997; 
Clausner & Croft, 1999) are listed in (10) and (11): 
(10) CONTAINMENT/CONTAINER, PATH/SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, LINK, 
PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, BALANCE 
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(11) FORCE schemas: ENABLEMENT, BLOCKAGE, COUNTERFORCE, 
ATTRACTION, COMPULSION, RESTRAINT, REMOVAL, DIVERSION 
(Hampe, 2005a p.2) 
Consequently, examples such as (12), and (13) are grounded on the 
CONTAINER, and PATH/SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, respectively; i.e.: our bodily 
and perceptual experience of paths ─leading to a destination/goal─ and 
containers ─in/out─ helps us construe and understand these expressions: 
(12)  He is in a very difficult situation. 
(13) She is far from getting the promotion. 
4.2.4 Construal mechanisms 
Croft and Cruse (2004) offered a list of construal mechanisms, understood 
as instantiations of broader cognitive processes, thus highlighting the link 
between language and cognition (Table 1). Construal mechanisms allow us to 
conceptualise the world, therefore to create meaning. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, many authors resort to construal mechanisms or to notions derived thereof in 
order to account for humour: figure-ground reversal (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; 
Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011), salience (Giora, 1991, 1997), metaphor 
deblending (Kyratzis, 2003), metonymy (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003), etc. The 
present study annotated each humorous instance found in the sample on the 
basis of Croft and Cruse’s classification of construal mechanisms listed in Table 
1, in order to explain how these instances are cognitively motivated. 
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Table 1. List of construal mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004 p. 46) 
Whenever we produce an utterance, we “unconsciously structure every 
aspect of the experience we intend to convey” (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 40). A 
construal can be defined as an operation whereby a speaker creates and delivers 
a conceptual representation, which, in turn, will have an effect on how that 
representation is construed by the hearer (Evans & Green, 2006). According to 
Croft and Cruse (2004, p.45), construal operations are manifestations of four 
basic cognitive abilities: attention, comparison, perspective, and constitution. In 
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turn, these cognitive abilities are paired to world properties such as salience, or 
to the philosophical concepts of judgement, situatedness, and Gelstat.  
A definition of each construal type under these categories follows. All 
definitions are based on Croft and Cruse’s book on cognitive linguistics (2004, 
pp.46 – 73). 
4.2.4.1 Attention / salience 
Attention is a human cognitive ability in which certain conceptual structures 
are activated in a neural network. Linked to attention is also salience, understood 
as the natural property of phenomena and objects in the world which somehow 
call more attention to themselves.   
4.2.4.1.1 Selection 
Selection can be defined as our ability to focus only on certain parts of an 
experience which are relevant at a given time, while ignoring concurrent aspects 
deemed irrelevant.  
4.2.4.1.1.1Profiling 
Profiling is the process whereby a certain concept in a semantic frame is 
given more prominence. A typical example is that of profiling the arc or radius in 
a circle (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 47). Profiling may also occur within a concept 
itself, in which only certain aspects of the domain are highlighted, as in example 
(14) below (ibid., p. 48): 
(14)  Where is the Sunday Times? 
 Have you read the Sunday Times? 
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In (14), the first question profiles the Sunday Times as a physical object, 
whereas in the second question, it is the text contained in the paper and not the 
physical object itself which matters. 
In the sample under study, profiling is the second most frequent construal 
mechanism identified. This may be consistent with the widely-held view that 
humour lies in an incongruity, which may well be produced and resolved by way 
of shifting the focus from an expected ─salient─ meaning to a less salient one 
(Giora, 1997; Giora, Drucker, Fein, & Mendelson, 2015). Consider example (15) 
below, extracted from our sample. 
(15)  Amy Schumer:        This past winter Canada Goose gave me a coat.  
         Stephen Colbert:    Oh, those are great. 
Amy Schumer:      And, yeah, super warm. And I was psyched 
'cause it was my favourite. It was like...free. 
In this example, Amy Schumer has profiled just one feature of the coat she 
had been given (one “facet of the domain matrix”, to use Croft and Cruse 
terminology [ibid p.47]), i.e.: that it was free, so she didn’t have to pay for it, as 
opposed to the coat being warm, trendy, comfortable, etc., which could be hailed 
as more traditional reasons to like a piece of clothing. The humorous effect stems 
from the fact that those expectations on the reasons why clothes are appreciated 
are broken (all the more so coming from a celebrity, which is expected to be able 
to afford a winter coat). 
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4.2.4.1.1.2 Metonymy 
Broadly speaking, a cognitive definition of metonymy is the ability to select 
“a different contextually salient concept profile in a domain or domain matrix than 
the one usually symbolized by the word” ─ A for B─ (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 48). 
That is, the typical concept profile is changed to be used to refer to something 
else, as in (16) below (ibid. p.48), in which ‘french fries' [sic.] is used by a waiter 
to refer to the person who ordered such food: 
(16)  That french fries is getting impatient. 
In our sample, the only utterance that could arguably be considered an 
example of metonymy is (17), which is Elon Musk’s answer to a question by 
Stephen Colbert on whether a new charger for electric cars to be released by 
Tesla is safe: 
(17) Elon Musk:  For the prototype at least, I would recommend not 
dropping anything when you're near it. 
In my view, the profile concept of “dropping anything near it” is metonymic 
for the consequence, which would allegedly be to be attacked by the new device 
being tested. That is, the salient meaning of “dropping anything near it” is shifted 
to include the whole event, which would roughly include two stages: dropping 
something near the prototype and being attacked by it. 
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4.2.4.1.2 Scope of attention  
Scope of attention refers to the area surrounding the focus of attention 
(what is selected or foregrounded), which contains elements that can be 
accessible in terms of attention.  
4.2.4.1.2.1 Scope of predication 
The scope of predication means that presuppositions entailed in a concept 
are more easily accessible than more indirectly related domains. Consider 
example (18) below.  
Amy Schumer is speaking about an incident with animal-welfare activists, 
who criticised her for wearing a coat with coyote fur. 
(18) Amy Schumer:  What they do is...To make the hood, they kill 
coyotes. And I was like...yeah...I was like "Oh, 
my god”. If I made a list of the animals I care 
about more than coyotes... It would be a list of 
every animal. I don't care. 
In this case, with the counterfactual “If I made a list of the animals…”, she 
establishes a scope of predication in which the domain of an actual list with a 
given number of animals (potentially a long list, as it was clear in the interview 
that she did not share the activists’ concerns) is easily accessible. As I see it, 
humour relies on the exaggeration entailed in including every single animal on 
the list, as a way of making clear that she does not care at all about the use of 
coyote fur in the coats at stake.  
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4.2.4.1.2.2 Search domains 
Search domains refer to achieving the construal of a concept by narrowing 
down the scope of preceding expressions. This is very clear in locative 
expressions, in which the order in which they are presented is crucial to pinpoint 
the concept to be delimited. 
(19)  The money is on the top shelf, in the kitchen, under the counter, 
behind the meat grinder, in the lefthand cabinet. (Croft & Cruse, 
2004, p. 51). 
4.2.4.1.2.3 Accessibility 
The last construal operation related to scope is that of accessibility, 
whereby a domain is accessible by way of a referent point in the scope of 
attention (that is, part of the concept that is around the focus). Again, no such 
examples have been found in the sample. 
4.2.4.1.3 Scalar adjustment 
Scalar adjustment involves a change in the scale of attention. Consider 
example (20) below (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 52): 
(20)  a. She ran across the field. 
 b. She ran through the field. 
The use of ‘across’ in (20a) conveys the idea of thickness or volume, as 
that preposition is used for three-dimensional spaces. In (20b), however, the field 
is portrayed as two-dimensional by way of the preposition ‘through’. Both 
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sentences describe the same scene, but the way they have been construed and 
presented directs our attention to different aspects of the field.  
Scalar adjustment can be achieved quantitatively or qualitatively. 
Quantitative scalar adjustment is achieved by means of changing the granularity 
of the concept, as in example (20) above, in which (20a) offers a more coarse-
grained depiction of the field, whereas (20b) is more of a close-up. Qualitative 
adjustment, in turn, refers to the construal of a concept resorting to a wider 
category. Whereas quantitative adjustment involves construing along a scale, 
qualitative adjustment relies on the loss of irrelevant properties.  
4.2.4.1.4 Dynamic attention 
Attention can lead to static construals of a concept, as with focus, scope 
and scale, but it can also be dynamic, construing a given scene moving the 
attention across it.  
4.2.4.1.4.1 Fictive motion 
Fictive motion involves the dynamic construal of a static scene, as in (21) 
(Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 53): 
(21)  The road climbs through the valley and then climbs over the high 
mountains. 
Clearly, the road itself is not moving nor going anywhere, but in (21) it is 
dynamically construed, attributing movement to the static road. 
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4.2.4.1.4.2 Summary / sequential scanning 
A scene can also be construed through scanning, conceptualising it in its 
entirety (summary scanning), as in ‘The collapse of the building’, or sequentially, 
e.g.: The building collapsed. 
Consider example (22) from the sample, in which Sigourney Weaver is 
talking about a recent trip to Cuba and about what happened with one of the 
classic cars they hired. 
(22) Sigourney Weaver:  Ours [car] stalled and we all had to get out and 
give a little push... 
In (22) the situation is sequentially scanned and it is presented in such a 
way that we construe the situation over a period of time. 
4.2.4.2 Judgement / comparison  
Judgement as a philosophical concept is linked to the cognitive process of 
comparison, which can be performed through the following construal 
mechanisms. 
4.2.4.2.1 Categorization  
Categorization consists of “applying a word, morpheme or construction to 
a particular experience to be communicated” (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p.54). To do 
so, a process of comparison between the experience at hand and previous 
experiences is undertaken, and judgement is made to assign the present 
experience to the same category as the previous ones. 
Chapter 4 – Cognitive linguistics 113  
 
 
Consider example (23), taken from the sample, in which Alec Baldwin 
refers to the casual clothes he is wearing for the interview: 
(23)  Alec Baldwin:  I call it the Springsteen look. 
In (23), Alec Baldwin is framing the way he looks with the clothes he is 
wearing by aligning his style to famous American singer Bruce Springsteen’s 
typical casual look. He has construed his look by first comparing it to a well-known 
singer who usually dresses informally, and then Alec Baldwin has judged it was 
a legitimate comparison and that today’s style can be assigned to Springsteen’s 
usual look. 
4.2.4.2.2 Metaphor 
Metaphor is an operation whereby a certain phenomenon is construed in 
terms of another ─A is B─. A relationship is established between a source 
domain, which will serve to facilitate the construal, and a target domain, which is 
the one described by the metaphor. Usually, the source domain is more tangible 
and easy to understand than the target domain, hence its use as an explanatory 
tool. 
Consider example (24), from Alison Janney’s interview. She has been 
asked how she feels about Trump’s Administration, given that, according to the 
host, she had some relevant expertise gathered when she impersonated CJ, the 
character of White House Press Secretary in the popular series The West Wing. 
She refers to Mr Sean Spicer’s job (Trump’s Press Secretary at the time) resorting 
to metaphor, in which the source domain is that of a plane, where the leading 
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team is in the cockpit. The plane in the target domain is linked to the country, the 
cockpit to the Administration, and the pilot to the President of the US. 
(24) Alison Janney:  It's not easy. And, and, and, I, as CJ, I had Aaron 
Sorkin in my cockpit. And he [Mr Spencer] has 
someone I'm not sure knows how to flight a plane. 
4.2.4.2.3 Figure-ground alignment 
The relation between figure and ground is used to construe spatial 
relations, whereby the position of an object ─figure─ is expressed in relation to 
another ─ground─, such as in (25), in which ‘boy’ is the figure, and ‘house’, the 
ground.  
(25) The boy is in the house. 
Figure-ground relations can also be established between events, as in (24) 
(Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 57), where ‘sleeping’ ─the ground─ is subordinate to 
‘dreaming’ ─the figure: 
(26) He dreamed while he slept.  
4.2.4.3 Perspective / situatedness 
Perspective does not only relate to spatial position. It can also be based 
on our knowledge, attitudes and believes. The philosophical notion of 
situatedness is linked to perspective, as it refers to being in a particular place, at 
a given time, with all the spatial and non-spatial elements of the context involved.  
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4.2.4.3.1 Viewpoint 
Viewpoint is a focal adjustment based on vantage point and orientation. 
The vantage point will determine a certain foreground-background setting, 
whereas orientation refers to the vertical dimension.  
Consider example (27) below, taken from the sample, in which British 
Daniel Kaluuya talks about the extent to which experiences by black people in 
Britain and in the US are alike: 
(27)  Daniel Kaluuya:  White people say some very weird staff to you. 
(27) is a clear example in which the situation to be conveyed is construed 
and expressed from the standpoint of the speaker as a black person. It is from 
his perspective (as a proxy of black people’s perspective as a community) that 
the utterance is produced. 
4.2.4.3.2 Deixis 
Deixis is the operation whereby a speaker will refer to something in the 
scene or event described, either relative to the speech event or to another deictic 
centre established by the speaker. The use of pronouns, demonstratives, verb 
tenses are expressions of deictic construals, as they are always used relative to 
the speaker.  
Deixis can be used to establish spatiotemporal references (28). It can also 
be based on the knowledge shared by interlocutors, as well as common beliefs 
and attitudes, in which case we talk of epistemic deixis. In (29), Daniel Kaluuya 
is making reference to a previous situation in the interview, which in turn referred 
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to a scene in the film Get Out, where a man who would later prove to be extremely 
racist said to the black main character that he would have voted for Obama a 
third time . The common ground, i.e., shared knowledge, assumptions, etc., will 
constrain what is expressed and how it is expressed. In addition, speakers may 
take the perspective of the interlocutor to construe and express a situation or 
event by means of applying empathy deixis, such as in (30), where VP Biden 
takes on the perspective and attitude of the audience (or what he believes will be 
so). 
(28)  Susan Sarandon:  Oh my God, look at your ceiling. 
(29)    Daniel Kaluuya:  [On Stephen Colbert remark that he had seen 
Get Out three times]. Thank you, thank you so 
much. I mean, I'm so happy... 
(30)  VP Joseph Biden:  Now, you're all gonna laugh when I say this. 
4.2.4.3.3 Subjectivity / objectivity 
Subjectivity/objectivity refers to how a situation is conceptualised when the 
speaker is included. Consider example (31) (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 62): 
(31) [said by mother to child] 
  a. Don’t lie to me. 
  b. Don’t lie to your mother. 
(31a) is an example of subjective construal, whereas (31b) implies a 
process of objectivization in which the mother refers to herself as an entity that is 
not part of the speech event. 
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Example (32) below is taken from our sample: 
(32) Elon Musk:  [on question whether he is a super hero or super 
villain] I try to do useful things. 
Stephen Colbert is trying to portrait Elon Musk as a super hero or super 
villain, given that he is a billionaire, he develops new technologies and he has the 
ambition to change the world. Elon Musk replies by playing down all those facts 
and defining himself just as someone who tries to do useful things. He is 
positioning himself at the centre of the speech event. 
In (33), however, also taken from the sample, Amy Schumer refers to 
herself as a third person, ‘home-girl’, therefore placing herself outside the scene 
as a different person from the one wearing a designer dress for a fancy event 
portrayed in the picture she is mentioning. 
(33)  Amy Schumer:  But I'll tell you what. Home-girl was sweating. 
All construals based on perspective depend on us being in the world in a 
particular manner (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 63). That places ourselves in a given 
vantage point, both conceptually and spatiotemporally, i.e. deixis. In addition, as 
participants in a speech event, our role in it will determine the status of the 
situation to be conveyed ─epistemic deixis─, as well as our attitude towards it 
─empathy─, and how we present ourselves in that situation ─subjectivity─. 
4.2.4.4 Constitution / Gelstat 
Constitution / Gelstat imply construal operations whereby the structure of 
the entities in a given scene is conceptualised. Such entities are constituted, that 
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is, given a Gelstat or structure, with the definition of relations of proximity, 
boundaries, and continuation. It is the most basic level of construing our 
experience (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 63). 
4.2.5 Conceptual metaphor 
From a multimodal perspective, arguably the most widely researched 
construal mechanism is metaphor (Velasco-Sacristán & Fuertes-Oliveira, 2006; 
Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Velasco-Sacristán, 2010), with metonymy 
receiving increasing attention (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Velasco-Sacristán, 
Fuertes-Oliveira, & Samaniego-Fernández, 2005; Velasco-Sacristán, 2010; 
Tabacaru & Feyaerts, 2016; etc.).  
One of the most influential books on metaphor from a cognitive linguistic 
perspective is Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors we live by (1980), in which they 
establish that metaphor is a figure of thought, and not of speech. Their 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory is mainly concerned with conventional metaphors, 
i.e. metaphors that have become entrenched among a community of language 
users (Croft & Cruse, 2004). 
Metaphor in cognitive linguistics is the ability to understand one concept in 
terms of another ─A is B─ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Forceville, 2009). It involves 
a relationship between the source domain, i.e. the literal meaning of the 
metaphorical expression, and the target domain, i.e. what is going to be 
conceptualised by means of such metaphor. Conceptualisation occurs via the 
mapping of features from the source domain ―usually more concrete and easier 
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to grasp― and the target domain ―usually more abstract and difficult to 
comprehend―.  
Let’s consider the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980), in which there is a mapping of features from the source domain, i.e. 
JOURNEY into the target domain, LOVE, which allows us to construe the latter 
in terms of the former. That means that lovers have a common goal, like travellers 
going to the same destination; progress in the relationship is equated to progress 
along the path; there may be obstacles in their relationship, in the fashion of 
obstacles against motion, etc. (Ruiz de Mendoza & Galera, 2014, pp. 1-2). The 
mapping between source and target domains include two types of 
correspondences: ontological and epistemic. Ontological correspondence is 
established between elements in the respective domains, e.g. destination/goals 
in the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, whereas epistemic mapping refers to the 
relations between elements, e.g.: going in the same direction is good for the 
travellers / having the same goals is good for the lovers (Croft & Cruse, 2004). 
Recent studies distinguish between several types of metaphor, whose 
different dimensions, such as metaphor in language, in thought or in 
communication, can be analysed from various approaches. (Steen, 2011; Kaal, 
2012). Furthermore, the study of metaphor as it is found in natural discourse 
environments is receiving increasing attention (Marhula & Rosinski, 2014). One 
such perspective of analysis is the MIPVU method (Steen et al., 2010), which 
focus on identifying metaphor-related words in discourse in order to confront their 
basic and context meaning. Given that MIPVU analyses are mainly concerned 
with lexical units, not exploring underlying mapping correspondences, this 
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procedure has been discarded for the present study, as my thesis is mainly 
interested in conceptual metaphor as a construal mechanism. 
4.2.5.1 Multimodal metaphor 
Forceville (2009, 2015, 2016) and Cienki (2008, 2013a) argued that 
metaphors are not exclusive to verbal language, and they can also occur in other 
modalities, such as gestures. Indeed, metaphoric gestures are one of the 
categories established by McNeill (1992), defined as gestures whose pictorial 
content represent an abstract idea. In mixed metaphors, a target domain is 
understood in terms of two or more source domains (Forceville, 2016). Cienki 
(2008) provided various examples of multimodal metaphors involving gestures 
and speech. One such example (p.14) reports a student talking about honesty 
being a clear-cut concept, in which you are right or wrong (“black and white”, with 
no grey colours), while making a “chopping gesture” with her hands, demarcating 
two distinct spaces. This example is interesting because two different source 
domains are elicited through speech and gestures in order to convey “the stark 
difference between two kinds of moral behaviour” (ibid.): whereas a colour 
metaphor is used verbally ―black and white―, a spatial metaphor is used in 
gesture, dividing space into two clearly distinct areas.  
As with conceptual metaphors, gestural metaphors can be more or less 
conventionalised, salient or highlighted in conversation. However, metaphors 
expressed verbally or by means of gestures do not necessarily coincide, and 
each modality expresses metaphors in a different way (McNeil 1992; Cienki, 
2008, 2013; Cienki & Muller, 2014). This claim is further supported by Forceville 
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(2016, p.1), who explained it due to the affordances and constraints of each 
modality, and also to the fact that multimodal discourse has no grammar, albeit it 
does have structure; therefore multimodal and purely verbal metaphors behave 
differently. 
4.3 Current Discourse Space 
Langacker (2001) linked cognitive grammar to discourse claiming that all 
linguistic units result from the abstraction of usage events, i.e. actual examples 
of language use. Fig. 2 illustrates the different elements comprised in a usage 
event: 
 
 
  Figure 2. Representation of a usage event (Langacker, 2001 p. 145) 
 
The ground is the communicative situation itself, including the speaker, the 
hearer, the time and place of the event, etc. The context of a usage event refers 
to the immediate context of speech, including “the physical, mental, social and 
cultural circumstances” (Langacker, 2001, p.145), whereas the shared 
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knowledge is made of background and encyclopaedic knowledge shared by 
interlocutors beyond the immediate context. The viewing or discourse frame is 
the scope of representation and conceptualisation interlocutors have at any given 
time, which is necessarily limited. Within the activated viewing frame, a certain 
focus of attention is profiled against the background by multimodal means (verbal, 
gesture, intonation, gaze, etc.).  
The CDS is defined as “the mental space comprising those elements and 
relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for 
communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse” (Langacker, 2001, p. 
144). The CDS is therefore the overarching framework in which communication 
is taking place, including subsequent usage events ―and obviously all their 
components therein―. The CDS evolves as a result of and is transformed by the 
linguistic structures in usage events, where linguistic must be understood as not 
merely verbal, but multimodal, comprising gestures, intonation, etc. 
To some extent, Langacker acknowledged multimodal inputs as linguistic 
units in his description of usage events as bipolar events, with a conceptualisation 
pole and a vocalisation pole. Each pole is enriched by multiple coordinating 
channels. The conceptualisation pole comprises three channels: information 
structure, speech management (basically turn taking) and the objective situation 
(the most prominent channel). In turn, the vocalisation pole would be fed through 
gestures, intonation, and segmental content. If we refer to these three channels 
as modes, the clear link with multimodality already present in Langacker’s work 
becomes explicit. 
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Compared to Clark’s (1996) layering model, advocated by Brône (2008), 
Langacker’s ground would be equivalent to Clark’s layer 1. I claim that 
Langacker’s CDS comprises all inputs which can potentially be elicited to produce 
or interpret meaning in a communicative situation. The CDS dynamically changes 
as usage events are being realised. Langacker (2001) considers CDS and ground 
to be cognitive domains that can be potentially tapped into for the meaning of 
linguistic elements. Domains can also be drawn upon to form mental spaces. 
Blends and construal operations involved in humorous communication therefore 
take place against the backdrop of CDS.  
Humour would stem from sudden incongruous changes in the CDS 
achieved by means of construal mechanisms subverted for humorous purposes 
(Veale et al., 2006). Furthermore, I posit that both the semantic and pragmatic 
approaches to humour converge under this perspective, as conceptualisation 
―therefore dynamic meaning― is rooted in discourse, thus acknowledging both 
the meaning-making production and context-related interactional facets. 
4.4 Cognitive linguistics and semiotics 
Semiotics is “a system of thought which explicitly seeks to mediate 
between the natural environment and its perception in consciousness” (Daylight, 
2012 p.1). Furthermore, if we consider Bezemer et al.’s (2012) definition of 
multimodal social semiotics (cf. Chapter 3), there is a clear link between sign 
production rooted in the organisation of social resources ―which Bezemer et al. 
(ibid.) take as the object of study for social semiotics― and conceptualisation of 
our experience of the world as a meaning-making process grounded in discourse, 
as advocated by cognitive linguistics (Langacker, 2001). Social interaction is a 
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key element of discourse. The entrenchment of discursive patterns, stemming 
from recurring usage events, including social interaction patterns, form the basis 
of shared social resources. Let’s consider the following example (Bezemer et al., 
2012 p. 9): 
[In an operating theatre], teacher and learner use a range of 
communicative resources to manage the positioning of retractors. In 
Example 1 the trainer uses hand gestures to signify to the trainee 
where and how to hold the retractor. Her verbal comment (“Just hold 
it there”) is only meaningful in relation to those hand gestures. In 
Example 2 her use of speech (“just slide that one in laterally”) 
becomes more precise, describing a movement and a direction, 
whilst a pointing gesture indicates which of the two retractors to use 
for making that movement. In Example 3 speech is not used at all. 
Here the trainee signals to the trainer, through self-initiated 
positioning of the retractor, that he feels he is capable of doing so. 
This is then followed by an evaluation of the trainer (“Yeah, brilliant”; 
“yeah perfect”). 
From a multimodal perspective, the interaction between gestures and 
speech in this communicative event is clear, with pointing and direction gestures 
complementing the meaning elicited by words. At the same time, the multimodal 
social semiotic analysis performed by Bezemer et al.’s views changes occurred 
during the usage event, where control gradually moves from trainer to trainee, as 
a sign of learning (p.10). Finally, from a cognitive perspective, there is a construal 
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of the situation in which the trainee adopts the trainer’s viewpoint and which is 
framed by a teacher-learner domain governing the interaction between them. 
4.5 Cognitive semiotics and multimodality 
Brandt and Brandt (2005) argued that communication (interpersonal or 
intersubjective) is essentially semiotic, and that expressive blends should be 
understood as signs and fall under the study of cognitive semiotics, which is 
concerned with “the study of cognition in semiosis” (p. 216). In order to account 
for blends from a semiotic perspective, they argued that input spaces blend in a 
semiotic space, where the “very act of signifying” (ibid. p.225) occurs. They 
distanced themselves from Fauconnnier’s discourse base space, as they 
consider it to be ontological, rather than semiotic. They argued that it represents 
the speaker’s view of reality. They likened their semiotic space to Langacker’s 
ground (Langacker, 2001). Giora (2002), in turn, linked this semiotic space to 
Langacker’s notion of current discourse space. 
According to the description that followed in Brandt and Brandt (2005), 
though, their semiotic space could rather be equated to Langacker’s usage event. 
They pictured the semiotic space as three concentric spheres, one pertaining to 
the expressive act itself, a larger sphere corresponding to the apprehension by 
participants of the circumstances of the communicative situation and the biggest 
sphere, comprising the other two, related to what they call the pheno-world 
―defined as “conditions that are universally given in the human 
phenomenological life-world”― (p. 226). I argue that Brandt and Brandt’s spheres 
correspond to ground, context, and shared knowledge in Langacker’s (2001) 
usage event. In my view, the construct of current discourse space is a large 
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notion: a fluctuating and evolving mental space elicited by the overarching 
discourse situation, of which usage events are specific instances at a given time. 
Brandt and Brandt’s semiotic space, on the contrary, is not linked to the discourse 
event beyond the inner sphere of the speech event itself, which I see as 
analogous to Langacker’s ground. 
One obvious difference, though, is that while Langacker (2001) placed his 
usage event in a bigger current discourse space, shared by interlocutors, Brandt 
and Brandt took the semiotic space as inherent to any form of communication, 
which can involve an interlocutor or just interaction with oneself in the form of 
inner thought. To me this distinction is a matter of perspective, rather than of 
substance. Both accounts share the fundamental claim that meaning-making 
processes ―Brandt and Brandt’s (2005) signification and Langacker’s (2001) 
conceptualisation― are rooted in discourse and in our experience of the world.  
Brandt and Brandt represented blending networks as examples of 
semiosis in the Peircean tradition. They pointed to the following mental spaces 
(ibid.): 
a) Presentation Space, including the representamen (the signifying sign). 
b) Reference Space, including the object to be signified. 
c) Interpretant Space, showing how the sign must be interpreted. 
d) A blended space with the meaning resulting from combining the three 
previous inputs. 
Their basis for rejecting Fauconnier and Turner’s (1998, 2002, 2003) 
model is that, in their view, it does not account for inferences. Hence, they 
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claimed that more spaces are needed in the blending network. One is the 
semiotic space, linking the blending process to the context in which the act of 
signifying occurs. Another is the relevance space within the semiotic space 
allowing for the retrieval of inferences. They therefore claimed that their model of 
blending network is more comprehensive.  
However, I reject this claim for two reasons: first, as they themselves 
acknowledge in their paper, not all sign relations are relations between mental 
spaces, and thus they cannot be represented in terms of presentation space, 
reference space, etc. Brandt and Brandt (2005) claimed that the overall structure 
of the network is nevertheless the same, but they offer no counterexample to 
illustrate it. If, as they claimed in the article, communication is essentially semiotic 
in nature, it necessarily involves signs, so a question remains to be answered: 
How those signs would be motivated if not by means of conceptualisation through 
mental spaces? 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, in my view, they argued that this 
cognitive semiotic model of blending networks relies on intentional sign relations. 
They further posited the following as a major tenet of Cognitive Semiotics (p. 
242): 
The blending network is a cognitive remodelling of semiosis in 
general, as understood in the Peircean tradition, but only in the 
sense that a Presentation of a Reference is necessarily an 
intentional sign relation, linking a Representamen to an Object, and 
that the stabilization of such a relation through an Interpretant 
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corresponds strictly to the semiotic function of Relevance-making in 
the blending network. 
In my view, to include only intentional communication implies that many 
instances of communication are excluded. The cognitive semiotics approach 
advocated by Brandt and Brandt proves to be too restrictive for a comprehensive 
analysis of communication. A broader view of cognitive semiotics, though, is 
advocated by Zlatev (2012), who defined it as “an emergent field dedicated to the 
transdisciplinary study of meaning” (p. 2), whose aim is to provide new insight 
into the process of human signification drawing from various disciplines and 
specially merging cognitive science and semiotics. Zlatev defended that the study 
of gestures is best analysed from this cognitive semiotics perspective, as he 
believes has been more or less explicitly done by Kendon (2002, 2004), McNeil 
(1985, 1992, 2000, 2014) and Müller and Cienki, 2009 (see also Cienki & Muller, 
2008). 
4.6 Conclusion 
A brief introduction of the discipline is offered (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Evans 
& Green, 2006; Geraeerts, 2008), along with an overview of major assumptions 
within this approach, placing special emphasis on the experiential bases for 
knowledge advocated by cognitive linguists (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Talmy, 
2000 a, 2000b; Langacker, 2001; etc.), as what I think is the obvious link between 
cognitive linguistics and multimodality. If our thoughts and construal of the world 
are shaped through our perception and bodily experience, then a cognitive-based 
multimodal study of spontaneous communication focusing on the interplay 
Chapter 4 – Cognitive linguistics 129  
 
 
between the verbal, prosodic and co-speech gestures channels (or modes) is 
warranted.  
Paramount concepts in cognitive linguistics, such as domains (Langacker, 
1987), construal operations (Croft & Cruse, 2004), image schemas (Lakoff, 1987; 
Johnson, 1987), mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994), and blending (Fauconnier & 
Turner, 2002) are reviewed, as they will later be drawn upon to conduct a 
cognitive analysis of humorous instances identified in my sample. To that end, I 
will endorse Clausner and Croft’s (1999) claim that image schemas are 
subsumed as a sub-type of domains, which in turn are overarching frameworks 
in which metal spaces arise. 
Langacker’s (2001) notions of current discourse space, along with that of 
linguistic units as abstractions of usage events, are advocated as the bases of 
my account of humour in conversation. In line with one of cognitive linguistics 
major tenets, i.e. that language is not based on an independent cognitive ability 
different from other cognitive functions, and that linguistic meaning is not separate 
from other forms of knowledge that we have (Geraeerts, 2008), I endorse Veale 
et al. (2006) view that humour does not need to be explained by means of 
humour-specific mechanisms. Instead, cognitive linguistics offers the tools to 
account for humorous communication as a highly complex phenomenon (Veale 
et al., 2015) which draws on a non-prototypical use of general construal 
operations (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003). 
Then, the chapter delves into the link between cognitive linguistics and 
semiotics, and, more specifically, into a critical review of cognitive semiotics, as 
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defended by Brandt and Brandt (2005). Their model for explaining blending from 
a cognitive semiotic point of view is analysed and rejected, as in my view it does 
not offer better explanatory power than other tools such as blending (Fauconnier 
& Turner, 2002) or Langacker’s (2001) current discourse space.  
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  Chapter 5 
 Material and methods 
 
5.1 Introduction 
There is increasing recognition that in order to conduct a proper multimodal 
analysis of communication, it is better to study spontaneous instances of 
communication (Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo et al., 2013; 
Tabacaru, 2014). Regarding humour, many analyses focus on staged humour as 
a proxy for spontaneous communication (Urios-Aparisi & Wagner, 2011; 
Tabacaru, 2014). However, given than humour is based on familiarity, it could be 
argued that staged humour resorts to exaggerated or more ostentatious features 
in order to reach a wider audience (Flamson et al., 2011). Therefore, its validity 
as a proxy for everyday spontaneous communication could be questioned. 
Consequently, for the purposes of this dissertation, I have favoured the approach 
of studying non-scripted, non-rehearsed humorous communication.  
Below I present the sample in detail, along with the annotation tools used 
for this analysis. This chapter ends with a brief overview of the quantitative results 
obtained for all the parameters studied: humour types, construal mechanisms, 
gestures, and prosodic features.  
5.2 Sample 
The sample analysed includes 14 interviews from The Late Show with 
Stephen Colbert. The choice of show has been determined by the fact that, 
typically, late night shows allow for humorous instances to occur more frequently 
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than other type of shows. Late-night talk shows belong to a genre which involves 
political satire, sketch comedy, monologues, and interviews to celebrities in a light 
and playful tone.  
Interviews have been selected as a source of non-scripted speech in which 
humorous communication is likely to occur. In order to ensure that only non-
scripted communication is accounted for, only utterances by interviewees have 
been analysed, avoiding mostly pre-scripted or rehearsed host’s speech. 
Interviews were selected to have an equal number of men and women and a 
variety of ethnic and professional backgrounds. 
Humorous instances found in interviews vary in length, type and number. 
Each interview was analysed in a different ELAN file, as explained more in detail 
in section 5.3.1. Prosodic features for each selected utterance were studied 
separately in Praat. All interviews are freely available on Youtube. The videos 
were downloaded with aTube Catcher, a free video software. Table 2 summarises 
the main features of the 14 interviews under study in this sample. 
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Interviewee Gender Age  Ethnic back. 
Interview 
(s.)  
Humorous 
instances 
Humorous 
instances (s.)  
Episode/season date 
Alec Baldwin Male 60 White 432,030 13 43,055 Episode 130 (S2) 18/4/2017 
Alison Janney Female 58 White 445,262 6 29,206 Episode134 (S2) 24/04/2017 
Amy Schumer Female 36 White 514,597 12 38,495 Episode 140 (S2) 2/05/2017 
Condola Rashad Female 31 Black 389,859 4 17,430 Episode 106 (S2) 2/3/2017 
Cristela Alonso Female 39 Hispanic 364,549 12 44,325 Episode 82 (S2) 20/1/2017 
Daniel Kaluuya Male 29 Black 404,488 13 45,859 Episode 71 (S3) 16/01/2018 
Elon Musk Male 46 White 167,691 4 13,905 Episode 2 (S1) 9/09/2015 
Michael Hayden Male 73 White 448,257 5 14,050 Episode 109 (S2) 7/03/2017 
Joseph Biden Male 75 White 625,797 7 18,495 Episode 55 (S2)6/12/2016 
John McWhorter Male 52 Black 412,383 7 31,120 Episode 94 (S3) 27/02/2017 
Riz Ahmed Male 35 Asian 543,923 13 39,420 
Episode 198 (Season 1) 
29/08/2016 
Sheryl Crow Female 56 White 290,501 3 9,535 Episode 132 (S2) 20/4/2017 
Sigourney Weaver Female 68 White 454,829 5 17,870 Episode 126 (S2) 5/04/2017 
Susan Sarandon Female 71 White 676,788 5 11,560 Episode 123 (S2) 
Table 2. Interviews in the sample 
The sample contains 103.83 minutes of interviews, out of which 109 
humorous utterances were found, amounting to 6.24 minutes in total. For each 
humorous utterance, annotations on five parameters were made: a) transcription 
of the utterances selected, b) main construal mechanism underlying humour, c) 
type of humour involved, d) gestures made in the humorous utterances, e) 
prosodic analysis (pitch and intensity). Additional utterances were selected for 
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comparison of prosodic features between humorous and non-humorous 
utterances, as will be explained in more detail below. What follows is an overview 
of each interview with regards to types of gestures and humour identified. 
 
 
 
ALEC BALDWIN  
  
  
 
 
  Figure 3. Overview of Alec Baldwin’s interview 
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ALISON JANNEY  
 
 
 
  Figure 4. Overview of Alison Janney’s interview. 
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AMY SCHUMER  
 
 
 
  Figure 5. Overview of Amy Schumer’s interview. 
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CONDOLA RASHAD  
 
 
 
  Figure 6. Overview of Condola Rashad’s interview. 
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CRISTELA ALONZO 
 
 
 
  Figure 7. Overview of Cristela Alonzo’s interview. 
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DANIEL KALUUYA 
 
 
 
  Figure 8. Overview of Daniel Kaluuya’s interview. 
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ELON MUSK 
 
 
 
  Figure 9. Overview of Elon Musk’s interview. 
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JOSEPH BIDEN 
 
 
 
  Figure 10. Overview of Joseph Biden’s interview. 
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JOHN MCWHORTER 
 
 
 
  Figure 11. Overview of John McWhorter’s interview. 
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GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN 
 
 
 
  Figure 12. Overview of Michael Hayden interview. 
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RIZ AHMED 
 
 
 
  Figure 13. Overview of Riz Ahmed’s interview. 
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SHERYL CROW 
 
 
 
  Figure 14. Overview of Sheryl Crow’s interview. 
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SIGOURNEY WEAVER 
 
 
 
  Figure 15. Overview of Sigourney Weaver’s interview. 
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SUSAN SARANDON 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Overview of Susan Sarandon interview. 
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What follows is a breakdown of gestures and humour types per gender. No 
differences exist between male and female interviewees. The most frequent 
gestures and types of humour in both groups are in line with the overall results 
for the sample. 
 
        Figure 17. Gestures performed by men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 18. Types of humour (men). 
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Figure 19. Gestures performed by women. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Humour types (women) 
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5.3 Annotation tools 
Two different software applications were used to perform the multimodal 
analysis: ELAN, version 5.1 (ELAN, 2017) was used to upload and study videos, 
with annotations on transcription, construal mechanisms, gestures, and humour 
type. A fifth tier on prosody was added to report the results of the separate 
prosodic analysis conducted in Praat. Praat, version 6.0.32 (Boersma & Weenink, 
2017)4 was used for the prosodic analysis, drawing audio files equivalent to the 
utterances selected in order to obtain measurements for pitch (fundamental 
frequency: F0), and intensity. Mean intensity and mean F0 values were then 
included in the prosodic tier in Elan for each utterance identified. Finally, statistical 
data was processed through SPSS (version 20). 
5.3.1 ELAN 
Elan is a video annotation tool, allowing for multiple complex annotation 
on different tiers. The videos were first captured and downloaded in mp4 format 
from The Late Show with Stephen Colbert YouTube channel using aTubeCatcher 
(version 3.8.9325 DsNet Corp., 2017)5. They were subsequently imported to 
ELAN, creating one file per interview. 
ELAN offers multiple possibilities for viewing and manipulating videos. The 
control menu enables playing the video at different speed, thus facilitating 
                                            
4 Boersma, Paul & Weenink, David (2017). Praat: doing phonetics by computer 
[Computer program]. Version 6.0.32, retrieved 20 September 2017 from http://www.praat.org/ 
5 DsNet Corp. (2017). aTubeCatcher Version 3.8.9325, retrieved 1 July 2017 from 
http://www.atube.me 
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transcription (Fig.21). Precise gesture annotation is possible thanks to the 
function of moving through the video frame by frame (either backward or forward).  
 
 
Figure 21. Control window in ELAN 
 
Five tiers were created in ELAN to include the following annotations: 
transcript, type of humour, type of construal mechanism, gestures, and prosodic 
analysis Fig. 22). In total, 254 utterances were selected and annotated in ELAN: 
109 humorous utterances, and 149 non-humorous utterances, divided into 66 
pre-base utterances and 79 baseline utterances (see section 5.3.3 for 
definitions). Only humorous utterances were annotated on all 5 tiers. Both pre-
base and baseline utterances were used for the purposes of prosodic analysis 
exclusively. 
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Figure 22. Annotation tiers in Elan 
 
Humorous utterances were selected first, on the basis of laughter elicited 
in the audience. The segmentation into baseline and pre-base utterances was 
done after careful selection of humorous utterances. The selection of baseline 
and/or pre-baseline utterance was not always possible, hence the smaller 
number of these types of utterances with regards to humorous ones. Once 
selected, utterances were transcribed on the first tier, before conducting the 
analysis of the subsequent levels.  
ELAN allows for easy navigation through tiers and annotations, as it is 
possible to select annotations by type resorting to the grid window, where a list 
of all annotations made on a given tier can be selected to move through different 
instances in that tier (Fig. 23 and 24). 
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Figure 23. View of annotations by list of construal mechanisms 
 
 
Figure 24. View of annotations by humour type 
 
Upon selection of one annotation from the list displayed, the clip of video 
linked to that annotation is shown and can be played individually. In addition, the 
FASTsearch function facilitates searching occurrences of any given word either 
through one file or group of files, depending on the search domain previously 
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established. Opening the relevant video clip and file is as simple as just clicking 
on any of the results displayed on the list (Fig. 25).  
 
 
Figure 25. FASTsearch function 
 
Furthermore, statistics on any given annotation can be obtained in ELAN 
through the Annotation Statistics option in the View menu. An annotation tier must 
be selected and the system shows different values, such as the number of 
occurrences and frequency of each annotation in the opened file (Fig. 26). 
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Figure 26. Annotation Statistics function 
Finally, statistics can be saved as a text file, which can later be imported 
into SPSS for further analysis. 
5.3.2 Praat 
Praat was used to perform the prosodic analysis. Praat is a highly 
sophisticated piece of software enabling an extremely fine-grained study of 
prosodic features. For the purposes of this dissertation, only basic functions have 
been used, as the type of audio files under analysis do not meet the necessary 
quality conditions for further study, given that all sounds in the programme 
―interlocutors, audience, music and background sound― are included in just a 
single audio track, which cannot be broken down into different speaker or sound 
tracks. 
In order to analyse the prosodic contrast between humorous and non-
humorous utterances, the first thing to do was to extract the sound from each 
video file and import it into Praat. The soundtrack was extracted and downloaded 
in mp3 format using the convert/save option from VLC media player software6. 
Full interview sound files were then open in Praat to select and export smaller 
                                            
6 VideoLan Organization. (n.d.). VLC media player (Version 2.2.6) [Software]. Available 
from http://www.videolan.org/vlc/ 
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files with sound excerpts corresponding to the utterances selected in ELAN (Fig. 
27). 
 
 
Figure 27. Full sound track of an interview opened in Praat and excerpt 
selected to be exported. 
 
Once selected, sound files for each utterance were open in Praat to be 
annotated. Mean F0 and mean intensity values were obtained through the Pitch 
and Intensity menus respectively (Fig. 28). Both the file and the annotations were 
later saved as Praat binary files for further analysis and consultation. Mean F0 
and intensity values were then copied into the ELAN tier for prosody. Finally, 
standard deviation of pitch and intensity in pre-base, baseline and humorous 
utterances was estimated with SPSS. 
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Figure 28. Sound excerpt open in annotation window with Praat. 
 
5.3.3 Segmentation and types of utterance 
Following Bryant (2010), three different kinds of utterances were identified 
with regards to the prosodic analysis: a) Humorous utterances: To identify 
humour can be a highly subjective task. For the sake of objectivity, utterances 
were considered humorous if they elicited laughter in the audience. b) Baseline 
and pre-base utterances were also selected to measure prosodic contrast 
between humorous and non-humorous instances. Baseline utterances were 
those said immediately before humorous utterances, whereas pre-base were 
those immediately preceding baseline utterances. A control analysis could thus 
be performed comparing pitch (F0) and intensity values not only between 
humorous and non-humorous (baseline) utterances, but also between non-
humorous utterances (pre-base / baseline). Table 3 includes the total number 
and length of all types of utterances analysed. 
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Interview Interview (s.) 
Number of 
humorous 
utterances 
Total length of 
humour 
instances 
Number of pre-
base utterances 
Length of pre-
base 
Number of 
baseline 
utterances 
Length of baseline 
Alec Baldwin 432,030 13 43,055 8 21,524 8 20,114 
Alison Janney 445,262 6 29,206 5 13,372 5 17,334 
Amy Schumer 514,597 12 38,495 7 14,960 7 10,974 
Condola Rashad 389,859 4 17,430 3 7,980 3 4,810 
Cristela Alonzo 364,549 12 44,325 8 16,840 10 21,900 
Daniel Kaluuya 404,488 13 45,859 9 20,276 13 22,845 
Elon Musk 167,691 4 13,905 3 6,130 4 7,845 
Michael Hayden 448,257 5 14,050 0 ,000 3 4,410 
Joe Biden 625,797 7 18,495 5 11,065 5 13,595 
John McWhorter 412,383 7 31,120 5 13,210 5 11,910 
Riz Ahmed 543,923 13 39,420 7 16,935 10 28,315 
Sheryl Crow 290,501 3 9,535 1 1,160 1 ,670 
Sigourney 
Weaver 
454,829 5 17,870 3 6,100 2 9,460 
Susan Sarandon 676,788 5 11,560 2 3,260 3 5,560 
Total N 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Sum 6170,954 109 374,325 66 152,812 79 179,742 
 
Table 3. Utterances studied 
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5.4 Humour types 
Different taxonomies of humour can be found in the literature, based on 
different perspectives and put forward by various authors. One widely accepted 
major distinction is between conversational, or situational, jokes and canned 
jokes. As defined by Attardo (1994, pp. 296, 297), a canned joke is a joke which 
has been used before the time of the utterance in a form similar to that used by 
the speaker, such as those which are found in books, collections of jokes, etc. A 
conversational joke, in turn, is improvised during a conversation and draws 
heavily on contextual information for its setup. Conversational jokes are therefore 
bound by the context, while canned jokes are context-independent. In fact, 
sometimes the difference between this two types of jokes is not so stark, but the 
discussion on the topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
An often quoted classification of verbal humour is the one produced by 
Dynel (2009), based on a broad survey of previous literature. I agree with her 
claim that the categories established are not always clear-cut and can overlap at 
times; they are not mutually exclusive either.  
For the analysis conducted in this thesis, I have followed the classification 
of humour types used in the Corinth corpus (Feyaerts et al., 2010; Feyaerts, 
2013; Tabacaru, 2014), as it provides a comprehensive and fine-tuned framework 
of analysis. 
This classification includes 23 types of humour as follows: 
Situational humour, narrative joke, pun, irony, sarcasm, 
exaggeration, understatement, teasing, hyper-understanding, 
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misunderstanding, parody, register humour, anecdote, absurd 
humour, insider humour, joint fantasy, stereotype humour, meta-
humour, self-mockery, self-glorification, gender humour, sexual 
humour, inter-textual humour. 
5.4.1 Humour types 
5.4.1.1 Situational humour 
Situational humour refers to a type of non-verbal humour, which does not 
rely on words or verbal communication. It could be defined as based on an event 
incongruity, stemming from a breach of expectations. Situational humour is 
considered unintentional and is mainly perceived as humorous by actors non-
involved in the humorous event itself (Elleström, 2002).  
One example of situational humour in our corpus can be found in Sheryl 
Crow’s interview (Fig. 29), when she closes a statement made on an imaginary 
presidential campaign in which she would run against Kid Rock by kicking in the 
air with her right foot. In this example, the act of kicking is clearly intentional, but 
humour arguably arises as such a reaction is perceived as incongruous by the 
audience, with no verbal communication involved. 
  
                      Figure 29. Sheryl Crow kicking 
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5.4.1.2 Narrative joke 
Narrative jokes may come in different formats (short story, riddle, dialogue, 
etc.). They are defined by the punchline at the end, i.e. a surprising ending 
leading to a shift in interpretation whereby the humorous effect is produced 
(Attardo & Raskin, 1991). Narrative jokes have been extensively studied in the 
literature (Raskin, 1985; Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Attardo, 1993, etc.). No 
narrative jokes have been found in the current sample. 
5.4.1.3 Puns 
Dynel (2009) defines puns as humorous instantiations based on the 
ambiguity and different possible interpretations of a word or set of words (idioms, 
collocations, etc.). Broadly speaking, puns are a play on words. Consider 
example (34) from our sample: 
(34) Amy Schumer [on incident with PETA7 activists complaining about her 
wearing a coat with coyote fur]:  I promised, I was 
like, PETA, I promised I would never wear fur 
again...visibly. 
In this case, the pun lies in the word ‘visibly’, as it is highly incongruous 
with the situation explained, in which the expectation in order to comply with 
PETA demands would be for her to avoid wearing fur at all in the future, and not 
just visibly. The humorous effect is created by breaking such expectations 
through playing with the words,  
                                            
7 PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) is an American animal rights 
organisation: https://www.peta.org/  
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5.4.1.4 Irony 
The discussion on irony as a type of humour is beyond the study at hand. 
Dynel (2009) states that not all ironic utterances are humorous. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, however, irony will be considered as a type of humour, as well 
as sarcasm.  
Irony has traditionally been defined as the opposite of what is literally 
expressed. It lies at the difference between the literal and intended meaning of 
an utterance (Grice, 1989). Giora (1998) later defined irony as a pretence space 
where norms and expectations are violated.  
Example (35) below presents an instance of irony in our sample.  
(35) Sheryl Crow [on question whether she had got invited to the White 
House]: I didn't. I'm shocked that president Trump 
hasn't asked me to come by. 
Sheryl Crow is a well-known democrat, who has spoken out to criticise 
Trump and his administration. It is therefore obvious that she would never be 
invited to the White House by Donald Trump. By stating that she is ‘shocked’ that 
she was not invited, she is producing irony, as there is a clear difference between 
her literal words and the fact that, as a Trump’s critic, she cannot possibly expect 
to receive such an invitation. 
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5.4.1.5 Sarcasm 
Sarcasm is considered to be a more aggressive form of irony, with a clear 
target criticised (Attardo, 2000b). In this light, the main difference between irony 
and sarcasm is that the latter implies an attack or mockery of the given target.  
In example (36), General Hayden makes a sarcastic remark when he 
states that President Trump seemed to have forgotten that he was president of 
the U.S. and that, in that capacity, he had the authority to find out whether the 
wiretapping of Trump Tower he accused Obama of having ordered had actually 
happened. Obviously, it is implausible to think that someone can forget he or she 
holds such a high and powerful position, so General Hayden is making that 
remark to criticise Trump on his handling of this issue. 
(36) General Hayden: He seemed to have forgotten that he was the 
president of the US. 
5.4.1.6 Understatement 
Tabacaru (2014) defines understatement as the opposite of exaggeration. 
Humour lies in a conspicuously played-down presentation of the facts. Consider 
example (37) below: 
(37)  Elon Musk [on question whether he is a superhero or a supervillain]:
  I try to do useful things. 
The host, Stephen Colbert, points to the fact that Elon Musk has to be the 
real Tony Stark (Iron Man), given that Elon Musk is a billionaire and that he is 
working on so many advanced technologies. So Stephen Colbert insists that Elon 
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Musk must be either a superhero or a supervillain, as he has all the main features 
of these characters. Elon Musk plays down the comparison and his work by 
stating that he just tries to do useful things. If we consider that Elon Musk’s Space 
X and Tesla missions and ultimate goals include to enable people to live in other 
planets and to accelerate the advent of sustainable transport, it is obvious that 
those high ambitions exceed the mere desire to do useful things. 
5.4.1.8 Teasing 
Teasing is based on mock challenges, mimicry, etc. with the purpose of 
amusing both interlocutors (Dynel, 2009). Teasing relies on a common ground 
shared by interlocutors, who are aware that the other is not being serious (Veale 
et al., 2006). Let’s take the following example: 
(38) Alec Baldwin [Stephen Colbert complains he never gets invited to 
parties such as the ones organised by Obama at the 
White House]:   
Why do you think that is? 
When asking Alec Baldwin if he has ever been invited to White House 
parties, the host complains about himself never getting invited. Alec Baldwin does 
not answer the question; instead, he cunningly asks back why Stephen Colbert 
thinks he (the host) is never invited to such parties, clearly implying that he is not 
wanted as a guest at those parties. This is a pseudo-aggressive remark, said in 
a playful tone and clearly perceived as such by the host, who reacts by 
acknowledging the humour.  
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It could also be argued that other types of humour are at stake in this 
example. There is not always clear-cut boundaries among these humour 
categories, and various types can be at play in any given utterance. In (38), irony 
is also used, in the sense of implying the answer just by literally stating the 
question. Also, this example could be taken as an instance of hyper-
understanding, explained in 5.4.1.9. 
5.4.1.9 Hyper-understanding 
In hyper-understanding humour relies on the ability of a speaker to detect 
and exploit weak points in the interlocutor’s speech for their benefit. By doing so, 
humour stems from reversing or changing the interlocutor’s intending meaning. 
As stated before, example (38) could also be described as an instance of hyper-
understanding, as Alec Baldwin shifts the focus of the host’s question to the host’s 
himself. 
Another example of hyper-understanding found in the sample is the 
following: 
(39) Stephen Colbert:  Do you know things that you can’t tell me that 
I’d be fascinated to hear? 
    General Hayden:  Yes. 
    Stephen Colbert:  Dumb question. Can you give us even a hint? 
    General Hayden:  Can you keep a secret? 
    Stephen Colbert:  Turn off the cameras! Yes, I can keep a secret. 
    General Hayden:  Me too. 
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In this example, by asking the host if he can keep a secret, General 
Hayden leads Stephen Colbert to believe that he is going to reveal some juicy, 
unknown piece of information. Instead, General Hayden answers his own 
question too by stating that he can also keep secrets and that he is therefore not 
going to unveil anything at all. General Hayden exploits the interpretation Stephen 
Colbert makes of his previous question to reverse and change the perceived 
meaning by making the real one explicit. As with example (38), (39) could also 
be considered an instance of teasing, as both types of humour ―teasing and 
hyper-understanding― are clearly at play. 
Both (38) and (39) could also fall under Dynel’s (2009) definition of retort 
as a subtype of witticism in the form of a response to a previous utterance with 
which it forms an adjacency pair. It has also been given the name of trumping, as 
a kind of adversarial game (Veale et al., 2006).  
5.4.1.10 Misunderstanding 
Brône (2008) defined misunderstanding as a genuine misinterpretation by 
a participant due to an opposition between a salient and non-salient 
interpretation. As opposed to hyper-understanding, there is no intention on 
playing with the words or the situation to mock the other participant, but rather a 
true mismatch in the understanding of the event, which has a humorous effect. 
No occurrences of misunderstanding have been found in our sample. 
5.4.1.11 Parody 
Parody involves the humorous imitation of another person in a given 
situation, exaggerating certain traits in order to produce a humorous effect. For 
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example, in (40) Alec Baldwin explains how he achieves his highly acclaimed 
impersonation of Donald Trump: 
(40) Alec Baldwin: Left eyebrow up. Right eyebrow down. Shove your 
face like you're trying to suck the chrome off the fender 
of your car. 
In this case, the parody relies predominantly on the face he pulls to mimic 
Trump, rather than in Baldwin’s words. Again, we are confronted to another 
humorous instance in which different humour types intersect, as the way he 
describes how to fake a “Trump face” is clearly sarcastic. Another example of 
parody is found in (41) below: 
(41)  Daniel Kaluuya:  It's like...What would I say...? If I was white... 
 
          
      Figure 30. Daniel Kaluuya mimicking Stephen Colbert 
 
In this example, Daniel Kaluuya is impersonating Stephen Colbert, 
pointing to the fact that the host awkwardly looked at his nails while discussing 
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racial issues and what Mr Kaluuya defined as the weird way that white people 
behaved with blacks. Again, parody is not the only type of humour present in this 
instance, as by mimicking the host, Daniel Kaluuya is also teasing him. 
5.4.1.12 Register humour 
Register humour involves a sudden change in language register ―for 
instance, formal speech with interspersed slang―, which produces a humorous 
effect. No examples of register humour have been found in the sample under 
analysis. 
5.4.1.13 Anecdote 
An anecdote is a story based on personal experience or on other people’s 
lives (Dynel, 2009), which may produce a humorous effect (either intended or 
not). Perhaps not surprisingly, anecdote is the type of humour with the higher 
number of occurrences in this sample. Guests are in the show to talk about 
themselves, their work, etc., so it is understandable that anecdotes are so 
frequent. One such example is (42) below: 
(42) Cristela Alonzo [ending a story of how she went after and confronted 
a thief who had broken into her car and taken a 
Sephora bag from it]: (Speaking to a neighbour) I'm 
like: I've got my stuff back, don't worry about that. I 
look through my bag and I'm like, thank God, 'cause 
there was this lipstick I bought that was sold 
everywhere and I got it back. 
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In this case, the end of the anecdote has a humorous effect given the 
incongruity of facing such a potential danger ―to chase and confront a criminal― 
just to recover a lipstick. 
5.4.1.14 Absurd humour 
Absurd humour lies on the violation of Grice’s Maxim of Relevance 
(Attardo, 1993). Humour is attained by deliberately producing discourse in which 
any kind of logic with regards to the context is absent. No examples of absurd 
humour have been found in the sample. 
5.4.1.15 Insider humour 
Insider humour relies on references shared or made clear by participants 
in the event (Tabacaru, 2014). Common ground can be construed either prior to 
or during the speech event or conversation. The humour will only be perceived 
and understood by those sharing the same given references. Consider example 
(43):  
(43) Alison Janney [talking about Sean Spicer, Press Secretary for 
Trump’s Administration from January to July 2017)]: I 
mean, he is remarkable because he seems to be in a 
state of… fight and flight at the same time. You know 
what I mean? 
In this example, only people familiar with Mr Spicer and with his press 
conferences as Trump’s Press Secretary can understand the joke and partake in 
the humorous effect.  
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5.4.1.16 Joint fantasy 
Joint fantasy implies multiple partners jointly creating a funny, imaginary 
situation or experience (Kotthoff, 2007). Let’s take the following instance as an 
example: 
(44) Amy Schumer [After explaining an incident with PETA over a coat with 
coyote fur she was wearing, in which she 
promised never to wear fur again visibly]:  
At all times I’m wearing tortured ostrich 
underwear, and I want you all to know that. You 
can’t see it. 
    Stephen Colbert:  I’ve got a mental image. 
    Amy Schumer:  I torture them in my apartment. 
Here, Amy Schumer is building a fantasy into which she invites the 
audience by saying “I want you all to know that”. Stephen Colbert, the host, 
contributes in turn to construing the fantasy by stating that he can picture it in his 
mind.  
5.4.1.17 Stereotype humour 
Stereotype humour revolves around received ideas and clichés. This type 
of humour exploits expectations about certain behaviours of individuals or 
communities which are widely known. For example, consider (45) y (46) below: 
(45)  Cristela Alonzo:  We’re Latino, we don’t belief in depression. 
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(46)  Cristela Alonzo:  I’m Latina, I can’t be in Law & Order. 
In both examples, she’s playing with stereotypes associated with Latinos, 
according to expectations on this group of people in the U.S. In (46), in particular, 
there is arguably a strong component of irony too, as she is implying the links 
between crime and the Latino community which prevails in part of the American 
population, notably highlighted by the current Trump Administration. 
5.4.1.18 Meta-humour 
Meta-humour arises when explicit reference to humour is made in an 
utterance, as in the following instance: 
(47) VP Joe Biden:  Now, you’re all gonna laugh when you hear this. 
In this example, Vice President Biden is making an explicit reference to 
the humorous effect he thinks his next words are going to have on the audience. 
Incidentally, this meta-humour reference turned out to elicit more laughter in the 
audience than the subsequent utterance, perhaps due to different expectations 
raised on what he would say next. 
5.4.1.19 Self-mockery 
Self-mockery occurs when speakers make fun of themselves and they are 
the target of their own joke. Consider example (48): 
(48)  Alec Baldwin:  I’m sorry I didn’t dress up for you. 
Stephen Colbert:  No, you’re always dressed up. You look like 
you’re about to do like Taekwondo or 
something. 
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Alec Baldwin:  Or I’m about to clean your pool. 
In (48), Alec Baldwin decides to mock himself and the clothes he’s wearing 
for the interview by resorting to humorous self-denigration. 
5.4.1.20 Self-glorification 
Self-glorification is the opposite of self-mockery. In this case, the speaker 
achieves a humorous effect by praising themselves, as in (49) below: 
(49) VP Joe Biden [On the possibility of running for President in the next 
election]: Hell, Donald Trump will be 74. I’ll be 77. In 
better shape, I mean… 
Once again, more than one type of humour are at play in this example. 
Apart from self-glorification, it could be argued that the statement is also 
sarcastic, as it may be intended more as an attack on D. Trump (whose fitness 
for office has often been questioned), rather than as a praise on Joe Biden 
himself. 
5.4.1.21 Gender humour 
To some extent, gender humour could be considered as a subtype of 
stereotype humour, hinging on gender-specific issues. No examples of gender 
humour have been found in our sample. 
5.4.1.22 Sexual humour 
Sexual humour relies on implicit or explicit reference to sexual issues. 
Raskin (1985) states that sexual humour arises when there is an opposition 
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between a sexual and non-sexual script or interpretation. Only one instance of 
sexual humour has been found in our sample (50): 
(50) Amy Schumer [taking magazine with a provocative picture of her in 
the cover shown by the host]: Why are the pages stuck 
together? 
There is a clear albeit implicit allusion to the act of male masturbation as a 
result of sexual arousal upon looking at her picture in the cover. 
5.4.1.23 Inter-textual humour 
Inter-textual humour involves references made to well-known sources 
shared by the participants in the event, from literature, media, cinema, TV, 
religion, etc. References need to be easy recognisable by the participants in the 
speech event for the humorous effect to occur. Consider example (51): 
(51) Alec Baldwin [speaking about the casual clothes he had chosen to 
wear for the interview]: I call it the Springsteen look. 
In this instance, Alec Baldwin refers to a highly popular and worldwide 
known American singer, Bruce Springsteen, usually dressed in casual style, to 
define how he was dressed for the interview. 
As mentioned before, although a classification of humour types has been 
followed for the sake of analysis, boundaries between humour types are often 
blurred, and more than one humour type may concur in any given instance. 
Extensive humour research based on a large corpus would no doubt contribute 
to better define and detect categories (Tabacaru, 2014). In the current analysis, 
Humour in face-to-face interaction: A multimodal and cognitive analysis 174
 
in order to avoid subjective bias, a minimalist approach has been applied. That 
is, only one or two types of humour have been defined per utterance, choosing 
only the most salient and clear types. For example, in (52): 
(52) Riz Ahmed [on question whether he had experienced problems 
entering the U.S. given his Pakistani origins]: Well, 
now I get searched by fans, so they can be really 
thorough, actually, really take the time with the 
frisking. 
This instance has been annotated as an anecdote. It could be argued that 
there may be some sexual allusion when referring the thoroughness of searches 
conducted by fans at airports, but as I did not deem this sexual reference to be 
salient or clear, I decided not to annotate this utterance as an instance of sexual 
humour too. On the contrary, in (53): 
(53) Daniel Kaluuya [explaining how he got to meet Oprah]:       Even the 
story before is a gas story. So basically like: Denzel 
came out to me at the Globes… 
To me, it is clear that two humour types are salient in this instance. On the 
one side, (53) is a clear example of an anecdote, in which Daniel Kaluuya is 
starting to tell a personal story. On the other, I believe it is also clear example of 
self-glorification, as he tells the anecdote calling Denzel Washington by his first 
name, and mentioning the Globes as if it were an event he was used to attending. 
All this gives the impression of him being a well-established celebrity, approached 
by famous actors, and being cool and at ease in this kind of event. However, as 
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he himself acknowledged in his subsequent utterance (“No; I look like a wanker 
now, don’t I”), he was actually nervous and overwhelmed by the situation, as he 
is a young actor who was at The Globes for the first time. 
In this case, given that both types of humour are equally clear, I decided 
to annotate them both. As a result, the number of humour types annotated in the 
sample (123) is higher than the number of humorous utterances studied (109). 
5.4.2 Overview of humour types in sample 
As shown in Table 4 and Fig. 31, the highest number of occurrences in 
terms of humour type corresponds to anecdote. This is perhaps not surprising, 
as guest celebrities are typically interviewed in this type of show to talk about 
themselves and their work. In addition, the genre imposes a light tone with a touch 
of humour all through the show, so it is understandable that interviewees talk 
about themselves in a jocular manner. 
Anecdote is followed by irony and parody as, respectively, the second and 
third most frequent type of humour found in the sample. Again, it could be argued 
that the playful tone set in the show leads to amusing interviews in which overt 
criticism or grave statements are avoided, resorting instead to ironic remarks 
when negative comments are to be made. Furthermore, parody is used in the 
sample as a useful resource to give emphasis to personal stories told and to 
make them livelier. 
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Humour type 
Number of occurrences in 
sample 
Relative frequency 
anecdote 33 26.83% 
irony 17 13.82% 
parody 16 13.00% 
self-mockery 9 7.32% 
exaggeration 7 5.69% 
insider humour 7 5.69% 
sarcasm 6 4.88% 
hyper-understanding 5 4.06% 
stereotype humour 5 4.06% 
teasing 4 3.25% 
situational humour 3 2.44% 
inter-textual humour 2 1.63% 
joint fantasy 2 1.63% 
self-glorification 2 1.63% 
absurd humour 1 0.81% 
meta-humour 1 0.81% 
pun 1 0.81% 
sexual humour 1 0.81% 
understatement 1 0.81% 
Table 4. Humour types found in sample 
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Figure 47. Humour types found in sample 
 
5.5 Prosodic analysis 
Prosody can be defined as a set of suprasegmental oral features stretching 
over one or more than one consecutive utterances (Cruttenden, 1986). In order 
to perform a thorough multimodal analysis of face-to-face communication, not 
only gestures, but prosody, must be taken into account to establish the role it 
plays in conveying a message. All suprasegmental phenomena that are 
constituted by the interplay of vocal features such as pitch, loudness, pause, 
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stress, tempo, duration, rhythm, and voice quality can be understood as prosodic 
(Wennerstrom, 2001). 
The stream of speech is perceptibly broken up into units which can be 
interpreted (Brazil, 1997, p.5). Speech-prosody interaction can occur at different 
levels. Interactional, discrete, units: lexico-syntactic units for pragmatic actions 
co-occur with prosodic structures, i.e. turn-constructional units. Turn-
constructional units begin with syntactic units and are marked by prosodic units 
as well. Pre-positioned items may occur (syntactically and prosodically marked). 
Pauses and turn-holding are possible, whereas projected clauses can be 
continued. Syntactic and prosodic structures may be expanded. Bauman (2006) 
states that prosody plays a role in information structure (Jannedy & Mendoza-
Denton, 2005), making new information more salient than old information. The 
study of prosody needs to take into account the full spectrum of communicative 
functions: expressive, attitudinal, interactive, evaluative and stylistic in order to 
grasp its full communicative value (Kohler, 2006, p. 146). 
Synchrony is not enough to show what modalities are linked, as signals 
flow in a stream: facial expressions or gestures may come earlier or later than the 
words they co-occur with. Enfield and Sidnell (2014) proposed that it is the 
recognizable construction, interpretation and common engaging in activities such 
as word searching or re-enactment of events what enables participants to relate 
various modalities to one another, seeing them as part of a larger system. 
Different studies have been conducted on the prosody of humour, without 
conclusive results. Attardo, Pickering, and Baker (2011) found that punch lines, 
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puns, at the end of a conversational joke were delivered in a lower pitch but they 
concluded it was because punchlines occur at the end of a paratone (end of 
narrative), not because humour was prosodically marked. Punchlines did seem 
to be delivered at a slower pace, but the difference in speech rate was not 
statistically significant. 
Bryant (2010) measured the prosodic contrast between ironic and non-
ironic statements, measuring 5 acoustic dimensions: mean fundamental 
frequency (F0), F0 variability, mean amplitude ─intensity─, amplitude variability, 
and speech rate, i.e. mean syllable duration. Only in speech rate were consistent 
changes found, with ironic utterances delivered more slowly. Archakis et al., 
(2010) found systematic differences in the occurrence of jab lines, which are one-
liners occurring any time in conversation, not preceded by a narrative, as 
opposed to punch lines (Pickering, Corduas, Eisterhold, Seifried, Eggleston, & 
Attardo, 2009). In Archakis’ study, jab lines were preceded by significant pauses 
and delivered at a different speech rate and intensity.  
Therefore, there is a lack of consistency in results regarding the prosodic 
analysis of humorous utterances (Attardo et al., 2003; Pickering et al., 2009; 
Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011). With regards to humour marking, some 
prosodic components might be explained by the need of “contrasting utterances 
and their meaning, and ultimately, to highlight the ‘mention-factor’ value of an 
utterance” (Urios-Aparisi & Wagner, 2011 p. 525). 
In light of the above and partly following Bryant (2010) methodology, I 
decided to study if consistent prosodic contrast could be found between 
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humorous and non-humorous utterances to establish whether humorous 
utterances were prosodically marked in terms of intensity and pitch. To do so, I 
first chose humorous utterances as those utterances immediately preceding 
laughter in the audience, which was used as the criterion to determine whether a 
given utterance was humorous or not, in order to avoid subjective bias on the part 
of the annotator. Once humorous utterances had been selected, baseline 
utterances were delimited, defined as those immediately preceding humorous 
ones. Finally, as a control group, pre-baseline utterances were also selected, 
whenever possible, as those pronounced immediately before baseline 
utterances. As in Bryant (2010), that allows for comparisons between humorous 
and non-humorous utterances ─baseline─, as well as between non-humorous 
utterances alone ─baseline and pre-baseline utterances─. 
Given that the focus of the present study is to analyse spontaneous 
humorous communication, speech was segmented into utterances. The 
segmentation was based on a usage-based approach, in which an utterance is 
equated to a usage event and defined as a unit-like instance of linguistic 
behaviour in which the speaker “attempts to achieve a particular interactional goal 
or set of goals using particular linguistic and non-linguistic strategies” (bold in 
original text) (Evans & Green, 2006 p. 130). 
Utterances are unit like or “somewhat discrete” (ibid.) units to the extent 
that they convey a coherent idea, although it is highly difficult to provide a set of 
criteria to always precisely and unequivocally delimit utterance-units, due to the 
fact that utterance delimitation may simultaneously rely on grammar, semantics, 
phonological and pragmatic features which do not co-occur in fixed patterns. As 
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a result, segmentation was made trying to delimit utterances as stand-alone units, 
prosodically, semantically and pragmatically meaningful. Three types of 
utterances were identified: 
a) Humorous utterances: the utterance immediately delivered before 
laughter in the audience. Laughter and humour are not always and necessarily 
linked, as one may well occur without the other (Attardo, 1994; Attardo, 2003). 
However, the idea of laughter as an outcome of humour is widely acknowledged 
in the literature (Attardo, 1994; Kotthoff, 2000; Hay, 2001; etc.) and has 
extensively been used as a parameter associated to humour in humour studies 
(Archakis & Tsakona, 2005; Flamson et al., 2011; Tabacaru, 2014; etc.). 
b). Baseline utterances: the last words before the humorous utterances. 
Speaker’s laughter or sounds were not included (Bryant, 2010). 
c) Pre-baseline utterances: utterances immediately preceding baseline 
utterances.  
Although prosodic contrast can be noticeable even between relatively 
distant utterances (e.g. over 10s.) (Bryant, 2010), for this analysis only utterances 
immediately preceding the target or baseline utterances (as baseline and pre-
baseline utterances, respectively) were taken into account, so that we could 
safely consider that all utterances belonged to the same discursive and thematic 
unit. 
As explained in section 5.3.3, utterances were first identified and 
segmented in ELAN. Then they were extracted from the Praat sound file of the 
given interview, to conduct single-utterance analysis as individual files. 
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Utterance-files were analysed and annotated in Praat, in order to obtain mean 
pitch (F0) and mean intensity. Those values were then annotated in ELAN. 
Statistical analysis of prosodic data was performed in SPSS (v. 20). 
It was not always possible to pair a pre-base and baseline utterance with 
each humorous utterance identified. Also, the fact that there was only a single 
audio track including both the host’s and guest’s speech, as well as sounds 
coming from the audience, background noise and music, made it impossible to 
analyse the prosodic features of all utterances selected due to overlaps. When 
overlaps affected just a small part of the beginning or end of the utterance 
(overlaps under 10% of total utterance time), that part was excluded from the 
analysis and values on the remainder of the utterance were obtained. On the 
contrary, when overlaps were significantly longer (over 10% of total utterance 
time) or occurred in the middle of the utterance, the whole utterance was 
discarded for the prosodic analysis. 
Table 3 summarised the number and length of utterances studied. Figure 
32 shows the total length of each type of utterance studied: 
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  Figure 32. Total length of each type of utterance studied. 
 
Mean pitch (F0 in Hz) and mean intensity (in dB) were obtained for each 
utterance. Then, all data was recorded in SPSS in order to estimate the standard 
deviation (SD) in mean intensity and mean pitch, for each type of utterance per 
interview, as a proxy measure of variability and prosodic contrast (Purandare & 
Litman, 2006; Bryant, 2010). SD values per type of utterance were compared 
within speakers through t-tests (independent variables) or non-parametric tests 
to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in SD, which 
would lead to conclude that prosodic contrast in F0 and intensity was in turn 
significant. Kolmogoro-Smirnov normality tests were conducted prior to 
comparing SD values in order to determine which kind of test was suitable. An 
additional one-way ANOVA analysis of variance, along with a post-hoc LSD test, 
was conducted in order to corroborate the results obtained through independent-
humourous
53%
pre-base
22%
baseline
25%
Length of utterances
humourous pre-base baseline
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variable t-tests. SD values in mean intensity and mean pitch were compared and 
analysed for the following pairs of utterances: humorous / baseline utterances 
and baseline / pre-baseline utterances within speakers (Table 5). 
 
Interview 
Type of 
utterance 
N -utterances) 
Mean 
intensity 
(dB) 
SD 
intensity 
Mean 
pitch: F0 
(Hz) 
SD pitch 
Alec Baldwin pre-base 7 61,62 2,97 137,57 19,94 
 baseline 8 64,19 1,81 140,21 19,70 
 humour 10 66,46 4,43 185,97 70,30 
Alison Janney pre-base 4 62,50 5,27 165,56 37,04 
 baseline 5 61,50 3,85 147,53 45,79 
 humour 5 58,23 2,99 156,20 34,64 
Amy Schumer Pre-base 6 63,38 3,40 219.19 29.02 
 baseline 6 67,97 9,04 225,54 32,33 
 humour 11 62,04 2,45 196,42 26,40 
Condola Rashad Pre-base 3 63,57 2,27 232,68 38,19 
 baseline 3 66,34 2,22 241,44 22,06 
 humour 4 62,66 2,26 224,99 19,05 
Cristela Alonso pre-base 7 63,99 2,12 258,94 26,44 
 baseline 9 64,29 2,89 260,02 43,63 
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 humour 12 62,25 2,82 260,07 58,89 
Daniel Kaluuya Pre-base 9 68.37 3,83 188,94 66,54 
 baseline 11 67,94 3,46 170.05 49.67 
 humour 12 65,33 3,93 162,33 48,20 
Elon Musk Pre-base 2 64,91 2,43 165,99 43,10 
 baseline 3 64,92 2,67 179,17 75,22 
 humour 4 65,48 3,81 144,43 5,19 
Joseph Biden Pre-base 5 60,04 1,59 146,21 18,35 
 baseline 5 59,88 3,54 137,66 33,02 
 humour 6 60,57 6.06 137,40 29,69 
John McWorther Pre-base 5 62,13 2,77 142,59 35,65 
 baseline 5 51,66 25,26 134,14 27,36 
 humour 6 67,10 6,83 151,27 53,27 
Michael Haydn baseline 3 64,01 1,79 182,21 6,87 
 humour 5 62,16 2,21 174,10 11,49 
Riz Ahmed Pre-base 6 63.33 1,07 161.61 9,73 
 baseline 9 64,13 2,56 167,72 21,54 
 humour 8 62,69 2,31 158,59 11,97 
Sheryl Crow pre-base 1 61,53 n/a 205,99 n/a 
 baseline 1 65,69 n/a 185,92 n/a 
 humour 1* 61,53 n/a 192,53 n/a 
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*There are two additional humorous utterances, not included in the prosodic analysis as one is speechless 
and for the other the speech cannot be isolated from overlapping sound. 
 
Table 5. Prosodic data per type of utterance in each interview. 
 
5.5.1 Overview of results 
The full results of the prosodic analysis conducted for each interview can 
be found in Annex 1. No statistically significant differences in SD values for F0 
and intensity were found in in the sample (p = 0.05), neither between baseline 
and humorous utterances, nor between baseline and pre-baseline utterances. 
The results in the present study bear out previous research on spontaneous 
humour, i.e. no prosodic contrast has been found between humorous and non-
humorous utterances, when it comes to F0 and intensity SD values. Admittedly, 
the setting and casual tone of the programme, prone to humour, may not require 
humour be made particularly salient through prosodic cues. 
 
 
Sigourney Weaver Pre-base 2 62,20 1,45 177,14 11,87 
 baseline 2 63,39 0,14 186,04 32,00 
 humour 4 63,99 1,39 182,23 15,34 
Susan Sarandon Pre-base 1 64,33 n/a 177,63 n/a 
 baseline 2 63,87 2,62 180,74 26,56 
 humour 4 60,29 5,62 189,11 41,67 
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5.6 Gestures 
Communication is inherently multimodal: a multimodal analysis of 
discourse and human communication brings together information conveyed 
through different modalities, such as gesture, gaze, prosody, posture, etc. A 
comprehensive account of communication can only be achieved through careful 
exploration of how these modalities interplay. 
Therefore, in order to try to fully comprehend and account for 
communication, analyses should focus on the interplay between gestures and 
speech, which Kendon (2004) defines as visible utterance action. That is, a 
multimodal utterance, comprising gestures, speech, and prosody. 
Humour is arguably one of the most complex instances of communication, 
both in terms of production and comprehension. Research has taken an interest 
in studying how, or if, humour is multimodally marked (Attardo et al., 2003; 
Cheang & Pell, 2009; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Attardo, Wagner, & 
Urios-Aparisi, 2011, among others). My research focuses on how co-speech face 
movements and prosody interplay in spontaneous humorous utterances, in order 
to account for how humorous knowledge is multimodally constructed, 
represented and communicated through language, gestures and prosody. 
Given the constraints of the sample, only face and head movements have 
been studied in this thesis. Due to camera shots and viewpoints, it was not 
warranted to get a full clear view of the upper body at all times, hence the focus 
on the head and face. 
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Whereas speech is used to convey complex situations and make 
reference to abstract points, gestures may be used to make the pragmatic value 
of verbal speech explicit (Muller & Cienki, 2009). It is not single cues that suggest 
particular interpretations, but rather their co-occurrence and density. 
As explained in Chapter 3, gestures can perform the following functions: 
discursive, referential and interactional. Of the types of gestures along the 
Kendon’s continuum (McNeill 1992), the ones relevant for the current analysis 
are gesticulations, i.e.: co-speech gestures made unwittingly by the speaker, 
mostly with discursive and interactional value. The gestures annotated in our 
sample are face and head movements, identified as follows. 
5.6.1 Head movements 
      
    Figure 33. Head movements (Wagner, Malisz, & Kopp, 2014, p. 212) 
 
Communicative head movements involve rotations around three axis, as 
shown in Fig. 33: axis Y, axis Z, axis X. In addition, two linear displacements are 
also common, along the Y and X axis respectively (Wagner et al., 2014). 
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It must be noticed that the actual realisation of these movements can be 
of great variety, in terms of extent, angles, etc. (Kousidis, Malisz, Wagner, & 
Schlangen, 2013). Head movements may overlap, such as a tilt and turn shown 
in Fig. 34:  
 
    
       Figure 34. Tilt and turn 
 
The list of annotated head movements is the following: 
  
a) Tilt: rotation around axis X. 
   
Figure 35. Tilt 
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b) Turn: rotation around axis Z. 
   
    Figure 36. Turn 
 
 
c) Upstroke: upward rotation around axis Y. 
   
   Figure 37. Upstroke 
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d) Nod: downward rotation around axis Y. 
   
    Figure 38. Nod 
e) Protrusion: forward slide along axis X. 
   
    Figure 39. Protrusion 
f) Retraction: backward slide along axis X. 
   
  Figure 40. Retraction 
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Head gestures need to be interpreted in their multimodal context, taking 
into account other multimodal cues such as prosodic features, hand or face 
movements, etc. (Poggi, D’Errico, & Vincze, 2010). Head movements are varied 
and mainly pragmatic. Despite the polysemy entailed in head movements. Some 
of them can be associated with a semantic core, such as nods used by speakers 
to underscore the importance of what is being said (Poggi et al., 2010) or turns 
linked to the idea of negativity (Kendon, 2002). 
5.6.2 Face gestures 
Regarding facial expressions, Poggi and Pelachaud (1998), drawing on 
previous work by other authors (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; C. Goodwin, 1980; 
Ekman, 1982; Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990), distinguished the following possible 
functions: 
a) Affective display: seven possible prototypical face expressions for 
emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise and 
embarrassment). 
b) Syntactic function: accents, emphasis, question marks, etc. 
c) Dialogic function: turn taking (eye and head movements). 
d) Referring function: to refer to an emotion is not currently being felt by the 
speaker. Included are deictic gaze, or facial emblems, even iconic eye 
movements (squinting as opposed to wide open). 
e) Attitude display: convey social attitude towards the addressee (anger, 
ordering, imploring, etc.). 
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In humour analysis literature, gestures are referred to as kinesic markers 
(Muecke, 1978) or gestural triggers (Tabacaru, 2014), helping to frame the 
utterance as humorous or stressing a shift in focus, clarifying by way of gestures 
what might be ambiguous by resorting only to speech, or just reinforcing the 
humorous message. All in all, gestures are considered to be multimodal cues 
intended to help listeners grasp the humorous intention. However, markers do 
not confer the humorous turn to speech, as this can be humorous even in the 
absence of such multimodal cues (Attardo et al., 2003).  
With regards to face movements, the gestures annotated have been the 
following: 
 
a) Smile 
 
 
Figure 41. Smile 
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b) Frowning 
  
       Figure 42. Frowning 
 
 
c) Raised eyebrows 
  
      Figure 42. Raised eyebrows 
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d) Blank face 
 
Figure 43. Blank face 
 
Both head and face movements may overlap, and they may be produced 
repeatedly. For the current analysis, a minimalist approach has been applied, 
annotating only the type of gesture produced, regardless of the angle, pace of 
repetition or extent. I have strived to annotate all repetitions of a given gesture 
separately. The reason to apply this minimalist approach is the fact that camera 
shots were not always taken from the same viewpoint or angle. As a result, 
despite a movement analysis conducted frame by frame, it could not possibly be 
ensured that every single movement was unmistakably and accurately accounted 
for. Therefore, I decided to opt for a more coarse-grain, almost-qualitative 
analysis, to detect co-speech gesture and prosody interplay patterns which could 
ultimately point to the direction that future and more fine-tuned research should 
take.  
This minimalist approach enables understanding of multimodal 
communication. In order to provide a comprehensive and nuanced account of the 
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role played by any given gesture in an utterance, all gesture features should be 
taken into account, namely movement rate, amplitude, speed, repetitions, etc. 
(Bressem, 2012; Wagner et al., 2014). Heylen (2008) suggest differences be 
made between repeated shakes, head sweeps, slow head movements, 
repositioning and other lateral movements to assign difference functions to each 
type of move. Having said that, the painstaking work required to annotate 
gestures and movements, not to mention features such as repetition, amplitude, 
etc., needs specific software, movement recognition devices and human 
resources that were not available for the research described in this thesis.  
 
5.6.3 Overview of results 
Table 6 and Fig. 45 summarise the results of the analysis conducted in 
terms of annotated gestures: 
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Gesture 
Number of 
occurrences in sample 
Relative frequency 
nod 91 20.36% 
tilt 79 16.67% 
raised eyebrows 65 14.54% 
turn 53 11.86% 
shake 47 11.86% 
smile 41 9.17% 
upstroke 35 7.83% 
frowning 17 3.80% 
protrusion 12 2.68% 
other8 3 0.67% 
retraction 2 0.45% 
blank face 2 0.45% 
 
Table 6. Gestures found in sample 
                                            
8 The three instances classified as “other” include two instances of mimicking (therefore, 
not unintentional) in Amy Schumer and Alec Baldwin respectively. The third one refers to an 
utterance in Susan Sarandon’s interview in which she is looking to the ceiling and it is not possible 
to detect and annotate any head or face gesture. 
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Figure 45. Gestures found in sample 
  
5.7 Construal mechanisms  
The purpose of this dissertation is to study how humour is multimodally 
expressed and cognitively motivated. To that end, an analysis of construal 
mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004) underlying humorous utterances has been 
conducted. The classification of construal mechanisms used in this thesis is the 
one provided by Croft and Cruse (2004), which is summarised in Fig. 46 below. 
All types of construal mechanisms have been defined and illustrated with 
examples in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 46. Classification of construal mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 46) 
 
Figure 47 below shows the distribution of construal categories underlying 
humorous utterances found in the sample.  
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  Figure 47. Distribution of construal categories found in sample 
 
5.7.1 Overview of results 
Table 7 summarises the number of occurrences per type of construal 
mechanism identified in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspective/situatedness
61%
Attention/salience
27%
Judgement/co
mparison
12%
Constitution/gelstat
0%
Construal categories
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Annotation Sum Relative frequency 
viewpoint 46 38.01% 
profiling 23 19.00% 
subjectivity 14 16.94% 
dynamic attention 
(sequential scanning) 
8 9.68% 
deixis spatiotemporal 8 9.68% 
categorization 7 5.78% 
metaphor 7 5.78% 
deixis (empathy) 4 3.30% 
deixis epistemic 1 0.83% 
metonymy 1 0.83% 
objectivity 1 0.83% 
scope of predication 1 0.83% 
 
Table 7. Type and number of occurrences of construal mechanisms identified in 
the sample. 
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Figure 48. Construal mechanisms found in sample. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a full account of the sample studied and the methodology 
followed has been provided. First, a brief explanation was offered as to why I 
have favoured the study of spontaneous, non-staged humorous communication 
to avoid the necessarily more ostentatious multimodal features in staged humour, 
as it is intended to reach a very wide and unknown audience. The different 
elements employed to conduct the multimodal and cognitive analysis of 
humorous utterances have subsequently been presented in different sections of 
the chapter. Section 5.2 focuses on the collection of the interviews included in 
the sample. It offers a quick overview of the number of interviews selected, as 
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well as of the number and length of humorous and non-humorous utterances 
studied. Section 5.3 explains the various annotation tools used for the analysis, 
notable ELAN, as a video annotation software, and Praat, with which the prosodic 
study was undertaken.  
Section 5.4 presents the classification of humour types used in this study, 
with definitions of each type of humour. Whenever possible, examples from the 
sample have been included to expand on the definition of the humour types 
found. The multimodal part of the analysis is described in sections 5.5 and 5.6. 
In 5.5 an overview of the prosodic analysis and types of utterances studied is 
provided. Section 5.6 includes a list of gestures annotated in the sample. Only 
face and head movements have been studied, given that a clear view of the full 
upper body was not always available, and therefore it was not possible to 
systematically include other types of gestures, such as hand movements. Images 
from the sample analysed are included for each gesture listed. Finally, as in 
previous sections, the chapter offers overview of the results obtained with regards 
to construal mechanisms. 
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Chapter 6 
 A multimodal analysis of humour 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, a multimodal analysis of some of the humorous instances 
found in the sample is presented, taking the quantitative results obtained in terms 
of frequency of gesture type as a starting point. As a result, I zoom in on the 
following gestures, with the highest number of occurrences in the corpus, as 
shown in Table 6 in Chapter 5: head nods, head tilts, raised eyebrows, head 
turns, head shakes, and smiles. 
The gestural movements of the hands and arms are 
probably the most studied co-speech gestures (Wagner et al., 2014), with less 
attention devoted to head or face expressions (Hadar et al., 1985; Poggi & 
Pelachaud, 1998; McClave, 2000; Kendon, 2002; Lee & Marsella, 2010; Kousidis 
et al., 2014; Ishi, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2014; Tabacaru, 2014; etc.). Head 
movements and raised eyebrows have been found to serve as beats (Hadar et 
al., 1983; Pelachaud, Badler, & Steedman, 1996; Krahmer & Swerts, 2007; 
Guaiatella et al., 2009; Flecha-García, 2010; Tabacaru, 2014), that is, non-
representational gestures used to punctuate speech (Kendon, 1980; McNeill, 
1992). Head nods are considered to generally signal agreement (Lee & Marsella, 
2010), whereas head shakes are associated with explicit or implicit negative 
statements (Kendon, 2002). 
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Given the sample constrains as to what parts were visible at any given 
moment, as well as image definition as a result of the angle of the camera shot 
during the interviews, I focused on annotating head movements, i.e., nods, 
upstrokes, shakes, turns, tilts, protrusion, retraction, and certain face gestures, 
namely raised eyebrows, frowning, blank face and smile/laughter. Therefore, my 
analysis is a contribution to the previously mentioned studies, and will draw on 
their results to confront my own analysis with them. My research is novel insofar 
as it deals with humour in spontaneous communication and joins the multimodal 
analysis to a study of the cognitive mechanisms underlying humour. 
Face-to-face interaction is inherently multimodal. Modalities belong to 
different systems of representation, i.e., language, gestures, and posture, and 
they translate into actions which mediate between the concrete and the abstract. 
Modalities are considered as complex cultural tools, to the extent that they are 
socially acquired or learnt and used in interaction (Norris, 2013). Gestures and 
body movements help to organise turn-taking (Mondada, 2013). Gestures mainly 
have discursive value and are essentially pragmatic (Cienki, 2013a). 
What follows is an in-depth analysis of the pragmatic and discursive value 
of the head and face gestures most frequently found in the present sample. The 
first section is devoted to facial displays, specifically raised eyebrows and 
smile/laughter, followed by a section on head movements, with special emphasis 
on tilts and nods. Cross-reference data on the occurrence of each type of 
gestures with humour types and construal mechanisms is also included, as 
shown in Tables 8, and 9.  
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  nod tilt raised eyebrows smile turn shake 
irony 19 11 9 6 15 2 
inter-textual 2    
2 
 
self-mockery 2 6 5 1  5 
teasing 1 1 4 4  1 
hyper-understanding 2 2 2 4 1 1 
parody 5 11 8 7 6 10 
anecdote 15 31 15 9 19 11 
insider humour 17 2 1 1 2 1 
sarcasm 3 5 2 1 2 3 
exaggeration 8 3 5 2 3 9 
pun 6      
joint fantasy 3  2 1  1 
stereotype humour 3 4 7 2 2 2 
self-glorification  1 2    
understatement 1 1    1 
absurd humour 2 1  1   
meta-humour 1  1    
Situational humour 1  
2 2 1 
 
Table 8. Head and face gestures per type of humour 
 
Chapter 6 – A multimodal analysis of humour 207  
 
 
  nod tilt raised eyebrows smile turn shake 
profiling 4 1  1 1 2 
categorization 5   
1 3 2 
metaphor 8 7 5 4 2 6 
profiling 17 8 13 7 9 7 
viewpoint 24 46 23 14 17 17 
spatiotemporal deixis 4 4 4 2 5 1 
deixis empathy 2  3   1 
subjectivity 4 8 5 6 2 5 
dynamic attention 7 5 5 3 2 1 
scope of predication   1   1 
objectivity 1     1 
deixis epistemic   1 2  1 
metonymy 4    1  
Table 9. Face and head gestures per type of construal 
 
6.2 Facial expressions 
Face gestures have been assigned various communicative functions in the 
literature (Poggi & Pelachaud, 1998): (1) affective display, with seven universal 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971) prototypical faces showing happiness, sadness, fear, 
anger, disgust, surprise (Ekman, 1982), and embarrassment (Castelfranchi & 
Poggi, 1990); (2) syntactic function, when facial expressions punctuate 
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questions, emphasis, intonational accents, pauses, etc. (Poggi & Pelachaud, 
1998); (3) dialogic function, when face signals are produced in interaction to 
manage turn taking (C. Goodwin, 1980); (4) referring function, when speakers 
use face movements to refer to an emotion that they are not feeling at the moment 
of speaking (Ekman, 1979); (5) attitude display, when face gestures express the 
speaker’s attitude towards the interlocutor, e.g. to express anger through 
frowning, or agreement through a smile (Poggi & Pelachaud, 1998). 
Ekman (1979) argued that there are instinctive face movements which do 
not manifest as people supress them under certain circumstances, e.g. “in the 
presence of an authoritative figure” (ibid. p. 180), whereas certain learnt 
behaviours may be so embedded that they occur without the speaker being 
aware of it. Ekman, therefore, concluded that the distinction between 
voluntary/involuntary or intended/unintended gestures is not relevant as it does 
not reflect reality. 
6.2.1 Raised eyebrows  
6.2.1.2 The meaning of raised eyebrows 
Eyebrow movement studies go back to Ekman seminal work on the issue 
(1979). He advanced that facial signals could be used either to express emotions 
or as conversational tools. He distinguished 7 distinct eyebrows actions, called 
action units: 5 involved in the expression of emotions, such as anger, fear, 
surprise, disgust, etc., and 2 used as signals in conversation, mainly to punctuate 
speech or to underline certain bits of information (Fig. 49). Ekman claimed that 
both functions are essential to grasp the full complexity of communication. 
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Figure 49. Action Units for the brow/forehead (Ekman, 1979, p. 174) 
 
Citing Darwin (1872), Guaiatella et al. (2009) referred to a primitive 
function of raised eyebrows to enlarge the visual field and thus enhance visibility. 
This could be associated with the traditional link between raised eyebrows and 
the expression of surprise or astonishment, as acknowledging that something 
deserves increased attention. They drew a distinction between slow and rapid 
eyebrow movements and claimed that rapid raised eyebrows in conversation are 
used as an attention-getting device by interlocutors and are related to turn-taking. 
This is consistent with Kim, Cvejic, and Davis’s (2014) claim that eyebrow 
movements may be used to alert the hearer about an important upcoming bit of 
information. They analysed the interplay between brow and head movements, 
and concluded that the latter might serve to underline content over bigger chunks 
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of speech. However, they posited that differences in gesture timing and 
realisation may be simply due to physical properties, e.g., muscles that need 
activating, etc. 
Flecha-García (2010) defended that raised eyebrows may serve to guide 
the coherent structure of discourse, as participants tended to raise eyebrows 
more at the beginning of segments in which they introduced a new topic. In 
addition, they were used to underline certain bits of information. Tabacaru (2014) 
delved into the multimodality of humour, and provided an in-depth analysis of the 
relation between raised eyebrows and frowning with the humorous instances she 
identifies in her corpus. She found that raised eyebrows are consistently 
associated to sarcasm, and concluded that they can serve as gestural triggers 
(Tabacaru & Lemmens, 2014), which co-occur with the “core humorous part of 
an utterance” (Tabacaru, 2014, p. 217) to signal that the utterance has to be 
interpreted as humorous. 
6.2.1.2 Eyebrows and prosody 
Recent studies have zoomed into the meaning of eyebrow movements and 
their interplay with prosody. Flecha-García (2010) remarked that raised eyebrows 
and pitch accents were aligned in English, the former slightly preceding the latter, 
pointing to the use of raised eyebrows to underline certain parts of the utterance. 
She also noticed that raised eyebrows occurred more frequently at the beginning 
of large discourse segments. She further claimed that regardless of whether 
raised eyebrows are intended or unintended gestures, that is, made consciously 
or unconsciously by the speaker, they can both be considered as signs, as both 
Chapter 6 – A multimodal analysis of humour 211  
 
 
nevertheless carry meaning which can be interpreted by the interlocutor. She 
hypothesised that raised eyebrows may be intended signals when used for 
emphasis and unintended gestures, stemming from the speaker’s speech 
production process, when functioning as markers of discourse structure.  
The issue of the connexion between raised eyebrows and prosody was 
also briefly touched upon by Tabacaru (2014), who claimed that raised eyebrows 
are used as gesture-triggers for humour, more specifically for sarcasm. The 
distinction posited by Flecha-García (2010) is in line with Cavé et al.’s (1996) 
classification of gestures into rhythmic, i.e. expressive gestures, associated with 
rises in fundamental frequency, and dynamogenic, i.e. discursive gestures, linked 
to flat F0 curves. Guaiatella et al. (2009) also focused on eyebrow movement 
correlation with prosodic features, namely, with changes in F0. They concluded 
that eyebrow rises are used as tools to gain the interlocutor’s attention, either to 
express the will to take the turn in conversation or to signal the importance of a 
particular portion of speech. Their study focused on rapid eyebrow movements, 
but they argued that both rapid and slow movements in general can have semiotic 
value and have the potential to be used as rhythmic or dynamogenic gestures.  
6.2.1.3 Raised eyebrows in sample 
Regarding facial movements, raised eyebrows appear with the highest 
number of occurrences (65) in the present sample. As seen in Table 9, the 
occurrences cluster around the most frequent construal mechanisms, i.e., 
profiling and viewpoint, and are more or less evenly distributed among less 
frequent construals. As for humour types (Table 8), the distribution pattern is 
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consistent with what can be statistically expected, given the high number of 
occurrences both in raised eyebrows along with anecdote, irony, and parody, 
which are the most frequent humour types found. Interestingly, no strong 
correlation appears between raised eyebrows and sarcasm, as opposed to 
results obtained by Tabacaru (2014), although, arguably, the number of instances 
of sarcasm in the present sample (6) is too low to draw any significant conclusion. 
Let’s now analyse examples of the most frequent instances, as per the data 
summarised in the tables. 
Example (54) shows an instance of raised eyebrows in an anecdote. 
Sigourney Weaver is speaking about her recent trip to Cuba, and how she was 
so pleasantly surprised to see the classical education afforded to all artists. At 
one point, she is describing the Art School building, likening it to a womb, as if 
artists would emerge from it re-born after their artistic education period. Arguably, 
the instance elicits humour in the audience due to the unlikely comparison of the 
building to a womb, and the specific description of the entrance to the building as 
having the form of a vagina.  
(54) Sigourney Weaver:  It's in an art school built on the golf course. 
They got rid of the golf course after the 
revolution and they built this womb-like... It's 
literally...You walk into a vagina-like opening… 
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  It’s….       literally… 
   
  You walk into a… 
  Figure 50. Raised eyebrows in example (54) 
 
Sigourney Weaver raises her eyebrows at the beginning of the sentence 
“It’s literally”. Her gesture could be interpreted as a way of signalling the non-
conventional nature of what she is going to say next. I don’t believe she intends 
the utterance to be humorous, although it is perceived as such by the audience. 
Rather, she is simply describing the building and conveying her thoughts and 
emotions about it in the most effective way possible. Therefore, raising her 
eyebrows may be a signal of acknowledgment of the unexpected nature of her 
description and choice of words, or as a way to alert the hearer, as if to say, “I 
know this is going to be surprising to you”.  
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Arguably, though, this particular instance of raised-eyebrows cannot be 
linked to a discursive function, as no change in turn takes place either before or 
after the statement, and given that there is no new topic introduced: the building 
as womb metaphor had already been presented in the previous remark. The 
utterance is accompanied by a variety of gestures, among which head tilts, nods, 
frowning, and smiles, in addition to representational hand gestures depicting the 
entrance to the building. Furthermore, therefore, in this particular case no link can 
be drawn between the raised eyebrows and the humorous nature of the 
utterance, as, in my view, the speaker does not intend to produce humour. 
The following example (55) shows an instance of irony, which is produced 
intentionally by the speaker. Sheryl Crow is discussing her latest album, which 
includes a song about collusion between Russia and a fictional American 
President, far earlier than suspicions arose about possible Russian interference 
in 2016 American elections.  
 
(55) Sheryl Crow:  I was sitting with my buddy, going, “Wow, what’s the 
craziest thing you can imagine… like Russia, like 
Russia hacking. That’d be crazy. And like, uh…the 
President being involved with Russia. That’d be so 
fucked up!” 
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The President… 
           Figure 51. Raised eyebrows in example (55) 
 
Sheryl Crow raises her eyebrows upon uttering “The President…”, so it 
can be claimed that she underlines the bit of information which for her is the most 
important and where the highest incongruity lies, as if conveying that the idea of 
having a President colluding with a foreign power is so serious that it is beyond 
imagination. In this case, “The President” is not only highlighted by the raised 
eyebrows, but also by protruding the head. In addition, the prosodic accent falls 
on the word ‘president’. Hence, various multimodal cues, i.e., accent, raised 
eyebrows, and protrusion of the head align to give clear prominence to that part 
of the sentence, which is arguably the most relevant for the speaker, and, in 
Tabacaru’s (2014) terms, where the core of the irony, in this particular example, 
is placed. 
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Irony arises as she is portraying a situation in which she, along with her 
colleague, came up with what they thought was a crazy idea, and the product of 
their wild imagination. However, it turned out to be the object of a federal 
investigation within the U.S. administration, as probable cause for Russian 
meddling and, possibly, collusion with the then candidate Donald Trump, had 
been acknowledged. Clearly, she is underlining the implausibility of her idea at 
the time to highlight the opposition between the situation as they construed it 
then, in which no grounds to suspect anything of the like were possible, and the 
current circumstances, in which the legitimacy of the President himself is 
questioned.  
Finally, in example (56) we find an instance of raised eyebrows and 
parody. Stephen Colbert is interviewing Alec Baldwin, and he brings up a letter 
that Alec Baldwin received from President Nixon after Baldwin had lost the 
election for president of his school at George Washington University. Alec 
Baldwin then takes the letter to read what he considers to be the best part of it. 
 
(56) Alec Baldwin:  You know what the greatest part of this thing 
is? It’s that he writes: “From our mutual friend 
Mark Weinberg I’ve learnt of the disappointing 
results, as far as you are concerned”. 
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    From our mutual friend...            …as far as you are concerned. 
    Figure 52. Raised eyebrows in example (56) 
 
In this example, Alec Baldwin resorts to parody to delimit the part of the 
letter that he finds most interesting, as conveying the lack of tact by Nixon, or 
simply the fact that he did not feel sorry for Alec Baldwin’s defeat. In order to do 
so, the actor mimics precisely those Nixon’s words, as opposed to the first excerpt 
from the letter that he reads normally. The parody is shown by a change in voice 
quality, significant lower pitch, a palm-up gesture, head shake, and raised 
eyebrows. On this occasion, eyebrows are raised over the entire remark “as far 
as you are concerned”. As I see it, in this particular instance the use of the raised 
eyebrows could be twofold. On the one hand, to frame the chunk of letter that 
Alec Baldwin considers more significant, arguably because it is the most telling 
part about Nixon’s attitude towards his defeat, or because he feels it showed lack 
of empathy. On the other, the raised eyebrows could also be associated to the 
expression of surprise felt by Alec Baldwin on reading that part of the letter. 
Perhaps, the raised eyebrows in this case can also be an indication by Alec 
Baldwin to the hearer of the unexpected nature of such words. 
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Let’s now turn to cases of raised eyebrows in instances in which the 
underlying mechanisms are viewpoint and profiling, as there is where the 
occurrence of raised eyebrows clusters with regards to the type of construal 
operations. As said before, this is to be expected because those are the two most 
frequent construal operations found in the sample. An instance of raised 
eyebrows against the backdrop of viewpoint as a construal mechanism can be 
found in John McWhorter’s interview. To the question of whether there is a word 
in English whose meaning has not changed through time, the lexicographer 
answers that the most frequently used and dullest words are the ones that change 
the least, and gives the conjunction ‘and’ as an example, which elicits laughter in 
the audience and has therefore been annotated as a humorous utterance: 
(57) John McWhorter: For example, ‘and’. I have nothing remotely 
interesting to say about ‘and’. 
               
               Figure 53. Raised eyebrows in example (57) 
 
This is an interesting example, as the speaker keeps his eyebrows raised 
throughout the whole statement, but he raises them a bit higher upon uttering 
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‘and’, ‘nothing’, and ‘interesting’, which, in this case, are the more meaningful 
words. Again, raised eyebrows are aligned with the most prominent words, so I 
argue that they serve to reinforce the information structure of the utterance by 
underlining the most significant bits of information provided. 
As for a co-occurrence of raised eyebrows and profiling, an example can 
be extracted from General Michael Hayden’s interview, in a humorous instance 
already discussed in Chapter 2 as a token of hyper-understanding. General 
Hayden tricks the host into thinking that he is going to give away a juicy piece of 
information by asking a question usually put when people are going to say 
something important. However, he subsequently profiles just the literal meaning 
of the question, by answering it himself too in order to stress that he is bound to 
keeping secrecy. 
(58)  General Hayden:  Can you keep a secret? 
Stephen Colbert:  Turn off the cameras…I can keep a secret. 
General Hayden: Me too. 
    
Me…      …too.     
Figure 54. Raised eyebrows in example (58) 
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General Hayden raises his eyebrows upon the pronunciation of “Me too”. 
Admittedly, raised eyebrows in this example serve to highlight the unexpected 
turn in the conversation, as under normal circumstances, speakers do not ask 
this question in order to answer it themselves. It can also be associated to the 
idea of the surprise that is intended to cause in the hearer. Furthermore, by 
underlining the incongruity underlying his reply, General Hayden’s clear 
humorous intent with this remark is reinforced. 
The results of the analysis above are consistent with the claim that raised 
eyebrows can be used as underliners (Ekman, 1979; Tabacaru, 2014) to highlight 
parts of the speech that the speaker considers that deserve more attention. They 
may therefore be used to direct the hearer’s attention to the most meaningful 
parts of the speech to favour a correct interpretation, as intended by the speaker. 
Furthermore, raised eyebrows tend to align with prosody to make salient 
elements in the utterance clearer to the interlocutor; to that end, the upper part of 
the face, the area around the eyes, encompasses the strongest cues to 
prominence (Swerts & Krahmer, 2008). 
6.2.2 Smile and laughter  
Laughter and humour do not consistently go hand-in-hand, as the former 
can occur without the latter and vice-versa (Morreal, 1983). In fact, some argue 
that laughter is not even an intrinsically social phenomenon, as there can be 
solitary laughter (Weeks, 2016). Laughter is considered meaningful in itself and 
can be used to refer forward or backward in the conversation (Jefferson et al., 
1987). Norrick (1993) argued that laughter is the natural response to humour by 
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the hearer, and that its absence points to failed humour. Provine (2000) and Hay 
(2001), nevertheless, dissociated humour and laughter as a necessary and 
inevitable response. Having said that, laughter remains as a valid indicator of 
humour in the literature, given how frequently they co-occur (Holt & Glenn, 2013; 
Gironzetti, 2017). 
With regards to smiles, they have traditionally been associated with the 
expression of enjoyment (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1983). Only recently has 
research taken an interest into exploring from a multimodal perspective how 
smiling and humour are related (Harris & Alvarado, 2005; Attardo et al., 2013; 
Ikeda & Bysouth, 2013; Gironzetti & Menjo, 2014; Gironzetti et al., 2015). Ikeda 
and Bysouth (2013) associated smile and laughter, along with other multimodal 
cues, e.g. gaze, as features that, combined, may have communicative value to 
signal, for example, appreciation. Attardo et al. (2013), in turn, found in their study 
that smile and laughter were the only multimodal cues frequently co-occurring 
with humour. They concluded, though, that neither smiling nor laughter can be 
taken as markers of humour, as they are not consistently associated with it.  
For them, laughter and smile are not linked to the hearer’s reaction to 
humour, but to the way speakers signal their humorous intention, as part of a 
negotiation between interlocutors to determine when a given turn is to be 
comprehended as humorous (Attardo, 1994; Eisterhold, Attardo, & Boxer, 2006). 
This hypothesis was borne out by other studies, showing that humorous turns 
were consistently associated with higher-intensity smiles and smiling synchrony 
among interlocutors (Gironzetti & Menjo, 2014; Gironzetti et al., 2015). On a 
different note, some authors consider that laughter promotes cooperative 
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behaviour and it is not intentional (Smoski & Bachorowski, 2003). Interestingly, 
listeners can identify whether a person is smiling just thanks to acoustic cues 
(Drahota, Costall, & Reddy, 2007). 
Smile annotations in the sample include some instances of laughter, as 
the current analysis does not aim at disentangling the nature of both phenomena, 
but rather at looking into their association with humour and their possible function 
to frame humorous instances (Attardo et al., 2013). Smiling amounts only to a 
relative low frequency of gestures found in the sample. This may be due to the 
nature of the gestures themselves, as raised eyebrows or head movements tend 
to be shorter and repeated, whereas smiles can be maintained over a longer 
segment of speech, and therefore be annotated just once, despite covering 
longer stretches of utterances. A better measure of the co-occurrence of smiles 
and humour is to look into the percentage of humorous utterances in the sample 
in which speakers smile.  
Smile has been annotated in 41 out of 109 humorous utterances, which 
means that it is present in the production of 37.61% of the humorous instances 
identified. Interestingly, there is great variety in the use of smiling across 
speakers. This frequency reveals that smile or laughter are by no means 
necessary to frame a given utterance as humorous nor to signal the humorous 
intent of the speaker. Perhaps, the context itself is prone to humour, given the 
genre of the programme and the interviews themselves, and it might be a reason 
why smiling is not be essential, then, to frame any turn as humorous, as this is 
taken for granted in such a setting. 
Chapter 6 – A multimodal analysis of humour 223  
 
 
As for the co-occurrence of smiling with types of humour or construal 
mechanisms, it is more evenly distributed across all types than raised eyebrows. 
Still, the highest number of smiles are found in combination with viewpoint, with 
regards to construal operations, and with anecdote, parody, and irony, in terms 
of humour types, which again is consistent with the higher presence of these 
humour forms and construals in the sample. 
Cristela Alonzo is the speaker in the sample who most often resorts to 
smiling upon the production of humorous instances, as in example (59) below, in 
which she is discussing with the host differences in how they were taught certain 
aspects of religion as children. 
(59)  Cristela Alonzo:  You’re gonna have a crown in Heaven? 
Stephen Colbert:  You get to Heaven, you get a crown. That’s was 
I was told. 
Cristela Alonzo:  My mum would say: “Mija, in Heaven, you’re 
gonna get electricity, running water… 
 
 
Figure 55. Smile in example (59) 
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She smiles at the end of the humorous utterance, corresponding to her 
last statement in the previous dialogue. I believe that smiling in this case is an 
indication of the humorous nature of Cristela Alonzo’s utterance, and of her intent 
for the remark to be taken as such, despite pointing to a difficult childhood as the 
daughter of an immigrant Mexican mother with very few financial means. Another 
example of smile and viewpoint can be found in the same interview, but this time 
co-occurring with frowning, which, in my view, assigns a different value to the 
smile. Again, Cristela Alonzo is referring to her childhood, this time to explain how 
she became passionate about comedy to the point of wanting to become a 
comedian herself. She explained that she watched a lot of comedy on TV, as she 
spent a lot of time alone in her house and TV was her main companion. 
 
(60)    Stephen Colbert:  How did you get to comedy from there? Were 
there clubs in your town? How did you…? 
Cristela Alonzo:  No clubs whatsoever. I loved TV. I was a 
latchkey kid… 
Cristela Alonzo:  [on ─inaudible─ reaction by someone in the 
audience]: Ok… Ooh, times were tough. 
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  Ooh! Times were tough! 
 Figure 56. Smile and frowning, in example (60) 
In this case, Cristela Alonzo’s smile, which includes a short bout of 
laughter, does not co-occur with speech but substitute for it. In my view, after 
expressing her astonishment at the reaction by a member of the audience with 
the first ‘Ok’, she clearly conveys her disapproval through frowning, which has 
traditionally been taken as a sign for disagreement (Tabacaru, 2014). Also, the 
position of the hands seem to be signalling disbelief or lack of understanding, as 
if asking ‘What is going on?’ or ‘What was that?’  
Her smile in this case may be taken as an attempt to attenuate the rejection 
of the audience’s reaction so as not to come across as outright confrontational, 
which would be out of place, and possibly even detrimental for her career, in the 
context of the programme. In addition, it could be a way of trying to conceal her 
negative emotions and to save face in order to keep the light and humorous tone 
expected at the interview, an attitude which is further reinforced by her response, 
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after which she seems to dismiss the whole episode with a shrug, before turning 
to the host and resume her speech where she’d left it before this interruption, by 
repeating “I was a latchkey kid”. Beyond illustrating different ways in which smiling 
can be used, apart from expressing appreciation, encouraging cooperation or 
signalling humorous intent, I find this particular example to be a showpiece of 
how different multimodal channels interplay to convey much more than what is 
simply said. 
Turning now to instances of smile co-occurring with the most frequent 
humour types, we can consider example (61) of smile and anecdote, in which 
Condola Rashad is telling that she used to go with her mother, a famous actress, 
to theatres where her mother was playing and act as her assistant, and even take 
notes of her performance: 
 
(61) Condola Rashad:  I would sit in the audience and I took notes. I 
brought them to her a few times. If I didn't hear 
a line I said: “You know? That line, at the end 
of it you just kind of dropped off and I need 
more”. 
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               Figure 57. Smile in example (61) 
Once more, we find the smile occurring at the end of the statement, which 
is often the case in all instances of smiles found in the sample. I claim that 
Condola Rashad’s smiling in this case is not so much as to signal humour as 
such, but an acknowledgement of the implausibility of the situation she is 
depicting, with her, a young girl, lecturing her mother, a seasoned and renowned 
actress, on how she could improve her performance.  
Something similar can be said of the following example (62) extracted from 
Daniel Kaluuya’s interview. The British actor is describing his experience at The 
Globes, as a newcomer in a world of glamour and big film stars. He is specifically 
telling how he met Denzel Washington, and how overwhelming the whole 
experience was for him. 
(62) Daniel Kaluuya:  And Denzel spoke to me, and I'm like, he was 
like...I was like: I can't believe he knows who I 
am, I can't believe he knows who I am. And 
then…[mimicking Denzel’s words to his wife] 
"He can't believe I know who he is". 
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                Figure 58. Smile in example (62) 
 
I posit that this smile, which is produced right after the remark, is not used 
either to frame the turn as humorous or to signal a humorous intent on the part of 
the speaker. He is vividly describing the situation from his point of view, in very 
honest terms; that is, a young, unknown British actor in one of the most important 
gatherings of the film industry for the first time, getting acquainted with the elite 
of Hollywood stars.  
In my view, his smile is a reflection of his own positive feelings of 
bewilderment and overwhelm at such a dream come true for him. It is, therefore, 
an inward-looking smile, which is highlighted by the fact that the smile is not 
directed at the hearer, and no eye-contact is made by Daniel Kaluuya, which, to 
me, points that no agreement is sought on the part of the interlocutor in this 
particular utterance. 
Finally, example (63) below illustrates an instance of smiling and irony, 
from Vice President Biden’s interview. It conveys Joseph Biden’s answer to the 
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question of what he felt on the 2016 election night, in which fellow democrat 
Hillary Clinton lost to Donald Trump. 
(63) Vice President Biden:  Well, I've been in the closet since then. I 
haven't come out...No. 
 
              
Figure 59. Smile in example (63) 
 
Vice President Biden smiles right after pronouncing ‘no’, which, in turn, 
negates the meaning of the preceding utterance, intended as ironical. In this 
case, I see the smile as clearly pointing to the humorous ironical nature of his 
remark, reinforced by the verbal negation of what he had just stated, as if to dispel 
any possible doubt about it. Of the last three examples analysed, this is the only 
smile that can undoubtedly be tied to humour, as intended to frame what has 
been said as such. On another note, the type of humour or of construal 
mechanism involved in a given utterance does not seem to bear any strong link 
with the smile produced.  
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According to the analysis conducted, smiling is not consistently associated 
with humour. Even when it does appear in humorous utterances, it is not 
necessarily to frame humour or as a signal of the humorous intent. Smiling, 
therefore, is just but one of the various multimodal cues that can be elicited at 
any given time by speakers to reinforce whichever message they want to convey, 
whether humorous or not, but it can also be just an expression of attitude or 
affective display, not necessarily tied to an intended communicative value by the 
speaker (Ekman, 1979).  
In any case, the outcome of my analysis is rather qualitative, as no 
differences have been drawn between smiles in terms of intensity (Gironzetti and 
Menjo, 2014; Gironzetti et al., 2015), and as the focus has been placed solely on 
the production of humorous instances, with no account of smiles and laughter 
that speakers produce outside those utterances or of smiles elicited in the 
interlocutor. Further and more fine-tuned research is needed to fully comprehend 
the nature of the relationship between humour and smile/laughter. 
6.3 Head movements 
Head posture changes constantly during speech (Hadar et al., 1983). Their 
exact instantiation is very varied in terms of angles and extent, with different 
gestures possibly overlapping (Wagner et al., 2014). Head movements can have 
semantic, discursive, and communicative functions. Head shifts can regulate 
interaction, yielding or asking for turn (Hadar et al., 1984), or requesting 
backchanneling (Maynard, 1987; McClave, 2000; Altorfer et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, head movements by listeners tend to synchronise with those made 
by speakers (Hadar et al., 1984).  
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In addition, head movements, as hand gestures (McNeill, 1992), can have 
deictic functions and locate referents in abstract space; that is, a given space will 
be signalled by the hands and/or the head to correspond to a certain element of 
the speech, e.g. different people or places the speaker is referring to, and that 
space-element correlation will be kept during speech. Furthermore, switches in 
narrator while speaking, i.e. when the speaker refers someone else’s words, can 
also be indicated by head movements (McClave, 2000).  
Nods are typically associated with agreements, while shakes are linked to 
negation (Kendon, 2002). We usually look away and move the head upwards 
when thinking about something (Lee & Marsella, 2006). Head movements can 
also be recruited to signal the humorous nature of what is being said (Lee & 
Marsella, 2010) or to give prominence to the elements of the utterance which 
carry the humorous meaning (Tabacaru, 2014). McClave (2000) considered that 
head gestures can also be the result of cognitive processes, frequently 
accompanying lexical repairs.  
Finally, the relationship between interlocutors has been found to have an 
impact on the frequency of head motion events, e.g. speakers nod more in 
interactions with less familiar listeners, than when speaking with relatives or close 
friends (Ishi et al., 2014). Head movements must be interpreted in the multimodal 
context in which they occur, as their interplay with other modalities, e.g., face 
expressions, can have an impact on their function (Poggi et al., 2010; Wagner et 
al., 2014; Heylen, 2008). For example, head tilts are typically associated with 
disbelief or lack of understanding, but can yield a different interpretation of 
surprise or interest when joined by certain facial displays (Heylen, 2008). 
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6.3.1 Head tilts 
Head tilts and head nods are the most frequent gestures found during 
humorous utterances in the present sample. Head tilts have been linked to 
disbelief, lack of understanding (Heylen, 2008), interjections expressing denial, 
word searching, (Lee & Marsella, 2006), and in segments or speech with weak 
boundaries, such as unfinished utterances or stretches in which speakers pause 
to think (El Kalioubi & Robinson, 2004; Ishi et al., 2014). Head tilts loosely align 
with prosody (Cvejic et al., 2010), although they do not synchronise with certain 
parts of utterances as strongly as nods or shakes (Ishi et al., 2014). In addition, 
Tabacaru (2014) claimed that head tilts also serve as gestural triggers, 
underlining those parts in the utterance which are more significant to enable the 
humorous interpretation. 
In our sample, head tilts have been annotated mainly with anecdote, 
followed by a large margin by parody and irony. This seems natural, as those are 
the three most frequent humour types identified in the interviews. As for construal 
mechanisms, head tilts overwhelmingly cluster around viewpoint.  
Example (64) has been extracted from General Hayden’s interview. 
Stephen Colbert had brought the subject of President Trump accusing President 
Obama of having wiretapped Trump Tower for campaign surveillance purposes. 
General Hayden explains that to obtain a court order for wiretapping is extremely 
difficult, and that they are only issued when probable cause of serious criminal 
activity is proved. The subsequent exchange follows: 
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(64)  Stephen Colbert [after mentioning that President Trump had called 
for an investigation on the issue]: Can a 
President just find out by himself that this 
happened? 
General Hayden:  Yeah. That’s why I wondered what happened 
on Saturday morning. He seemed…He 
seemed to have forgotten that he was the 
President of the United States. 
 
              
Figure 60. Tilt in example (64) 
General Hayden tilts his head upon pronouncing the first ‘seemed’, and 
keeps it slightly tilted throughout the utterance, except for a further prominent tilt 
upon saying ‘forgotten’, which is additionally punctuated by a nod. The onset of 
both tilts are clearly aligned with accented words: ‘seemed’, and ‘forgotten’. It 
could be argued that the first tilt is associated to the unfinished utterance, 
although there does not seem to be a pause for thinking or retrieving the word. 
Instead, I belief that General Hayden is marking the beginning of a humorous 
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sarcastic turn, as if requiring closer attention by the hearer. As said before, the 
second tilt falls upon ‘forgotten’. I posit that both ‘seemed’ and ‘forgotten’ are the 
most relevant elements in the utterance to facilitate its sarcastic interpretation. 
Hence, in this case, tilts fall within Tabacaru’s (2014) gestural triggers, as well as 
play a part in information structure (McNeill & Levy, 1993; Jannedy & Mendoza-
Denton, 2005), highlighting the most relevant pieces of new information. 
The following example (65), however, of an occurrence of a head tilt in an 
instance of parody, with viewpoint as the main underlying construal, does not 
seem to have the same function. In this case, Riz Ahmed is referring to how he 
switches to the required accent for the character he has to play in a given series, 
film, etc. the moment he sets foot in the place where that is going to be filmed, 
and keeps the character’s accent even when he is not shooting. He explains that 
this leads to embarrassing situations in which, once the shooting is finished and 
he goes to thank the team, already in his natural British accent, people react badly 
as they feel betrayed. 
(65) Riz Ahmed:  They can feel quite betrayed, really. Because 
we wrap the whole shoot and I go to people: 
“Thanks a lot, mate. Nice one; I really 
appreciate it”. [Reporting the team’s reaction] “I 
don't even know you, you know?” 
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          Figure 61. Tilt in example (65) 
 
In this instance, there is a short tilt that falls upon ‘know’, while he is 
reporting the reaction he gets from his team when they realise he talks differently 
from what they are used to. According to the literature survey reported above on 
the functions of tilts, this example could be associated to the expression of 
disbelief, and, in my view, it also has a clear use in terms of information structure, 
aligning with prosody to underline the most prominent word in that utterance. On 
another note, it is interesting to note that he does not express the transition to 
indirect speech verbally. Instead, he turns his head and gaze to a different space 
allocated to the referent, i.e. the team he has worked with, in a distinct location to 
identify them. So the switch in narrator is marked by this gaze and head 
movements, to set up a new space, along with a clear frowning to convey the 
disapproval he gets from the team members, and by the semantic content of the 
sentence itself, which can only fit with his previous statements as conveying the 
reaction of her fellow work colleagues. 
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Example (66), from Alison Janney’s interview, shows an example in which 
a tilt is combined with a head shake, in an anecdote with viewpoint and profiling 
as main construal operations. She is explaining how she became interesting in 
acting while in college, especially after realising she could not major in 
Psychology, as she was unable to conduct rat experiments in the lab. 
(66) Alison Janney:  I tried to major in Psychology and I had to deal 
with the rats, and I was like...I cannot do with 
the rat-lab part of Psych...Whatever, I don’t 
know. 
                 
Figure 62. Tilt and shake in example (66) 
 
Upon uttering ‘whatever’, she tilts her head to the right, while also 
performing a shake. The tilt could be associated to the unfinished utterance, i.e., 
weak boundaries (Ishi et al., 2014), or it might reinforce the expression of 
rejection and denial, clearly shown by the head shake and the position of the 
hands, as if pushing away the idea of having to work with rats in the lab. In any 
case, no clear connection seems to exist between the tilt and the humorous effect 
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of the utterance, nor to the profiling of the rat experiments as part of how she 
explains her decision to study theatre at college. 
An interesting example from the same interview occurs in a later 
statement, in which she is telling that she was cast by Paul Newman to act in a 
university play he himself directed, as a former student of the same college. When 
asked why she thinks she was chosen by Paul Newman to play the leading role, 
she explains that, in the casting, she came up with a monologue on fast driving, 
as she knew Paul Newman was very fond of cars, and she hints to the possibility 
that her canning and seducing pretence to be a car-fan woman enticed Paul 
Newman into giving her the role. In the sample, this instance has been annotated 
as an anecdote, with viewpoint as the main underlying construal mechanism.  
(67)  Alison Janney:  And it probably had nothing, no reason, 
to do why I got the part. But I like to think 
that I...You know... I catfished him into… 
cast me. 
  
 …into…   cast    me 
 
Figure 63. Head tilts in example (67) 
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The utterance identified as humorous corresponds to the latest part of this 
statement, i.e. “I catfished him into cast me”. This utterance is punctuated by 
repeated head tilts. At first, short tilts accompany “I catfished him into…”, whereas 
the last part, “…cast me”, is framed by slightly more sweeping head tilts. It gives 
the impression that she is a bit unsure about what she is going to say at the 
beginning, as the seduction innuendo is clear, but then decides to go for it, but 
making clear through this head motion of repeated tilts that the remark has to be 
taken as humorous, and not at face value. Repeated tilts are not common in 
Western societies, as opposed to in India, where they are widely used for 
backchanneling (Wagner et al., 2014). The beginning of each head tilt cycle in 
this instance is clearly aligned with the accented part of the corresponding 
segment of speech, i.e., “I CATfished him into…CAST me”. The non-serious 
nature of the utterance is further reinforced by a smile at the end.  
In my view, this latter example is proof of the versatility of gestures at large, 
and head movements in particular, which can be recruited for different functions 
and that always need to be interpreted in the context in which they are being 
performed.  
6.3.2 Head nods 
Nods are typically associated with the semantic expression of agreement 
or acceptance (Poggi et al., 2010), but they can have different functions (Wagner 
et al., 2014), such as confirmation, approval, appreciation, emphasis, etc. (Poggi 
et al., 2010). They can also be used for turn taking or giving (Ishi et al., 2014) and 
strongly correlate with prosody (Swerts & Krahmer, 2010). Head nods produced 
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by speakers can function as backchannel requests, to which listeners have been 
found to be extremely sensitive (McClave, 2000).  
Most nods annotated in the sample co-occur with viewpoint and profiling, 
as far as construal mechanisms are concerned, and with anecdote, parody, and 
irony, with regards to humour type, thus following the expected statistical pattern, 
given the highest frequency of these construal operations and humour types, 
respectively. 
The following example (68) illustrates an instance of a single nod in an 
utterance identified as belonging to hyper-understanding, with profiling as the 
main underlying mechanism. Stephen Colbert welcomes lexicographer John 
McWhorter and tells him that he listens to his podcast all the time, to which 
McWhorter replies “Keep listening”. Arguably, humour arises from the 
unexpected nature of the remark, as a simple “thanks” what would have typically 
been expected. By profiling the action of listening to McWhorter’s podcast, 
instead of taking the remark just as a polite onset of the interview, the 
lexicographer reverses to a certain extent the host’s statement in order to exploit 
it for his own benefit. 
 
(68) Stephen Colbert:  Thanks for being here. I listen to your podcast 
all of the time… 
John McWhorter:  Keep listening. 
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Figure 64. Nod in example (68) 
 
John McWhorter produces a single nod, starting upon the pronunciation of 
‘keep’, which is also the most prominent word in the utterance, and ending in the 
baseline position at the end of the word ‘listening’, so both the head movement 
and prosody strongly correlate. Although it could be claimed that the nod in this 
example signals appreciation or approval, I believe that in this particular instance 
it is used to place emphasis on the utterance, as a way of highlighting a non-
conventional remark which, therefore, requires more attention and effort to be 
processed on the part of the hearers. 
A different function can be interpreted in example (69), where several nods 
are performed in the turn, which is Vice President’s Biden reply to the question of 
what he expects from the Trump administration: 
(69) Vice President Biden:  Now, you’re all gonna laugh when I say 
this [burst of laughter in the audience]. 
But the honest-to-God truth is, I don’t 
know. But I’m being deadly honest to 
you. I don’t think the President himself 
knows for certain. 
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     You’re all gonna      laugh when I say this. 
   Figure 65. Nod in example (69) 
Two utterances were identified as humorous here: “You’re all gonna laugh 
when I say this”, as an example of meta-humour with empathy deixis as the main 
construal mechanism, and “I don’t think the President himself knows for certain”, 
as an instance of insider humour and viewpoint. The nod onset co-occurs with 
‘laugh’, which is the accented word in the utterance, and the head keeps down in 
this single nod until the end of the utterance. I posit that this nod is a backchannel 
request and that it serves to engage the audience and to make sure the speaker 
has their full attention.  
A further example of what I believe to be a nod to request backchanneling 
from listeners is found in the subsequent humorous remark. In this case, it 
correlates with the word ‘certain’, at the end of the statement. In my view, this nod 
is again intended to capture the hearers’ acknowledgement of what is being said, 
as if to make sure that they fully grasp its meaning. A different nod is produced in 
this very same utterance, coinciding with the word ‘President’, which happens to 
be the most prominent word in that stretch of speech. I claim that this particular 
nod serves to underline the term ‘President’, as the most relevant word 
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introducing new information, in which the agent switches from Joseph Biden to 
the President. 
An illustration of a nod signalling confirmation and agreement can be found 
in example (70). Given the Pakistani background of actor Riz Ahmed, Stephen 
Colbert has asked him if he has experienced troubles travelling to the US due to 
his physical appearance. Riz Ahmed replies that he frequently gets “randomly” 
selected for searches at security control, to which the subsequent exchange 
follows: 
(70)    Stephen Colbert:   A secondary search? 
Riz Ahmed:    Well, it’s a random search, really. 
Stephen Colbert:  Ok, I thought maybe it was a slightly 
deeper search. 
Riz Ahmed:  Well, now I get searched by fans, so they 
can be really thorough, actually. Yeah. 
 
        
    So they…        can be really… 
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     …thorough… 
    Figure 66. Nods in example (70) 
 
Riz Ahmed performs a nod co-occurring with ‘they’, and a double nod upon 
‘thorough’. Clearly, with his remark, the actor picks up on Stephen Colbert’s 
tendentious question, agrees with the host’s suggestion, and confirms it himself 
with his words. The nods, therefore, play a role to signal such confirmation. In 
addition, they loosely align with the two most prominent words in the last 
sentence, thus contributing, along with prosody, to information structure, as those 
are the two key words to comprehend the message. 
The last example (71) analysed shows an instance of repeated nodding. 
Stephen Colbert asks Sigourney Weaver if they have starting shooting the 
second part of the film Avatar, to which she awkwardly replies that they haven’t 
and that if she had said the opposite in an interview the day before, she was 
wrong. It so appears that they had indeed starting shooting the film but that the 
information was probably under embargo and no one was allowed to speak about 
it. The hosts then said that he understood and further asked confirmation that 
they would start shooting at some point, to which the actress replied as follows: 
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(71) Sigourney Weaver:  I'm sure we will start at some point. 
 
        
    I’m sure we will                …start… 
                  
   … at some point.     
   Figure 67. Nods in example (71) 
 
The whole utterance is punctuated by nods, clearly signalling confirmation. 
Furthermore, there is strong correlation with prosody, as the word ‘start’ is made 
more salient in the statement by means of prosodic accent and also underlined 
by a longer nod, in which the head is kept down until Sigourney Weaver starts 
uttering “at some point”, when her head shifts to baseline position. A last nod is 
performed right after the utterance is finished, which, along with gaze directed at 
the listener, could be interpreted as a signal to yield the turn. 
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As seen through these examples, nodding in humour performs the same 
functions as in non-humorous utterances, identified in previous studies (McClave, 
2000; Poggi et al., 2010; Swerts & Krahmer, 2010; Ishi et al., 2014). No 
correlation between nodding and a particular type of humour or construal 
mechanisms has been found. This analysis also illustrates the polysemy of 
gestures, even within the same instantiation, in which they can be interpreted as 
having different functions, e.g. information structuring and confirmation, as in 
example (70). 
6.3.3 Head shakes and head turns 
Head shakes and head turns also frequently appear in the sample, 
although in fewer numbers than nods and tilts. Both are performed along the 
same axis, with shakes involving repeated sweeps, and turns a single movement 
(Wagner et al., 2014). In addition, shakes differ from turns in terms of amplitude 
and the angle of the movement performed (Kendon, 2002). Kendon (2002) 
argues that head shakes share a core meaning of negation, although their 
different instantiations can correlate with inclusivity, e.g. with words like 
‘everyone’ or ‘everything’, intensification or superlative, e.g., with expressions 
such as ‘very’, ‘a lot’, ‘exactly’, etc. (C. Goodwin, 1980; Schegloff, 1987), 
uncertainty, and lexical repairs (McClave, 2000; Kendon, 2002). The underlying 
implicit notion of negation in head shakes accompanying expressions of 
intensification or inclusivity is justified as no exceptions are envisaged to what is 
being conveyed by those expressions (Kendon, 2002). In addition, shakes can 
co-occur, precede or be performed after speech. With regards to head turns, they 
are typically associated to discourse management, in terms of turn-taking and 
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turn-yielding, as well as signals structuring abstract spaces where to locate 
referents in speech (McClave, 2000).  
As for the correlation with types of humour and construals in the sample, 
it follows an expected pattern, with the highest number of shakes and nods 
happening along with the most frequent types of construal operations and 
humour, namely, viewpoint and profiling, on the one side, and anecdote, parody, 
and irony, on the other. Interestingly, around a third of shakes occur in instances 
of exaggeration as a type of humour, which is consistent with the association 
made in the literature between shakes and the expression of intensity or 
superlative.  
One such example is the following, in which Amy Schumer is telling about 
an incident she had with activists from PETA, an animal welfare organisation, 
who had criticised her for wearing a coat with a hood lined with coyote fur.  
(72) Amy Schumer:  If I made a list of the animals I care about more 
than coyotes [burst of laughter in the audience]. 
It would be a list of every animal. I don't care. 
 
 
Figure 68. Head shake in example (72) 
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Here, Amy Schumer performs short repeated head shakes on several 
occasions. First, upon uttering the word ‘coyotes’. This can be interpreted as the 
attitude of the speaker about coyotes, which basically is rejecting the idea that 
they should be protected. Later, while pronouncing the second part of the 
statement, she keeps shaking her head in short, quick, and low-amplitude 
movements. In this example, several of the interpretations for headshakes 
identified in the literature, as explained above, coincide, namely: an expression 
of inclusivity with ‘every animal’, and negation conveyed in ‘I don’t care’. 
Another example from the same interview illustrates a different use of a 
turn. In this exchange, Amy Schumer is talking about the comments made by 
some journalists about her body, deemed to be too plump for current Hollywood 
beauty standards. This instance has been annotated as an exaggeration, 
regarding humour, and based on viewpoint as the main underlying construal 
mechanism. 
(73) Amy Schumer:  They talk to me as if I need to be buttered to fit 
through a door.  
 
       
  They talk to me like I need to be…             …buttered to fit through… 
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  …a door. 
  Figure 69. Turns in example (73) 
Amy Schumer performs two turns during her remark. First, upon uttering 
‘buttered’, she turns to make eye contact with the host. I interpret this turn as 
seeking confirmation of the hearer’s attention, as well as underlining the word 
‘buttered’ as the one of the most relevant elements in the utterance. Then, she 
turns her head again upon the pronunciation of ‘door’. Once again, there is a 
correlation with prosody in terms of what words are most prominent, which, at the 
same time, I believe is linked to information structure in the sentence, highlighting 
the most meaningful words, i.e., ‘buttered’, and ‘door’. Furthermore, taking the 
latter turn along with gaze and hand gestures, I posit that it is pointing to the 
abstract space where the door is. As a matter of fact, she refers to the door shortly 
afterwards, in an utterance not taken as humorous, and she turns again to that 
very same space when pronouncing the word ‘door’. 
Let’s now consider example (74), in which different gestures co-occur, 
among which repeated shakes and a turn. Stephen Colbert has said to Elon Musk 
that given that he’s trying to do great things, he is a billionaire, and he is involved 
in the development of many state-of-the art technologies, he has to be either a 
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superhero or a supervillain, so that he has to choose one or the other. Elon Musk 
replies: 
(74) Elon Musk:  I try to do useful things.  
 
     
      I try to do… 
     
…useful things. 
Figure 70. Shake and turn in example (74) 
He precedes his statement with repeated head shakes that are maintained 
throughout, which could be interpreted as negating the idea that he is a superhero 
or a supervillain. Indeed, this utterance has been categorised in the sample as 
an example of understatement, as Elon Musk is trying to downplay the 
importance of what he does with regards to the idea of superhero saving the 
world, as portrayed by the host. In addition, Elon Musk performs a turn at the end 
of the statement, making eye contact with his interlocutor, while simultaneously 
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instantiating a nod and a tilt. I believe those movements have the function of 
signalling the end of his remark and yielding the turn in the conversation. The nod 
could also be seeking approval from the interlocutor, while the tilt could also be 
associated to a further expression of denial or disbelief with regards to the 
previous host’s words. 
I posit that these example further demonstrate the complexity surrounding 
the performance of head movements, whose analysis can certainly yield different 
interpretations as to what functions can be assigned and what role they are 
playing in any given instance of communication. A comprehensive study of such 
roles must therefore also necessarily include the point of view of interlocutors in 
the communicative event. Table 10 summarises the functions of gestures 
identified in the sample: 
Gesture Function identified in sample 
nod Agreement, underliner, backchannel request, confirmation 
tilt 
Gestural triggers in sarcasm and anecdote, expression of disbelief, 
information structure, rejection 
raised eyebrows 
Information structure, underliner, gestural trigger in irony and hyper-
understanding 
turn Change in narrator, change in viewpoint, turn yielding 
shake Rejection, inclusivity 
smile Frame turn as humorous or ironical, face-saving, affective display 
 
 Table 10. Functions of face and head movements identified in sample 
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6.4 Multimodal density: a prospective test 
In light of the analysis above, it seems clear that none of the gestures co-
occurring with humour that have been identified in the sample can be considered 
markers of humour, as they do not consistently co-occur with humorous 
statements and do not help to predict humour. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 
5 (cf. Section 5.5), humorous instances in the sample are not marked by prosodic 
contrast either. Therefore, if we admit that humour is a marked form of 
communication, requiring more cognitive effort by the hearer to be processed and 
understood, the question remains as to whether humour is signalled multimodally 
at all, in order to facilitate its apprehension.  
After failing to find head movements or face expressions that could be 
considered as markers, and having ruled out prosodic contrast as a way to 
underline humour, one may wonder if the key perhaps lies in the amount and 
frequency of gestures produced during humorous utterances, as opposed to non-
humorous ones. In the same vein of studies that have shown that the context in 
which communication occurs, and the participants in the communicative event 
exert an influence in the amount of multimodal cues we produce, e.g. nodding 
more with less familiar interlocutors, or repressing certain face gestures when 
confronted with authoritative figures (Ishi et al., 2014), maybe the presence of 
humour in a statement will lead to more gestures accompanying and punctuating 
that utterance. 
Going back to the notion of current discourse space (CDS), let’s remember 
that the viewing frame encompasses the current scope of conceptualisation in 
any instance of communication, i.e., a usage event. Within the viewing frame we 
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find the focus, that is, the profiled element, as well as the channels corresponding 
to the two poles entailed in any utterance: conceptualisation, and vocalisation. 
Langacker (2001), therefore, placed the multimodal part of the utterance in that 
vocalisation pole, in which prosody, intonation, and the verbal message interplay 
on the basis of how the event is being conceptualised. The strongest link between 
conceptualisation and the multimodal expression of a given event lies in the 
window frame. Therefore, it might be argued that the biggest impact on the way 
an utterance is constructed multimodally is precisely how the event is being 
construed. This is in line with the notion of growth point (McNeill, 2013), in which 
the conceptualisation processed itself is twofold, with an analytic (language) and 
an audiovisual (multimodal) component.  
The second biggest influence on the multimodal production of an utterance 
would be the ground within the CDS, including interlocutors, the interaction, and 
the immediate circumstances, followed by the larger context of speech, which 
includes more distant social and cultural circumstances, and the shared 
knowledge, as a set that is easily accessible but not explicit in the usage event.  
Arguably, in the interviews included in the sample the shared knowledge, 
context and ground remain stable, as the interlocutors and the audience is the 
same, as well as the assumptions presumably shared on the genre of the 
programme, expectations of amusement, knowledge about the interviewees, etc. 
As a result, I posit that higher multimodal density in humorous utterances in a 
given interview could be claimed to arise from the humorous or marked nature of 
the utterance itself. In order to test this hypothesis, I decided to conduct a 
prospective comparative test between humorous and non-humorous utterances, 
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using the interviews with the highest and the lowest multimodal density in 
humorous utterances respectively. Multimodal density in the present study ─not 
to be mistaken with modal density (Norris, 2014)─ will be measured by estimating 
the number of occurrences of head and face movements annotated in the 
relevant utterances, i.e. humorous or non-humorous, and divided by the number 
of utterances of the particular type involved. 
A prospective brief study was conducted to test this hypothesis, namely, 
that humorous utterances will be characterised by higher multimodal density. To 
do so, two interviews were selected, with the highest and lowest multimodal 
density respectively. John McWhorter was the person producing the highest 
number of gestures per humorous utterance, with an average of 5.85 gestures. 
On the opposite side, Susan Sarandon only produced 2.75 gestures per 
humorous utterance identified. Previously selected baseline and pre-baseline 
utterances (cf. Chapter 5, Section 5.5) as non-humorous utterances were 
analysed, with head movements and face gestures performed during those 
utterances annotated. The result for John McWhorter yielded an average of 5.1 
gestures per non-humorous utterance, while Susan Sarandon performed 2 
gestures per non-humorous utterance. The amount of gestures produced, then, 
did not vary significantly, and we cannot conclude that humorous utterances are 
produced with higher multimodal density; therefore, the starting hypothesis is 
rejected.  
Having said that, many caveats can be raised with regards to the approach 
taken in this study. To begin with, the size of the sample as a whole, and of the 
two interviews in which the hypothesis was tested in particular, is not large 
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enough to be able to extrapolate and generalise the findings. Furthermore, a 
major challenge is linked to the analysis of the sample itself. First, the 
segmentation of utterances was made applying a usage-based approach, but it 
is clear that different criteria can be implemented to decide how to delimit 
utterances. A different segmentation may well yield different results.  
Second, the study is rather qualitative, insofar as the technical means to 
achieve more accuracy in annotating gestures are not available, e.g. eye tracking, 
full view of the speaker at all times, etc. The decision to favour the study of 
spontaneous communication involves that no control over the camera shot exists, 
which results in available images varying in size, angle, etc. This, in turn, poses 
a big challenge as far as the annotation of gestures is concerned.  
A further non-negligible issue in this regard has to do with the difficulty in 
always clearly and unequivocally identifying gestures, not only due to the different 
shots available, but also because movements very often overlap. Hence, it is 
easy to mistake certain movements such as tilts, nods and turns or shakes, when 
they overlap, or in cases of short, quick shifts. In addition, no account of the 
amplitude or rate in gestures has been taken, whereas differences may lie in the 
various ways in which a movement such as head shakes, for example, can be 
instantiated (Wagner et al., 2014).  
Yet another element which may bear a huge influence in the interpretation 
of gestures is that of the interplay of all modes recruited in a single instance, i.e., 
mode density (Norris, 2004a; 2014). In this regard, our study is partial, as 
modalities such as hand-gestures, body-posture shifts, gaze, etc. have been left 
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out due to sample constraints ─the hands were not always visible, for example─ 
and the lack of technical means to provide more accuracy, as with eye-tracking 
technology to study gaze.  
Finally, a more fundamental question remains, as to where the humorous 
nature of an utterance lies. Our study has only be concerned with speakers, and, 
following standard practice in the literature, humour was considered to have 
occurred when an utterance lead to an outburst of laughter in the audience. But 
certain remarks that elicited laughter did not seem to have been uttered with a 
humorous intent by the speaker ─although, admittedly, this is a subjective 
interpretation which could only be confirmed by the speaker─, as Susan 
Sarandon’s comment on the ceiling (cf. example 28, Ch. 4). As a result, any study 
aiming at gaining an insight into how humour is multimodally framed has to 
consider the humorous intent in the speaker, which adds a further layer of 
complexity in the analysis.  
At the same time, the fact that a certain utterance may be perceived as 
humorous even in the absence of such an intention on the part of the speaker 
has to be also acknowledged. Consequently, my research has led me to realise 
that to fully understand what makes an utterance humorous, the hearer’s 
perspective must be taken into account too. But the question of where humour 
lies is still open. My claim is that it can be tied either to the speaker’s intention or 
to the hearer’s perception, which may not always overlap, as in the case of failed 
humour (Hay, 2001), or when humour is unwittingly produced by speakers. 
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In spite of the objections that I have just listed, I believe that this study also 
has clear merits. It confirms previous studies on the meaning of gestures, which 
seem to carry the same pragmatic and semantic functions in humorous and non-
humorous communication. It reaffirms the importance of conducting studies on 
spontaneous communication, as the production of multimodal cues is heavily 
influenced by the participants and context of communication, and, as a result, it 
may differ considerably in staged settings trying to reach out to a wide audience. 
It bears out previous findings pointing to the non-existence of multimodal markers 
of humour. Furthermore, it seems to refute the hypothesis that higher multimodal 
density is a feature of humorous communication ─as far as the sample is 
concerned─. In sum, no multimodal behaviour specific to humour that sets it apart 
from non-humorous communication has been found. Instead, speakers just 
recruit and elicit any modality at their disposal, fully exploiting related affordances, 
to try to convey their message in the most effective manner, regardless of 
whether that message happens to be humorous or not. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the results of my study of face expressions 
and head movements in humorous utterances, as recurrent multimodal cues in 
every interaction, gaining an insight into the functions that can be assigned to 
raised eyebrows, smiles, nods, tilts, shakes, and turns as facilitators of 
communication. The results of the analysis conducted bear out the outcome of 
previous studies on these gestures in the literature (Poggi & Pelachaud, 1998; 
McClave, 2000; Kendon, 2002; Lee & Marsella, 2010; Attardo et al., 2013; 
Tabacaru, 2014; etc.). These gestures are not specific to humorous 
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communication; they are rather used as multimodal tools by speakers and 
hearers in communication at large.  
In addition, no consistent pattern of association between certain types of 
humour or construal mechanisms and any of the particular gestures analysed has 
been found, with the exception of the highest number of shakes clustering around 
instances of exaggeration, and most tilts concentrated around occurrences of 
viewpoint. Further research will be necessary to determine whether these are just 
casual links or not. Hence, given that these gestures cannot be considered as 
humorous multimodal cues per se, the question arises as to whether there exist 
any multimodal tool that is consistently used to facilitate the interpretation of 
humorous utterances. 
As seen before, context plays a major role in determining the way we 
communicate, with a clear impact on what gestures we perform, their frequency, 
and intensity (Ishi et al., 2014; Wagner et al., 2014). For example, the less 
common ground and familiarity shared by interlocutors the higher need to mark 
messages multimodally (Ishi et al., 2014). In addition, when only aural 
communication occurs, prosodic cues are more salient (Cvejic, Kim, & Davis, 
2012). In other words, the current discourse space (Langacker, 2001) and all the 
elements therein will have an impact on the multimodal cues produced in 
interaction. Furthermore, modal density, defined as “the intricate interplay of 
various modes of communication or the intensity of a certain mode that a social 
actor employs” (Norris, 2004b, p. 102), is higher in communicative actions 
pertaining the foreground in a given context, i.e., where speakers place their 
focus of attention and have greater awareness of the actions performed (ibid.). 
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Norris emphasises that it is not just about counting how many modes interplay, 
but to disentangle the extent to which they intertwine. The intensity and frequency 
of gestures is higher when co-occurring with prominent parts of the speech 
(Ambrazaitis & Bruce, 2009; Ferré, 2010). The analysis conducted in this chapter 
proves that not only the interplay between different modalities, but also the 
overlap of co-occurring gestures, even from the same modality, will have an 
impact on how an utterance may be interpreted.  
In light of the above, it is clear that gestures cannot be just taken as 
elements merely punctuating speech, but as part of a “multimodal construction in 
which the different modalities of expression available are deployed by the 
speaker in the course of building a unit of expression according to the rhetorical 
needs of the interactive moment” [emphasis in the original] (Kendon, 2002, 
p.147). 
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    Chapter 7 
                            A cognitive analysis of humour 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will offer an analysis of humour from a cognitive linguistic 
perspective, on the basis of the instances found in the sample. An in-depth study 
of the most frequent construal mechanisms and types of humour identified is 
included. In addition, examples from the types of humour with the highest number 
of occurrences in the sample are accounted for drawing on widespread cognitive 
linguistic notions, such as current discourse space (CDS) (Langacker, 2001; 
Antonopoulou, Nikiforidou, & Tsakona, 2015), as well as blending (Fauconnier & 
Turner, 2002; 2003; Coulson, 2005a; 2005b; Coulson & Oakley, 2005), 
conceptual integration network (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998), and mental spaces 
(Fauconnier, 1994; 1997).  
Cognitive linguistics offers the best framework for a comprehensive study 
of humour (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Brône, Feyaerts, & Veale, 2006; Veale et 
al., 2015; Dynel, 2018). It does away with artificially drawn boundaries between 
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in order to account for conceptualisation at all 
levels of language structure (Brône et al., 2006), acknowledging the key role of 
discourse and embodiment in meaning construction (Langacker, 2001). It is an 
umbrella paradigm in which different approaches to humour can converge and 
be reconciled. Hence, my analysis draws on basic notions in cognitive linguistics 
and will subsequently bring together other approaches (Clark, 1996; Attardo, 
2001; Coulson, 2005b; 2005c, 2015; Brône, 2008; Veale, 2015; Giora, 1998; 
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McGraw & Warren, 2010; Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015; Giora, Jaffe, Becker, & 
Fein, 2018; Gibbs, Samermit, & Karzmark, 2018), with a more or less evident 
cognitive stance, into that basic account. I also assess compatibilities among 
different terms advocated by those various authors to try to look for overlaps and 
convergence that may ultimately show the way towards a possible unified 
approach. 
Furthermore, I review the notion of incongruity in relation to humour, and 
go through the vast array of related, albeit different, interpretations posited by 
authors as one of the most fundamental elements of humour (Clark, 1996; Giora, 
1991, 1998; Attardo, 2001; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Coulson, 2005b; 2005c, 
2015; Veale, 2015, etc.). Finally, I delve into various explanations as to what 
makes something funny (Morreal, 1983, 2009a, 2009b; Forabosco, 2008; 
McGraw & Warren, 2010; Veale, 2015; Giora et al., 2017; Gibbs et al., 2018, etc.). 
7.2 Construal mechanisms identified in sample 
A major tenet in cognitive semantics is that concepts are not isolated units 
in the mind. They can only be understood and processed in a context of 
presupposed, background knowledge structures, known as domains (Clausner & 
Croft, 1999). Concepts, therefore, are grounded or anchored in domains, and 
both are conceived through our experience, as well as our bodily and sensorial 
perception of the world, which can be construed in different ways. The mental 
processes whereby our experience of the world is thus conceptualised are called 
construal mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004).  
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7.2.1 Construal mechanisms and humour 
Croft and Cruse (2004) compiled a list of construal mechanisms, bringing 
together previous classifications (Langacker, 1987, 1991; Talmy, 2000a, 2000b) 
and unifying terminology. They established four broad categories of construal 
mechanisms: a) attention/salience, b) judgment/comparison, c) 
perspective/situatedeness, d) constitution/gelstat (cf. section 4.2.4 in Chapter 4). 
Brône and Feyaerts (2003) singled out some of these categories and certain 
construals therein as the most relevant to humour: profiling and metonymy as 
selection mechanisms under the category of attention/salience; metaphor and 
figure/ground under judgement/comparison, and viewpoint. 
Selection is the ability to focus only on what is considered to be the most 
relevant part of the linguistic input in a given instance of communication. In doing 
so, certain elements of a domain, frame or mental space may be highlighted, i.e. 
profiled, or a salient point can be used to refer to a different element within the 
same domain (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003). Certain contextual factors can determine 
the degree of saliency of elements, or, in the case of jokes, of different 
interpretations of humour (Giora, 1991, 1998; Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015; Giora 
et al., 2018). 
Judgment/comparison operations are pervasive and constitute one of the 
most basic categories of construal mechanisms (Langacker, 1987, pp. 103-105). 
The notion of figure-ground reversal has been widely exploited to account humour 
(Attardo & Raskin, 1991; Attardo, 2001; Veale et al., 2006; Brône, 2008; 
Tabacaru & Lemmens, 2014). Furthermore, the notion of mapping, central in 
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conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993; Ruiz de Mendoza, 
2014; Forceville, 2015) is a central piece of incongruity resolution, as it is what 
allows to establish a similarity between opposed scripts (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 
2001; Attardo, 2015). 
Regarding viewpoint, a different perspective on a given communicative 
event automatically yields a different conceptualisation of such event (Langacker, 
1987; Ritchie, 2006; Feyaerts et al., 2010). Viewpoint and mapping are two 
central elements of conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002, 
2003) and mental space theory (Fauconnier 1994; 1997), hence the suitability to 
apply such an analysis to humorous instances (Coulson, 2005a, 2005b; Dore, 
2015). Furthermore, blending can account for creativity as upon merging input 
spaces, the resulting blended space may well have new emergent structure not 
present in any of the inputs (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002).  
The results of the present study bear out Brône and Feyaerts’s (2003) 
analysis, as the most frequent construal mechanisms identified underlying 
humour instances in the sample are viewpoint, profiling, and subjectivity. Both 
subjectivity and viewpoint fall under the perspective category and are clearly 
related. Croft and Cruse (2004) defined subjectivity as the conceptualisation of 
an event in which speakers includes themselves (cf. section 4.2.4 in Chapter 4), 
i.e. they position themselves at the centre of the speech event. Both viewpoint 
and subjectivity, as all construals based on perspective, are built upon the 
particular way we are in the world, both spatiotemporally and conceptually. Our 
standpoint will determine our scope of attention, i.e. the viewing frame within a 
current discourse space (Langacker, 2001). It is within that viewing frame that we 
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will focus our attention on a salient element, and that we can direct our 
interlocutor’s attention to the particular element we want to profile, i.e. to make 
more salient. 
If we think of the characteristics of the sample under analysis, which 
consists entirely of interviews where only the interviewee’s speech has been 
studied, it is understandable that perspective, all construal operations therein 
included, is the most frequent category of construal mechanisms found in the 
sample. In the end, guests are there to talk about themselves, and it is only 
natural that they base their construal of the communicative event on their own 
personal perspective.  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse humour, the reason why only 
humorous utterances have been analysed. Nevertheless, it would be interesting 
to further study a set of non-humorous utterances within the sample to determine 
whether underlying construal mechanisms also fall mainly under the perspective 
category. I do not believe there are specific construal mechanisms associated 
with humour (Veale et al., 2015). I rather claim that the pragmatic and discourse 
context of the communicative event will ultimately determine the nature of the 
conceptualisation operations at hand (Attardo, 2001; Yus, 2003; Coulson & 
Oakley, 2005).  
Furthermore, leaving aside canned jokes, i.e., jokes which have been 
“used before the time of the utterance in a form similar to that used by the 
speaker” (Attardo, 1994, p. 295), the context in which a conversation occurs plays 
a major role in the perception of a given utterance as humorous.  
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Let’s consider example (75) below: 
(75) Daniel Kaluuya:  White people say very weird staff to you. 
This utterance was categorised as humorous in the sample as the 
audience laughed. It was part of the answer to a question put by Stephen Colbert 
on whether black people in America and Britain can be said to have similar 
experiences with regards to their racial background. I find that it is a clear 
example in which the humorous nature of the statement cannot be said to lie in 
the decontextualised semantic content of the utterance itself. One could easily 
imagine a more formal context, such as a conference on racial discrimination, for 
example, in which this very same utterance would not have been perceived as 
funny. However, the same underlying construal mechanism would be in place. 
So humour, in this case, does not hinge upon either the semantic content, or the 
conceptualisation process. It could be argued that the humorous nature of the 
utterance resides instead in the context in which it has been said, namely, a 
casual late-night show interview in which a light tone is expected and in which 
participants ―audience, host and guests alike― are prone to humour and 
laughter.  
7.3 Cognitive analysis of humorous instances 
7.3.1 Current discourse space 
Cognitive linguistics considers that all linguistic units are abstractions from 
actual instances of language use, i.e. usage events (Langacker, 2001). Usage 
events entail comprehensive conceptualisation of the event, articulated around 
two poles: conceptualisation itself, with full contextual apprehension by 
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participants, plus a vocalisation pole. Interlocutors’ complete understanding of the 
circumstances surrounding their interaction, i.e. the discourse they are engaged 
in (Langacker, 2001, p.144), is part of their conceptualisation of the usage event. 
As seen in Chapter 4, Langacker defined the CDS as the “mental space 
comprising those elements and relations construed as being shared by the 
speaker and hearer as a basis for communication at a given moment in the flow 
of discourse” (2001, p. 144). The ground, in turn, comprises the speech event, 
the interlocutors, their interaction and the immediate circumstances, mainly time 
and place of speech (Fig. 71).  
 
  
 Figure 71. Current Discourse Space (Langacker, 2001, p. 145) 
 
Regardless of the active or reactive role of speaker (S) and hearer (H), 
both have to process utterances on the basis of the double conceptualisation-
vocalisation pole. As they communicate, they will direct their focus of attention 
within a given viewing frame or scope of attention, determined by the CDS as a 
whole and delimited by “how much we can conceptualise or hold in mind at any 
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given instant” (ibid. p. 144). In successful communication, both S and H will 
coordinate their actions to focus on the same conceived entity, which is the 
profiled element within the viewing frame. Both the viewing frame and the CDS, 
however, are dynamic and flexible. The viewing frame can be directed anywhere, 
to real or invented situations. The focus of attention can also change within the 
viewing frame.  
Consecutive usage events conform the CDS, drawing on previous 
utterances and setting expectations for subsequent ones. Crucially, each usage 
event can entail changes in the CDS, to elicit a different context, bringing a 
backgrounded element to the fore of the viewing frame or drawing on shared 
knowledge to establish a new viewing frame. Notice that the ground in CDS refers 
to the immediate circumstances surrounding the interaction that is taking place, 
whereas the context of speech includes physical, mental, social and cultural 
elements. Finally, the shared knowledge is “the body of knowledge presumed to 
be shared” by both interlocutors and “reasonably accessible” (ibid., p. 145). 
As explained before, the viewing frame is determined by our 
conceptualisation field, or scope of attention at any given time. Fig. 71 clearly 
outlines the conceptual and vocalisation pole of every utterance.  
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    Figure 72. Viewing frame (Langacker, 2001, p. 146) 
 
The conceptual end includes three channels, namely speech 
management, related to turn taking; the information structure channel, in which 
old and new information are processed and weighted, and the objective situation, 
which is the main object of conceptualisation. This is the most salient part of the 
conceptualisation pole, and belongs to the focus of attention. This focus of 
attention also comprises a salient part of the vocalisation pole, which is the 
segmental content, i.e., what we are actually saying. The other two channels of 
this vocalisation pole are intonation and gestures, two additional modes in face-
to-face communication. 
I have chosen Langacker’s (2001) CDS as the basic framework for 
analysing humorous instances as it elegantly and simply account for all elements 
relevant to communication. By claiming that the CDS is the basis for 
conceptualising any linguistic unit, Langacker underlines the roots of language in 
discourse. Language units, therefore, regardless of their structure level, 
(semantic, lexical, construction, utterance, multimodal utterance, etc.) share a 
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grounding process not only in embodiment, understood as our perceptual and 
interactive experience of the world, but also in discourse and human interaction, 
as the most basic form of communication.  
Furthermore, both the cognitive and multimodal side of any communicative 
event are acknowledged in the CDS, through the two poles inherent to any usage 
event, i.e. conceptualisation and vocalisation. Finally, the crucial role played by 
the pragmatic context and discourse in general is also highlighted, comprising the 
immediate circumstances around the communicative event, cultural and social 
contexts and conventions, and mutually assumed and accessible shared 
knowledge. In my view, the current discourse space provides a comprehensive 
yet simple framework to analyse any instance of communication.  
My aim with this analysis is twofold: on the one side, to account for humour 
drawing on basic concepts in cognitive linguistics; on the other side, to reinforce 
the explanatory power of such a framework, demonstrating its validity to explain 
highly marked forms of communication such as humour. I do not believe that 
humour needs to be explained resorting to specific humorous communication 
mechanisms (Veale et al., 2015; Dynel, 2018). I think any account of 
communication must be able to explain humour too. The challenge, then, is to 
pinpoint where humour lies within those mechanisms in order to establish what 
exactly renders an instance of communication humorous and what makes it 
different from a non-humorous utterance that can be explained drawing on the 
same theoretical framework and principles. 
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7.3.2 Construal mechanisms and humour types 
What follows is an account of certain examples extracted from my sample, 
taking into account the most frequent construal mechanisms and humour types 
found. The three types of humour with the highest number of occurrences in the 
sample are anecdote (33 instances; 26.83 %), irony (17 instances; 13.82 %), and 
parody (16 instances; 13.00%). As for construal mechanisms, viewpoint as been 
identified in 46 utterances (38.01 %); profiling underlies 23 humorous instances 
(19.00 %), and subjectivity has been found in 14 instances (11.57%). 
Table 11 summarises the construal mechanisms at play in each of the 
three most frequent types of humour encountered. Notice that the number of 
construal mechanisms identified may be higher than the total number of 
occurrences in each humour type. The reason is that, although a minimalist 
annotation approach has been adopted (cf. section 5.6.1 in Chapter 5), at times 
two construal mechanisms were deemed clearly salient in a single humorous 
instance, in which case both types were annotated. 
 
Anecdote Irony Parody 
Viewpoint (22) 
Profiling (6) 
Subjectivity (5) 
Dynamic attention (4) 
Profiling (6) 
Viewpoint (3) 
Subjectivity (2) 
Metaphor (2) 
Viewpoint (10) 
Deixis (4) 
Categorisation (1) 
Dynamic attention (1) 
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Deixis (3) 
Categorisation (1) 
Metaphor (1) 
Deixis (2) 
Categorisation (1) 
Dynamic attention(1) 
 
Table 11: Construal mechanisms underlying most frequent humour types 
 
I then proceed to analyse an example of each of the three most common 
types of humour-construal combination, namely: an anecdote based on 
viewpoint; an instance of irony with profiling as an underlying construal operation, 
and an example of parody relying on viewpoint. 
7.3.2.1 Anecdote and viewpoint 
It is perhaps not surprising that anecdote and viewpoint go hand in hand 
in such a high number of occurrences. Anecdotes are stories based on personal 
experience or on other people’s lives (Dynel, 2009), so it is understandable that 
they be construed from the standpoint of the speaker. 
Let’s consider example (76) from the sample. Cristela Alonzo is talking 
about her childhood. She spent a lot of time at home watching TV, mostly comedy 
shows, and that is how she became fascinated by stand-up comedy. She explains 
how her mother, a Mexican immigrant, hardly knew any English and therefore let 
her watch comedy shows not intended for children, as she was unable to 
recognise inappropriate content in them. On the contrary, when she saw her 
daughter amused and she recognised comedians from the Saturday Night Live 
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programme, which she used to watch with her children, thought that the TV 
programme was fully appropriate for children. 
(76) Cristela Alonzo:  The Specials came out and she’s like “Ay, it’s 
the guy from SNL; you can watch this” [laughter 
in the audience; pause]. And then he starts 
talking and I’m like “Oh, damn. I can watch this” 
[laughter in the audience]. 
This example has been annotated as two distinct humorous utterances, as 
there is a pause and two bouts of laughter in the audience as a response. Both 
instances have been identified as anecdotes, and both with viewpoint as the main 
underlying construal mechanism. Clearly, she is telling a personal story and she 
brings in two different viewpoints, namely her mother’s and Cristela Alonzo’s own 
perspective. In terms of Langacker’s (2001) CDS, we could then identify two 
usage events, each corresponding to one of the humorous instances identified: 
UE1: The Specials came out and she’s like “Ay, it’s the guy from SNL; you 
can watch this”. 
UE2: And then he starts talking and I’m like “Oh, damn. I can watch this”. 
I will sketch the main elements that, in my view, need to be present in this 
CDS for communication to be successful. I do not claim it is a comprehensive list 
including every single one of the elements in each of the components of the CDS. 
There is no way around the fact that individual construals of this situation may 
yield somewhat different elements. I will therefore strive to list those items which 
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I believe form the bare minimum to ensure successful communication and a 
shared apprehension of the speech event.  
The CDS includes both these usage events, plus the previous ones, such 
as the host’s question, all of them setting expectations about what is going to be 
said next. The shared knowledge in UE1 is the same as in UE2. Shared 
knowledge contains what comedy and comedians are, what kind of programmes 
are suitable for children, the role of parents in monitoring what their children watch 
on TV, the situation of Mexican migrants not proficient in English, what SNL and 
The Specials are, and, crucially, what difference in tone exist between both 
programmes, even when having the same comedian appearing in both, etc. The 
context, regarding the cultural, mental, social and physical circumstances, 
comprises the figure of Cristela Alonzo as the first successful mainstream Latino 
comedian, her role as a comedian, and the need to come across as funny, 
therefore setting expectations about the likelihood of humour arising in her 
speech.  
The ground, defined as the immediate circumstances surrounding the 
speech event, contains Cristela Alonzo herself, Stephen Colbert as the host, and 
the audience, as well as the genre of the programme and the setting of the 
interview, which is meant to be amusing and entertaining. Finally, the viewing 
frame, as directed by Cristela Alonzo’s speech, comprises her past as a child of 
a Mexican immigrant mother, having the TV as her main companion ─she had 
actually mentioned that in a previous statement during the interview─, and her 
watching The Specials with the same comedian from SNL, a programme her 
family used to watch together.  
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All of the above-listed elements are shared both by UE1 and UE2. 
However, they differ in the focus of attention. In UE1, the focus of attention is 
placed on The Specials and on the comedian from the point of view of Cristela 
Alonzo’s mother, who allows her daughter to watch the programme as she does 
not understand what they say and thinks that the show was innocuous for 
children, having recognised the comedian from SNL, a family-friendly programme 
the family watched together on Saturdays. In the next usage event, UE2, 
however, the focus of attention is again on The Specials, but this time it is not the 
comedian that is profiled, but the words he is saying and the exhilaration felt by 
Cristela Alonzo when she is allowed to watch the programme. 
A more fine-grained analysis of the viewing frame can establish that the 
focus of attention in UE1 is composed of the mother’s point of view on The 
Specials and the comedian as the objective situation, as well as the actual words 
and literal quotation from her mother uttered by Cristela. In UE2, the objective 
situation is in turn her own point of view and feelings when she realises how 
inappropriate the programme is for children, and how good she feels she can 
watch it. Again, in the vocalisation pole, her words, now quoting herself, form the 
segmental content.  
Finally, as for the other two conceptualisation channels, she makes a 
pause after UE1, even though she keeps the floor, to allow the audience to laugh 
as an acknowledgement of the incongruity of what she is telling. Information 
structure is organised in terms of delivering her mother’s point of view first, in 
order to contrast it later with her own view of the situation at the time. In UE2 she 
actually conveys that latter perspective and then she keeps the floor to explain 
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that the fact that she watched so much TV comedy as a child had a deep impact 
on her desire to become a comedian herself.  
Lastly, on the vocalisation pole, both intonation and gestures are used to 
reinforce the different viewpoints from which the situation is construed. She acts 
out her mother’s and her own words at the time to make the message even 
clearer. Body posture and intonation also mark the passage from one usage 
event to the next.  
The previous analysis shows the validity of Langacker’s CDS model to 
explain how communication unfolds. It does not, though, account for the 
humorous nature of the utterances themselves. Humour can be said to be 
conveyed when it is acknowledged by participants in the communication event 
(Hay, 2001). In this case, the bar to measure whether the utterance has been 
humorous lies in the reaction by the audience. If they laugh, one can conclude 
that the utterance is perceived as humorous and has therefore been successful 
from that point of view (Morreal, 1983; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Bryant 
& Gibbs, 2015).  
With regards to the question of what confers to UE1 and UE2 their 
humorous nature, drawing on the idea of incongruity, or the notion of contrast of 
ideas or of expectations, as advocated by incongruity-resolution theories, I argue 
that humour lies in the following elements. In UE1, there is a clear clash between 
what parents are expected to do from a socially acceptable perspective, i.e. 
prevent their children from accessing inappropriate content for their age, and the 
fact that Cristela Alonzo’s mother explicitly gives her permission to watch that 
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inappropriate show as she recognises the comedian from SNL. Hence, the 
contrast arises between an element from the shared knowledge (socially 
acceptable parenting) and an element from the focus of attention (the mother 
allowing Cristela to watch a programme with inappropriate language). In UE2, 
Cristela’s own point of view is confronted with her mother’s, highlighting the 
mismatch between how they both construed the situation.  
7.3.2.2 Irony and profiling 
Irony is understood as a type of humour for the purposes of this analysis, 
although it is a controversial issue (Attardo, 2000a, 2000b; Dynel, 2009; etc.). 
Irony could be defined as a violation of norms and expectations in a pretence 
space (Giora, 1998) in which the speaker expresses detachment from the 
utterance said. In irony not only the utterance itself, but also the evaluation of the 
speaker on that same utterance is communicated. Most examples of irony in the 
sample occur with profiling as the main construal mechanism; therefore, one such 
example will be analysed resorting to the notion of current discourse space 
(Langacker, 2001). 
Profiling is the construal operation whereby only a certain element of the 
situation construed is made salient. Consider example (77). Susan Sarandon is 
talking about Bette Davis, as she impersonates her in one of her latest films. She 
is discussing the highly confrontational relationship between Bette Davis and 
Joan Crawford. Among the reasons for such enmity, she mentioned that it was 
partly instigated by a famous columnist, who wrote about their confrontation in 
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her column, and also the fact that both women had had many sexual partners in 
common.  
(77)  Stephen Colbert:  Joan Crawford and Bette Davis? 
Susan Sarandon:  Yeah. 
Stephen Colbert:  Not at the same time, right? 
Susan Sarandon:  I don’t think so. That would have been, maybe, 
a bonding experience. 
In this case, the humorous utterance identified in the sample is Susan 
Sarandon’s last remark. Susan Sarandon’s utterance is considered ironic as 
there is a clear difference between the intended and literal meaning of the 
utterance. The possibility that they could have had sex with the same partner 
simultaneously is very remote, given the seemingly protracted and intractable 
conflict between both women, not to mention the taboo of such sex practices at 
the time, i.e. the 30’s. In spite of that, Susan Sarandon decides to play on the 
host’s question and present the hypothetical ─pretence─ scenario, where having 
sex with the same partner simultaneously could have been a possible recipe to 
solve the confrontation between Bette Davis and Joan Crawford.  
The utterance identified as humorous in this instance is Susan Sarandon’s 
last remark: “I don’t think so. That would have been, maybe, a bonding 
experience”. In this case, the CDS contains her previous statements about the 
antagonism between both actresses, Stephen Colbert’s remarks, and her own 
ironic comment. The shared knowledge includes the public figures of Bette Davis 
and Joan Crawford, their work as actresses, morality at the time, sex taboos, etc. 
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As for the context, it comprises the apprehension of Susan Sarandon as a famous 
actress, and her role as Bette Davis in the film, which allegedly has made her 
thoroughly study the diva and become an expert on Bette Davis’ life.  
In the ground, in turn, we find the expectations linked to the programme 
genre and the informal tone of the interview, as well as the interaction itself 
between Susan Sarandon and Stephen Colbert, with the host’s remarks 
prompting the ironic response in Susan Sarandon, expected to live up to the 
witticism and humour in her counterpart’s comments. The viewing frame in this 
particular usage event is the bitter relationship between Joan Crawford and Bette 
Davis, their life in general and their sex life in particular. Stephen Colbert’s 
question had shifted the focus of attention to a pretence space in which both 
women had sex with the same partner at the same time. Susan Sarandon’s 
remark zooms into the same focus of attention to profile therein the bonding 
character that experience could have had for the two actresses, possibly helping 
to mitigate the bad feelings between them. 
In other words, Susan Sarandon keeps the objective situation ─both 
women having sex with the same partner at the same time─ that Stephen Colbert 
has previously established as the conceptualisation pole of the focus of attention, 
but she directs the attention to one particular element she sees in that objective 
situation, i.e. the bonding character the experience might have had for Bette 
Davis and Joan Crawford. Segmental content is, as always, made of the words 
uttered. The other elements in the vocalisation pole, namely intonation and 
gestures, do not starkly differ in this case from those accompanying previous 
remarks, apart from directing her gaze to the host at the end of the comment to 
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signal end of turn. This takes us to the remaining components of the 
conceptualisation pole, i.e. speech management ─she yields the turn at the end 
of her statement─, and information structure, where she introduces her view that 
such an experience could possibly have brought the two actresses closer 
together. 
In my view, humour in this case lies in a contrast within the viewing frame, 
in which the salient element in the immediately previous usage events had been 
the animosity between both divas. The focus placed by Stephen Colbert on a 
pretence space in which both actresses were having sex with the same partner 
at the same time had already elicited laughter in the audience, possibly because 
of the incongruous nature of the situation. Susan Sarandon’s retort results to be 
even more humorous ─provided we take the higher intensity of laughter in the 
audience as a valid measure─. I argue that the reason is that, instead of being 
taken aback by the host’s question, she is able to exploit it and delve into the 
humorous nature of that comment highlighting, i.e. profiling, an even more 
unexpected feature of that already unlikely event. 
Although I believe Susan Sarandon’s utterance is fundamentally ironic, it 
could also be defined as hyperunderstanding (Brône, 2008), in the sense that it 
exploits what has been said by the previous speaker changing their intended 
meaning. Although there is no confrontation nor verbal feud of any kind between 
Susan Sarandon and Stephen Colbert, i.e. neither of them is the target of the 
other’s humour, Susan Sarandon succeeds at reversing the host’s question to 
add an acute and unexpected perspective.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 5, boundaries between humour types are not 
always clear-cut and several categories of humour may converge in a single 
instance. Something similar occurs with construal mechanisms. In this example, 
it can also be argued that viewpoint plays a major role when it comes to 
construing and presenting the situation. Susan Sarandon is able to profile the 
bonding experience as a salient element of the viewing frame because she has 
conceptualised the situation from her own standpoint, which differs slightly from 
the one entailed in Stephen Colbert’s remarks. As explained before, I have opted 
to annotate only what I believe are the most salient types of humour and construal 
mechanisms in each humorous instance, for the sake of simplicity in the analysis 
and in order to gain an insight into possible patterns emerging between humour 
types and construal mechanisms. 
7.3.2.3 Parody and viewpoint 
Parody implies the playful imitation of someone in a given situation, 
exaggerating certain elements in order to produce a humorous effect. Therefore, 
the link between parody and viewpoint is unavoidable, as by definition, speakers 
clearly convey their own construal of the person and the situation subjected to 
parody. I argue that profiling also plays a major role, as in order to make the 
parody, the speaker necessarily needs to choose certain traits and features to be 
exaggerated. However, as I see it, viewpoint is more prominent than profiling, as 
the choice of features to be made salient to the audience through parody are 
subordinate to conveying the imitated person and situation from the speaker’s 
standpoint. Not only that, but in parody, the speaker seems to assume the 
parodied character viewpoint as they act out that person words or behaviour, 
Humour in face-to-face interaction: A multimodal and cognitive analysis 280
 
when in fact, what is truly conveyed is how the speaker construes the person and 
situation parodied. 
Let’s examine example (78), extracted from Condola Rashad’s interview. 
She is known by her role in the TV series Billions, where she impersonates a 
successful and ambitious assistant to the district attorney. When asked about 
how she prepares for the role and whether there is a big amount of research on 
legal issues involved, she refers to her sister, an attorney working for the Mayor 
in Atlanta, as her main source of information on those matters. The subsequent 
exchange is as follows: 
(78)    Stephen Colbert:  Does she ever get frustrated because you have 
the job that…? 
Condola Rashad:  Oh, totally. She was like, “Why do you get the 
job that I wanted? But you're playing it and I'm 
the real one here”. 
I don’t think she is trying to make fun of her sister with this parody. Rather, 
she is acting out her alleged sister’s frustration to reinforce the humorous nature 
of the interview and to acknowledge and support the host’s remarks. She decides 
to imitate her sister, highlighting her annoyance at having Condola coming across 
as a successful attorney in a relevant position (albeit in fiction), which, as Condola 
construes and presents the situation, her sister thinks should be her own 
exclusive purview. 
The humorous utterance identified in the sample corresponds to Condola 
Rashad remarks as referred in (78). The CDS includes Condola Rashad’s usage 
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event as stated above, plus Stephen Colbert’s previous remarks, preceded by 
Condola Rashad’s own account of her role as an assistant DA in Billions. The 
shared knowledge comprises the job performed by attorneys; the different ranks 
within the administration, i.e. that a district attorney ─even an assistant─ ranks 
higher than an attorney working for the mayor; sibling relationships; how actors 
prepare for a role, etc. Elements listed in the context of speech are Condola’s 
work as an actress, the popularity of the series Billions, the recognition achieved 
by Condola thanks to this character, and possibly also the salary entailed, which 
is presumably higher than a mayor attorney’s salary.  
The ground, as in the previous examples, is characterised by the tone of 
the interview, the programme genre, and the casual conversation in which guests 
are expected to be funny and play along with the host. The viewing frame includes 
Condola’s role in Billions, her preparation for the role, and the assistance 
provided by her sister. The focus of attention, i.e. the salient element in the 
viewing frame, is placed on her sister’s frustration at Condola playing a character 
with a position she would like to hold herself. Notice that it is Stephen Colbert 
who has directed the focus of attention to that feeling of irritation in Condola’s 
sister. Condola keeps the focus of attention bringing her sister’s point of view on 
the situation, as Condola herself construes it, conveying it through parody. 
The conceptualisation pole of the viewing frame entails the turn taking 
process as managed by Condola, replying to the host’s questions and 
subsequently yielding the turn. As for information structure, she picks up on 
Stephen Colbert’s remarks, confirming that bit of information and adding her 
sister’s reaction from Condola’s viewpoint. The objective situation is precisely her 
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sister’s feelings, expressed by the words uttered by Condola as if she were her 
own sister. This latest element already belongs to the segmental content in the 
vocalisation pole, accompanied by the other two channels, intonation and 
gestures, which very clearly delimit the part in which she is impersonating her 
sister by adopting a different stance, bodily posture, hand movements pointing in 
a reproachful attitude, mockingly portraying her allegedly angry sister. 
With regards to where humour lies in this example of parody, I claim it lies 
in the vocalisation pole. The way Condola Rashad acts out her sister’s words and 
attitude leads to the humorous effect. Not only the mock angry tone in which 
Condola delivers her sister’s speech but the actual words, i.e. the segmental 
content, she decides to use. Especially, the sister’s supposed claim “I’m the real 
one here” marks a contrast between the successful but fake Condola-assistant 
DA and the hard-working, but unknown sister-real attorney. So in this case, I 
believe humour relies on the interplay between deliberate gestures and mock 
angry tone, as well as the somewhat exaggerated opposition fake/real. 
7.3.3 Mental spaces 
Section 7.3.2 showed how cognitive linguistics can be elicited to account 
for humorous communication in conversation. I make the case for using 
Langacker’s (2001) notion of current discourse space as the core framework to 
explain interaction and discourse, with a clear link to conceptualisation. Once this 
overarching framework has been established, we can zoom in to analyse more 
in detail the conceptualisation process itself. To do so, I resort to the notion of 
mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1981, 1994, 1997) and conceptual blending 
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(Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002, 2003; Coulson, 2005a, 2005b; Coulson & 
Oakley, 2005; Dynel, 2011). Mental spaces are “small conceptual packets 
constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action” 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p.40). Blending refers to the process of merging 
different input spaces into a new space, i.e. the blend, that contains some 
elements from the input spaces, plus new emergent structure. Blends and input 
spaces conform a conceptual integration network (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). I 
will now make some terminological clarifications to set out how, for the purposes 
of this study, I understand certain basic notions in cognitive linguistics which 
sometimes overlap and which could be apprehended in slightly different ways: 
domain, mental space, frame, image schema. 
Domain is the conceptualisation of an experience that provides a 
background framework of knowledge for understanding concepts. Langacker 
(1987, p.488) defines domain as “a coherent area of conceptualisation relative to 
which semantic units may be characterised”. Therefore, although Langacker 
definition of the CDS refers to it as a mental space (2001, p. 144), I don’t equate 
the CDS to a mental space in Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) terms, but to a 
more encompassing and larger notion of domain (Cienki, 2007). Mental spaces, 
in turn, are partial and dynamic representations of relevant information in a 
particular domain (Coulson, 2005a), whereas frames are schematic entrenched 
mental spaces which can structure blending and the resulting conceptual 
integration network (Turner, 2015); Finally, image schemas are pre-conceptual 
patterns stemming from our spatiotemporal experience and elicited to map 
special structure onto conceptual structure (Oakley, 2007).  
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We can now turn to applying an analysis based on blending and mental 
spaces to the humorous instances studied in order to delve into the 
conceptualisation process entailed. As said before, I consider the CDS to be a 
domain. Mental spaces and the conceptualisation process of blending, therefore 
occur against the backdrop of the CDS. More specifically, the mental spaces 
elicited during conversation and the blending operations will be directly related to 
the objective situation channel in the conceptualisation pole of the viewing frame, 
as it is the substantive element being construed (Langacker, 2001). Mental 
spaces, though, can be prompted drawing on any of the components of the CDS, 
by eliciting an element of the ground, the context, the shared knowledge, previous 
usage events or expectations on subsequent usage events. 
As explained above, mental spaces are organised in conceptual 
integration networks (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Coulson, 2005b). Typically, the 
most basic form of network will include at least two input spaces, and the blend, 
onto which certain elements of each input space are mapped. Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002) advocate a generic space too, containing the structure shared by 
the input spaces. However, the need for a generic space has been questioned 
by some authors (Coulson, 2005a; Brandt & Brandt, 2005; Dore, 2015). 
Fauconnier and Turner argue that the generic space may lead to entrenched 
structured spaces that can be elicited directly. As I see it, what may become 
entrenched is the blend itself, so I will endorse the view that the generic space is, 
at least, optional (Dore, 2015), and I will not include it in my analysis. Let’s 
consider again Cristela Alonzo’s anecdote: 
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(79) Cristela Alonzo:  The Specials came out and she’s like “Ay, it’s 
the guy from SNL; you can watch this” [laughter 
in the audience; pause]. And then he starts 
talking and I’m like “Oh, damn. I can watch this” 
[laughter in the audience]. 
This example was annotated has having viewpoint as the main underlying 
mechanism. Furthermore, I have argued that humour lies in the clash between 
what children are supposed to be allowed to watch under socially acceptable 
parenting, and Cristela Alonzo’s mother unknowingly granting her permission to 
watch inappropriate content. 
The conceptualisation process itself can be illustrated resorting to blending 
and mental spaces as follows. I will represent mental spaces as headings of 
columns in the table, with elements of each mental space under the relevant 
headings. Elements in one mental space map onto the elements in another space 
that are in the same row (Coulson, 2005b). 
 
SNL Specials Blend 
Comedy programme 
Comedian 
Family-friendly  
Children can watch 
Comedy programme 
Comedian 
 
Comedy programme 
Comedian 
Family-friendly 
Children can watch 
Table 12. Mother’s viewpoint 
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SNL Specials Blend 
Comedy programme 
Comedian 
Family-friendly  
Children can watch 
Comedy programme 
Comedian 
Not suitable for children 
Children can’t watch 
Comedy programme 
Comedian 
Not suitable for children 
Children can watch, but 
mother allows 
Table 13. Cristela Alonzo’s viewpoint 
 
In this instance, the viewpoint of Cristela Alonzo’s mother is presented first. 
As shown in Table 11, the mother’s viewpoint elicits two input spaces, one 
corresponding to the programme Saturday Night Live, that we have previously 
been told she watched with her family every week, so that she considered it 
family-friendly. The second input space corresponds to The Specials programme. 
Cristela’s mother viewpoint is presented as the mother identifying the comedy 
genre, as well as the same comedian from SNL, so she creates a blend in which 
she maps not only counterpart features, but also SNL features for which she finds 
no counterpart in The Specials space. She therefore considers the programme 
to be family-friendly and grants permission for Cristela to watch it. 
When Cristela’s viewpoint and construal of the situation is presented, 
though, the input spaces do have corresponding counterparts for all the elements, 
as her knowledge of English enables her to recognise that the programme 
contains inappropriate language for children and that therefore she is not 
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intended as an audience. That is mapped onto the blend, which in this case 
contains a new emergent structure, i.e. her mother allows her to watch the 
programme as she deems it child-friendly. Therefore, in this analysis, the contrast 
that I claim leads to the humorous effect of this utterance is already present in 
both blends. Let’s now turn to Susan Sarandon’s example of irony: 
(80)  Stephen Colbert:  Joan Crawford and Bette Davis? 
Susan Sarandon:  Yeah. 
Stephen Colbert:  Not at the same time, right? 
Susan Sarandon:  I don’t think so. That would have been, maybe, 
a bonding experience. 
 
Bette Davis Joan Crawford Blend 
Bette Davis 
Sexual partner 
intercourse 
Joan Crawford 
Sexual partner 
Sexual intercourse 
Bette Davis + Joan Crawford 
Sexual partner 
Sexual intercourse 
Simultaneously 
Table 14. Stephen Colbert’s conceptual integration network 
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Bette Davis Joan Crawford Stephen Colbert’s blend Susan Sarandon’s blend 
Bette Davis 
Same sex.part. 
Sex. intercourse 
Increased enmity 
Joan Crawford 
Same sexual partner 
Sexual intercourse 
Increased enmity 
Bette Davis + Joan Crawford 
Sexual partner 
Sexual intercourse  
Simultaneously 
 
Bette Davis + Joan Crawford 
Sexual partner 
Sexual intercourse 
Simultaneously 
Bonding experience 
 
Table 15. Susan Sarandon’s conceptual integration network 
 
In this instance, Susan Sarandon takes Stephen Colbert’s blend as one of 
the input spaces in her conceptual integration network. The host’s blend adds the 
new feature of having sex with the same partner simultaneously, which is then 
recruited in Susan Sarandon’s own mental space. She merges this blend with her 
own two input spaces, in which the animosity between the divas was an element 
aggravated by having had sex with the same people. She brings the new element 
of simultaneity in the intercourse with the same partner to turn it into a way of 
bringing both actresses together. In her blend, Susan Sarandon highlights the 
relationship between Joan Crawford and Bette Davis, as a profiled element that 
we can assume was missing in Stephen Colbert’s blend, thus enabling the ironic 
comment. 
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Finally, let’s apply this mental-space analysis to the last example studied 
above, about Condola Rashad’s sister attorney. 
(81)  Stephen Colbert:  Does she ever get frustrated because you have 
the job that…? 
Condola Rashad:  Oh, totally. She was like, “Why do you get the 
job that I wanted? But you're playing it and I'm 
the real one here”. 
Condola Rashad Sister Blend 
Role as assistant DA 
Difficult job 
Preparation / research 
Recognition as actress 
Attorney 
Difficult job 
Preparation / research 
 
 
Fake / real attorney 
Difficult job 
Prep./ research for sister’s benefit 
Wish to be recognised 
Sister’s frustration 
Table 16. Stephen Colbert’s conceptual integration network (2) 
Condola Rashad Stephen Colbert’s blend Blend 
Role as assistant DA 
Difficult job 
Preparation / research 
 
Recognition as actress 
Fake / real attorney 
Difficult job 
Research for sister’s benefit 
Wish to be recognised 
Sister’s frustration 
Fake / real attorney 
 
 
 
Sister’s frustration 
Table 17. Condola Rashad’s conceptual integration network 
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In my view, in this example, Stephen Colbert’s blend serves as an input 
for Condola Rashad’s own conceptual network. She incorporates that full blend 
and maps onto her own blend only the elements of the sister’s feeling of 
frustration, as well as the opposition fake attorney / real attorney, that she 
conveys mimicking her alleged sister’s words. Again, we can see the contrast 
leading to humour present in the blend, but as opposed to the previous examples, 
in which the blend is enriched with new elements, in this last humorous instance 
studied the blend run by Condola Rashad is streamlined and left only with those 
relevant items she decides to convey through parody. 
According to Fauconnier and Turner (2002), emergent structure in the 
blend is possible through three operations involved in its construction: 
composition, completion, and elaboration. Composition refers to the 
establishment of relations between elements in the blend that are not present in 
the input spaces. For example, in (80) Bette Davis and Joan Crawford are brought 
together to have sex with the same person at the same time. So their individual 
distinct sexual relationships with the same partner are fused together to have 
them occur simultaneously. Completion, in turn, refers to the process of recruiting 
background structure and knowledge to complete the blend. The knowledge 
recruited is deeply entrenched and does not need us to set up an additional input 
space. For instance, in Cristela Alonzo’s anecdote, the knowledge that parents 
do not let children watch inappropriate content is drawn upon to complete her 
blend, thus rendering the contrast with her mother permission starker. Finally, 
elaboration implies the imaginary development of the blend following its own logic 
and principles. Susan Sarandon’s suggestion that Bette Davis and Joan 
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Crawford’s threesome could have been a bonding experience entails an 
imaginary development of the blend. 
7.3.4 The space structuring model  
Coulson and Oakley (2005) also combined mental spaces with 
Langacker’s (2001) notion of ground to account for the role played by context in 
meaning construction. Their conceptual integration network model includes not 
only input spaces, but also what they called a grounding box, including the 
elements of Langacker’s ground in the CDS, i.e. interactants, interaction, speech 
event and immediate circumstances. They claimed that the grounding box is not 
a mental space and may be non-representational.  
The grounding box contains the analyst’s list of important contextual 
assumptions, which need not be explicitly represented by speakers, though they 
influence the way that meaning construction proceeds. When those assumptions 
are explicitly represented by speakers, they are represented as models in mental 
spaces within the integration network. They posited that contextual assumptions 
and concerns affect meaning construction because the grounding box can be 
used to specify roles, values, and experiences that in turn will contribute to 
grounding speakers’ subsequent representations (Coulson & Oakley, 2005, p. 
1517). 
They equated Langacker’s (2001) notion of ground and their own 
grounding box to Brandt and Brandt’s (2005) semiotic space, which includes the 
construal of the immediate situation of ongoing discourse and the assumption of 
mutually-shared knowledge by interlocutors. I agree that the semiotic space as 
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described by Brandt and Brandt (2005) (cf. Section 4.5, Chapter 4) can be 
considered equivalent to Langacker’s ground. I also endorse Coulson and 
Oakley’s (2005) claim that mental spaces draw heavily on the ground for implicit 
conceptual assumptions. 
Furthermore, I believe that when any of those implicit assumptions is 
represented explicitly by any of the interlocutors, then it becomes part of a mental 
space in the ongoing conceptual integration network. Going back to Cristela 
Alonzo’s anecdote, for example, I posit that the notion of socially acceptable 
parenting, with regards to content allowed to be accessed by children, is an 
implicit notion. When it is explicitly represented by Cristela Alonzo through her 
remarks expressing surprise at being allowed to watch the inappropriate 
programme, that notion of socially acceptable parenting is part of her blended 
space and her conceptual integration network.  
Having said that, I argue that not just the ground, but the whole current 
discourse space can be drawn upon for background knowledge and conceptual 
assumptions. As I see it, that notion of good parenting does not belong to the 
immediate circumstances of the speech event, but rather to the presumed shared 
knowledge among participants in the communication event. It could also be 
claimed that this socially acceptable parenting notion falls within the context of 
speech. In fact, the line between shared knowledge and context as defined by 
Langacker within the current discourse space is not always clear-cut. I see the 
context as more closely related to the speech event itself, including salient but 
non-explicit elements (Giora, 1997), while shared knowledge concerns a more 
general and comprehensive background encompassing non-salient items. 
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In any case, the elements that can help to “specify roles, values, and 
experiences that ground subsequent representations” (Coulson & Oakley, 2005, 
p. 1534) can be drawn from any of the components of the CDS. The CDS 
constrains the kind of mental spaces that can be elicited in a usage event, but 
that it is a dynamic process, whereby recruited mental spaces and elements 
trigger changes in the CDS too, opening new possibilities for conceptualisation 
and communication in subsequent usage events. 
Coulson (2005a, 2005b) also resorted to blending theory to offer her own 
account of humour, sarcasm and irony, named the space structuring model. She 
proposed that “comprehension of a single event frequently requires 
speakers to set up multiple models of the same object in different mental spaces, 
in order to capture the differences between the object's properties in different 
contexts” (Coulson, 2005b, p. 134). She claimed that her model allows to go 
beyond the traditional definition of irony as the opposite of what is being said 
(Grice, 1989), to establish that both humour and sarcasm are indirect forms of 
communication. They entail the simultaneous construction of multiple mental 
spaces and blended models that often highlight disanalogies between the models 
elicited by the input mental spaces. Under this perspective, Susan Sarandon’s 
irony implies the simultaneous construction of several mental spaces: one in 
which Joan Crawford and Bette Davis sleep with the same people, on different 
occasions, which eventually reinforces the bad blood between them, and another 
mental space in which they would have sex with the same partner at the same 
time and therefore weave a tighter and more friendly relationship.  
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Coulson claimed that humour in this case might boil down to the 
unexpected perspective on the situation offered by this conceptual integration 
network. Furthermore, she posits that the process enabling joke comprehension 
within her space structuring model is frame-shifting (Coulson, 2015), defined as 
a “semantic and pragmatic reanalysis in which elements of the existing message-
level representation are mapped into a new frame retrieved from long-term 
memory” (Coulson, Urbach, & Kutas, 2006, p. 229). She further argued that 
linguistic and non-linguistic information is integrated rapidly and does not require 
prior representation of the propositional content of an utterance. For Coulson, 
meaning construction stems from a series of routines that involve the creation of 
cognitive models ─mental spaces─ enabling “interpretation, action, and 
interaction” (Coulson et al., 2006 p. 247). 
Coulson’s space structuring model is compatible with my previous account 
of humorous instances. The simultaneous construction of multiple mental spaces 
advocated by the space structuring model is entirely possible within the CDS, 
always associated to the conceptualisation pole of the utterance, as specified in 
the three relevant channels in the viewing frame. The grounding box presented 
in her model of conceptual integration really points to the significance of context 
in how we construe, represent, and communicate a given situation, so my 
proposal simply extends that notion to include all elements pertaining the current 
discourse space. Finally, I understand frame-shifting as a type of blending, where 
the ongoing conceptual integration network created online during interaction 
brings in a frame, i.e. an entrenched mental space, to confront it with the current 
representation of discourse. Coulson argues that frames are elicited from long-
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term memory; I further claim that they are retrievable because they are part of the 
shared knowledge within the current discourse space. 
I endorse Coulson’s view that inputs from language, perception, social 
context and the interlocutor’s cognitive state contribute to meaning and to 
construing the discourse situation in a particular manner. Therefore, changes in 
any of those elements result in different conceptualisation and meaning 
construction. I consider that all those elements are encompassed in Langacker’s 
(2001) depiction of the current discourse space. Thus, the CDS is the basic 
framework for communication and conceptualisation, including humour (Veale et 
al., 2006).  
7.4 Convergence with other approaches to humour 
7.4.1 General Theory of Verbal Humour 
Both Raskin’s (1985) SSTH and Attardo’s (2001) GTVH have been 
discussed in Chapter 2. The SSTH is essentially a semantic theory, which applies 
solely to single jokes, not to larger texts or other types of humour, and focused 
on humour competence, defined as “the capacity of a speaker to process 
semantically a given text and to locate a set of relationships among its 
components, such that he/she would identify the text ―or part of it― as 
humorous in an ideal situation” (Attardo, 2001, p. 167). Raskin’s theory predicts 
that humour will occur if the joke text is compatible with two opposing scripts (or 
frames), which fully or partially overlap. Attardo (1994; 2001) portrayed his 
General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH) as a revision of Raskin’s SSTH in 
order to account for any kind of humorous texts, not only jokes. In doing so, he 
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took GTVH beyond semantics and placed it in the realm of linguistics at large 
(Brône & Feyaerts, 2003).  
Brône and Feyaerts (2003) claimed that the GTVH is a cognitive theory, 
insofar as it explores the interface between language and cognition by studying 
how different parameters relate and contribute to creating humorous meaning. In 
particular, they pointed to the fundamentally cognitive nature of the Logical 
Mechanism, one of the six knowledge resources posited by Attardo (2001) as 
parameters that define the humorous text. The Logical Mechanism allows for the 
partial resolution of the incongruity at the core of the joke.  
Attardo (2001, 2015) also resorted to mental spaces in his account of 
humour and irony, where he advocates the adoption of a certain ironic or 
humorous mode leading to a possible world ─akin to a mental space, in Attardo’s 
view─ where interlocutors can then operate. Attardo defines mode adoption as 
the “acceptance on H’s [hearer's] part of a possible world, as defined by S 
[speaker], which differs from [the real world], i.e., the world that S and H mutually 
know” (Attardo, 2001 p. 176). Utterances that can trigger mode adoption, e.g. 
irony, humour, metaphor, etc. will enable the construal of a new mental space 
next to the base/reality space, so that the hearer does not have to reject the 
utterance as ill-formed. Attardo thus placed this account within pragmatics, to try 
to explain why speakers may decide to express their message indirectly, despite 
the higher cognitive effort required for the hearer to process it, but he drew on 
cognitive linguistics to argue that the construction of an ironical mental space 
avoids conflict between the presuppositions of an utterance and those of the 
speaker and hearer (Brône & Feyaerts, 2003). 
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The GTVH can be seen as compatible with my own account. I assume that 
mental spaces are always construed, elicited, and blended as we communicate. 
Once humour is recognised in a given construal of a situation, as represented 
through the relevant mental spaces, humour or irony can be further developed by 
means of elaborating that mental space (cf. section 7.3.2 above), which is in line 
with Attardo’s mode adoption proposal. Furthermore, I view the six knowledge 
resources posited by GTVH as potential elements in mental spaces; the Logical 
Mechanism would govern the mapping of relevant items between mental spaces, 
and the relations established therein, so that the resulting blend is recognised as 
novel and humorous.  
Let’s consider Condola Rashad’s parody of her sister (81) under this 
perspective. As seen before, Stephen Colbert sets up a mental space in which 
Condola’s sister is frustrated to see that Condola is perceived as a successful 
attorney in her role in Billions, holding a position that the sister would want for 
herself in real life. It could be argued that this mental space, including the novel 
element of the sister’s frustration, triggers the adoption of a playful and humorous 
mode, in Attardo’s terminology. One could safely assume that, rather than 
frustrated, the sister would be happy for Condola’s success. Moreover, the 
position of assistant DA is only a role, not a real job as an attorney, so there 
cannot be real frustration linked to the position allegedly coveted by Condola’s 
sister, as Condola does not actually hold that position. However, Condola Rashad 
adopts the mode set by Stephen Colbert’s mental space and reinforces it 
assuming and acting out the role of the frustrated sister.  
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In the resulting blend, on which the representation of Condola’s sister 
frustration is based, one could identify the following KR: Script Opposition – the 
contrast between Condola’s role as an attorney in Billions and her sister as a real 
attorney. That is the fundamental basis for this particular humorous instance, as 
if the sister had been a biologist, for example, no grounds for Stephen Colbert’s 
construal of the sister’s frustration would exist. The Situation evoked in the parody 
is that of a conversation between both sisters. In this case, there is no Target of 
the joke, as it is not really directed against anyone. As for the Narrative Strategy, 
the humorous instance takes the form of a monologue by the sister in the 
imaginary conversation elicited as the situation. Finally, the Language Knowledge 
resource is made of the actual words said by Condola while parodying the sister, 
and I dare to say that the way she says those words is also part of the language 
resource, thus establishing a link between this knowledge resource and the 
vocalisation pole in the viewing frame (Langacker, 2001).  
As I see it, the Logical Mechanism governs the correspondences 
established between the input spaces from which these elements are mapped, 
which enrich the highly schematic conceptual integration network described 
above, and the resulting new mental space. The LM is based on a relation of 
analogy, as the core of the joke is the duality or opposition between the sister’s 
actual attorney job and the fake position taken by Condola Rashad in the role she 
plays in Billions. Notice that in this example there is no incongruity to be resolved. 
In fact, as I will discuss in more detail in section 5 of this chapter, there is a 
growing body of literature that questions the very notion of incongruity and 
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incongruity resolution as a necessary condition for humour (Forabosco, 2008; 
Veale, 2015; Gibbs et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, in his elaboration upon the GTVH, Attardo (2001, p. 47 – 49) 
referred to a storage area with mutually assumed and shared information as a 
main feature of the theory. To me, this storage area is akin to the current 
discourse space. Attardo further posited that the information is stored in “clusters 
of information (scripts, frames) that come surrounded by a web of associations 
and links to other clusters of information” (ibid.). In other words, a conceptual 
integration network. Attardo acknowledged that “the GTVH has been mainly 
developed on the basis of canned jokes and that its application to conversational 
humour is less than straightforward” (ibid., p. 68). He claimed that conversational 
jokes are created online and depend heavily on context, and that speakers 
constantly negotiate and update what they assumed to be mutually known and 
what they consider to be relevant at any point in the interaction. I argue that 
Langacker’s (2001) current discourse space can account for all the elements that 
enable such negotiation and updating process. Furthermore, it provides a 
framework where the contribution made by different approaches can converge, 
as the role of semantics, pragmatics and discourse to enable successful 
communication is fully acknowledged, on the basis of a highly overlapping 
construal of the speech event by all participants in the interaction. 
7.4.2 Conceptual subversion 
Veale (2015) put forward a complementary approach to what he calls 
juxtapositional theories of humour, which are largely based on mental spaces 
Humour in face-to-face interaction: A multimodal and cognitive analysis 300
 
(Fauconnier, 1994; 1997), frame-shifting (Coulson & Kutas, 2001; Coulson, 
2015), and script opposition (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 2001). He acknowledged the 
inherently juxtapositional nature of humour, as it always entails some form of 
comparison in order to yield an innovative view with regards to what is considered 
normative or is expected. He argued, though, that the crucial element for humour 
production and comprehension is the nature of the structures that are juxtaposed. 
For Veale, humour lies in the conceptual subversion of a given category or 
mapping, rather than in the combination of different but overlapping categories. 
In other words, Veale argued that humour production and comprehension is not 
based on blending or cross-mapping various different input spaces (frames, 
scripts or mental spaces), but rather in manipulating and exploring the boundaries 
of a single input structure in order to identify novel and interesting counter-
examples. He refers to this process as subversion.  
He further posited that the appropriate counter-example to the category 
subverted is constructed “by stripping away the layers of conventionality and 
habitual thinking that have accreted around a category” (Veale, 2015, p. 77). In 
my view, the counter-example advocated by Veale as necessary to construe a 
novel and creative view of a given category is reminiscent of Coulson’s space 
structuring model (2005b). This approach advances that the simultaneous mental 
spaces of the object, category, event, etc. to be construed are created as different 
versions of that concept. This allows to identify the differences between those 
possible conceptualisations. Veale’s counterexample, therefore, would be one of 
those mental models created and confronted to the traditional frame (as an 
entrenched mental space) depiction of the category.  
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Let’s consider one of the examples used by Veale (2015) to illustrate his 
point, in which he reports a witticism by Zsa Gabor, a woman known for her 
multiple marriages and divorces: 
(82)  Darlink [sic.], actually I am an excellent housekeeper. Whenever I 
leave a man, I keep the house! (ibid., p. 77) 
Veale claimed that the humour in this remark stems from a novel reading 
of the term ‘housekeeper’, which introduces a new member into that category, 
i.e. a woman who literally keeps the house rather than a woman that strives to 
maintain the house in good condition and make everything work for the family. 
According to Veale, the category of ‘housekeeper’ is thus subverted to introduce 
a novel reading. I agree with his claim that the boundaries of the category are 
exploited creatively for humorous purposes, but I still believe that in order to 
subvert such category a novel blended space is construed from multiple inputs, 
which could schematically be described in Table 18 below. 
 
Zsa Zsa Gabor Housekeeper House - keeper 
Failed marriage 
Divorce 
House ownership 
 
Successful marriage 
 
House work 
Housekeeping 
Failed marriage 
Divorce 
 
Keeps/owns house 
Table 18. Conceptual integration network leading to subversion of the category 
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In this particular example, comprehension of the subversion entailed in 
Zsa Zsa Gabor’s comment is facilitated and made salient by her own words. 
Furthermore, subversion of the category actually relies on the contrast between 
the typical construal of a diligent and hardworking housekeeper, and the depiction 
of an independent and non-conventional woman that collects houses upon 
divorcing one husband after another. Consequently, in my view, conceptual 
subversion is one of the possible outcomes resulting from conceptual integration 
networks. Completely novel concepts, new category members or boundaries, or 
unexpected mappings between inputs may arise as a result of emergent structure 
in the blend.  
Veale’s proposal helps to better understand one of those phenomena. In 
addition, I posit that any of the different components of Langacker’s (2001) CDS, 
─viewing frame, ground, context, shared knowledge, previous usage events and 
expectations on subsequent usage events─ can be recruited to subvert the 
concept at hand. In that, my view converges with Veale’s, as he considers that 
humour does not lie in the subversion itself, but in the pragmatic and social uses 
of that subversion. 
7.4.3 Layering model and pretence space 
Clark’s (1996) model of layered meaning has been used by some authors 
to account for humour (Brône, 2008; Tabacaru, 2014). Clark posited that 
communication can occur at different levels, as there may be several layers of 
conceptualisation which are like “theatre stages built one on top of the other” 
(Clark, 1996, p. 16). Conversations may just occur on the first layer, but additional 
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layers may be necessary in instances of indirect speech, such as irony or humour. 
According to Brône (2008), layers represent different discourse worlds based on 
the actual utterances, which conform the surface level. In humour, sarcasm or 
irony, the first layer is the discourse base space, with the literal interpretation of 
an utterance, whereas a pretence space is created in a second layer, in which 
the intended meaning of the utterance becomes apparent (Brône, 2008; 
Tabacaru, 2014). Brône, therefore, equated layers to mental spaces, and so does 
Coulson (2005b). Tabacaru and Lemmens (2014) argued that layering and 
mental spaces show how people can access and process information, and how 
communication is made possible by resorting to meaning derived from previous 
discourse or background knowledge.  
This is fully compatible with my account of humorous communication 
based on Langacker’s (2001) CDS and Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) blending. 
Parallelisms can be drawn between the pretence space (Clark, 1996; Brône, 
2008) and the notion of counterexample leading to subversion (Veale, 2015) as 
part of the multiple mental spaces construed in interaction to confront and 
conceptualise the possible various readings of a given object or event (Coulson, 
2005b). As for the relevance of discourse and background knowledge, it is fully 
explained by the role that the CDS and all elements therein play in communication 
at large.  
7.5 What makes something humorous? 
The approaches to humour listed above describe the mechanisms 
whereby humour is produced and understood from a cognitive point of view. 
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Nevertheless, the question remains as to where the humorous nature of a given 
utterance, text, situation, etc. lies. 
The most widespread paradigm in current humour studies is the 
incongruity-resolution (IR) principle. The concept of incongruity, therefore, is 
present in such ideas as script-opposition (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 2001) 
─although Raskin rejects having his SSTH theory categorised as an IR theory 
(Raskin, Hempelman, & Taylor 2009)─, frame-shifting (Coulson et al. 2006; 
Coulson, 2015), relevant inappropriateness (Attardo, 2000a), discrepancies (de 
Jongste, 2016), pretence theory (Clark, 1996; Brône, 2008).etc.  
These concepts differ to some extent but mostly overlap around the idea 
of incongruity as a mismatch in expectations (Bergen & Bindsten, 2004), a 
surprise (Giora, 1991), a violation of conventional wisdom (Coulson et al. 2006; 
Coulson, 2015), etc. Forabosco (2008 p.45) stated that a stimulus is perceived 
as incongruous when it diverts from the cognitive model of reference. This very 
much resonates with the process underlying the frame-shifting model (Coulson 
et al., 2006; Coulson, 2015). Broadly speaking, incongruity-resolution models 
assume that behind any instance of humour lies an incongruity that has to be 
resolved, at least in part. Coulson and Kutas (2001), though, reject the two-stage 
process of humour interpretation, namely the identification of a surprise or 
incongruity, followed by its resolution, i.e. the re-establishment of coherence. 
Notice that incongruity does not per se entails the notion of outfront 
opposition. What incongruity implies is a perceived lack of coherence, a breach 
of expectations, not necessarily by confronting opposing readings or mental 
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frames. Having said that, for humour to arise expectations need to be broken. 
That clash in expectations may be due to the presentation of opposing ideas, the 
subversion of a category, the unwinding of cultural conventions, the momentarily 
deception with regards to assumptions on future usage events in a current 
discourse space, etc. In my view, that clash of expectations is manifested through 
a radical disruption in the CDS, in any of the components therein; i.e. the focus 
of attention, the ground, context or shared knowledge. Furthermore, that 
mismatch in expectations can be based both on the conceptualisation and on the 
vocalisation channel, as multimodality in face-to-face communication, e.g. verbal, 
gestures, intonation, can be recruited to reinforce and signal the humorous nature 
of a given usage event as construed by the speaker (Attardo et al., 2003; Attardo, 
2008; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Tabacaru & Lemmens, 2014; Bryant & 
Gibbs, 2015).  
Having said that, the presence of an incongruity alone is not sufficient for 
humour to arise, as incongruities exist in a variety of situations where humour will 
most probably not be the outcome (Morreal, 1983; Morreal 2009a, 2009b; Veale, 
2015). If a dog suddenly appears and fiercely barks at an absent-minded passer-
by, fear rather than humour is likely to be triggered. So the question remains as 
to what other conditions are necessary, and, possibly, sufficient for humour to 
occur. Giora argued that we find pleasure in stimuli that are innovative but still 
familiar (Giora et al., 2009). We find a remark, picture, cartoon, etc. pleasurable 
when we recognise the familiarity in the novel. Her Revised Optimal Innovation 
Hypothesis (Giora et al., 2017, p.10) states that a stimulus is optimally innovative 
if  
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[It] involves a non-default response to a given stimulus, […], while 
allowing for the automatic recoverability of the default response(s) 
related to that stimulus, so that both the default and non-default 
responses may be weighed against each other, their similarity and 
differences assessable. 
Default responses are automatically retrieved and processed, as they are 
salient and based on coded meaning, i.e. coded in the lexicon, whereas non-
default responses are non-salient, usually context-dependent, and take more 
time to be processed. According to Giora, therefore, we find pleasure when 
confronted to a non-default, i.e. unexpected, stimulus, as long as we can recall 
the expected default response to assess the (dis)analogy between them.  
In my view, this hypothesis is reminiscent of incongruity, as there is a 
notion of surprise and inconsistency, as well as of partial resolution of that 
incoherence upon the comparison of the default and non-default stimuli. Notice 
that Giora does not specifically refer to humour, but to a pleasurable effect. 
Indeed, upon reading a whodunnit we find pleasure, but not humour, in finally 
resolving the mystery, that is, the incongruity, running through the story 
(Forabosco, 2008; Morreal, 2009b; Veale, 2015). Some authors argue that the 
incongruity in humour is only partially solved, as opposed to other phenomena 
with incongruity as a core element, e.g., detective stories or some poetry, and 
that it is precisely the residual incongruity left what renders a particular text, 
utterance, event humorous (Forabosco, 2008; Morreal, 2009b; Hempelman & 
Attardo, 2011).  
Chapter 7 – A cognitive analysis of humour 307  
 
 
Apart from the presence of an incongruity, the need to resolve it only 
partially, with a stimulus that presents the right mix between innovation and 
familiarity, another condition claimed as necessary for humour is the need for 
interlocutors to be in the right playful and humorous mode (Canestrari, 2010; de 
Jongste, 2018). Morreal (2009b) considered humour to be a reaction to 
something that violates our mental patterns and expectations, i.e. an incongruity, 
that we not only experience but enjoy. He acknowledges, though, that this is not 
sufficient for humour, as incongruities can also be enjoyed “in other ways than 
amusement, as in the grotesque, the macabre, the horrible, the bizarre, and the 
fantastic” (p. 241).  
Morreal further posited that humour is a cognitive phenomenon ─as it 
involves perception, thought, mental patterns and expectations─ that triggers a 
sudden cognitive shift that we find pleasurable because we perceive it as a kind 
of play. For that we need to be in “a play mode, disengaged from practical and 
noetic concerns” (p. 243). In other words, humour can only arise if we have a 
certain predisposition towards it and our concern for the truth is suspended.  
De Jongste (2018) claimed that the basic requirement for successful 
humorous communication is that interlocutors shared or can quickly switch into a 
paratelic, i.e. non-serious, state, in which the orientation towards essential 
objectives is suspended. This allows for a challenging but pleasurable form of 
play in which interlocutors negotiate and coordinate their construal of the 
situation. De Jongste further posited that when people are not in a paratelic state 
or cannot switch to it because of certain emotions, for example, they may still 
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recognise a certain stimulus as humorous, but they will reject it and not engage 
in it.  
This opens the question as to whether humour relies on the intent of the 
speaker or the apprehension of the content as humorous by the hearer (Hay, 
2001; Canestrari, 2010). De Jongste (2016) propounded that for humorous 
discourse to be successful, the humorous intention of the speaker needs to be 
identified and accepted by the hearer. He further argued that the humorous intent 
must be partially hidden by the producer, although it is meant to be detected, thus 
conforming an enjoyable form of play. Humour intent can be signalled through 
verbal and non-verbal cues, but it is the hearer who ultimately decides whether 
that is perceived as funny or not. Veale (2015) questioned whether incongruity 
resolution is the main driver in humour creation, and gave pre-eminence to the 
social logic behind a humorous instance.  
In order to account for the social dimension of humour, Canestrari (2010) 
added a seventh knowledge resource to the GTVH (Attardo, 2001), that she 
named the Meta-Knowledge resource. Canestrari claimed that an interaction is 
humorous when at least one of the interlocutors is aware of its humorous nature. 
This awareness, in turn, can be signalled through verbal or non-verbal cues, 
which serve to communicate the metamessage that the instance at hand has to 
be taken as humorous. She defined “the Meta-Knowledge Resource as the signal 
that refers to the speaker’s intention of being humorous and to the hearer’s 
recognition of such intention” (Canestrari, 2010, p.330). Feyaerts (2013) also 
highlighted the social dimension of humour. He defined intersubjectivity as our 
ability to comprehend the interlocutor’s perspective and to model their mental 
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states, as a crucial element in communication, and key for humour to be produced 
and recognised (ibid., p. 245). 
Finally, moving beyond the idea of incongruity, Gibbs et al. (2018) 
advocated that humour arises from “disturbing the body in some non-serious 
ways” (Gibbs et al., 2018, p.10). They aligned their view with the benign-violation 
hypothesis on humour (McGraw & Warren, 2010), which “suggests that anything 
that is threatening to one’s sense of how the world ‘ought to be’ will be humorous, 
as long as the threatening situation also seems benign” (ibid. p. 1142). Gibbs et 
al. (2018) equated this threat perceived as benign to rough-and-tumble play fight 
and made the case for the embodied foundation of ironic humour.  
Although they claimed that benign violation is a more fundamental element 
to humour than incongruity, I believe that the notion of incongruity itself is 
embedded in the benign-violation hypothesis, provided we understand 
incongruity in a broad sense, as a diversion from the cognitive model of reference 
(Forabosco, 2008 p.45). In my view, the benign-violation hypothesis adds the 
perception of that diversion as a threat, but it does not invalidate the notion of 
incongruity as a violation of the cognitive model being threatened (social 
convention, belief, the perception of one-self or others, etc.). It is also reminiscent 
of the subversive role of humour with regards to the undermining of “habitually 
held world views” (Veale, 2015, p. 87). 
Humour is such a complex phenomenon that it resists being reduced to 
sufficient and necessary conditions (Veale, 2015). After reviewing all the 
approaches studied in this chapter, I still consider that incongruity, loosely 
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understood as a diversion from the cognitive model of reference (Forabosco, 
2008, p.45), is a core element of humour. For humour to occur, a sudden 
cognitive shift is needed (Morreal, 2009b), which I equate to a sudden disruption 
in the current discourse space.  
In my view, sudden changes in cognitive states are brought about by a 
clash between the expectations held on an utterance, and its actual instantiation. 
That may take different forms (Veale et al., 2015), as a violation of conventional 
wisdom (Veale, 2015), an juxtaposition of opposing ideas (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 
2001), a threat to our own world-view perceived as benign (McGraw & Warren, 
2010; Gibbs et al., 2018), or a mismatch with regards to frames or cognitive 
models stored in our memory (Coulson et al., 2006; Coulson, 2015; Forabosco, 
2008; de Jongste, 2018).  
Resolving the incongruity is not always necessary for humour to be 
successful (Veale, 2015; Gibbs et al., 2018). Absurd humour, for example, is 
based on extreme incongruities which are left unresolved. Having said that, when 
a connexion can be made between what is novel, i.e. incongruous, and what it is 
found as familiar, it is easier to find pleasure, as it requires less cognitive effort 
(Giora et al., 2017).  
I fully endorse the view that a paratelic state shared by interlocutors or, at 
the very least, a cognitive and emotional mode or state which enables to quickly 
switch to that paratelic state is a necessary requirement for humour to be 
successful. Ultimately, humour is a fundamentally social phenomenon (Veale et 
al., 2006; Brône, 2008; Feyaerts, 2013; Veale, 2015) and it can only be 
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considered successful when acknowledged and accepted by the hearer (Hay, 
2001; Canestrari, 2010).  
From a cognitive perspective, there may be usage events conceived as 
humorous by the speaker, but humour will fail if it is not apprehended or approved 
by the hearer, which means that the paratelic is not shared. On the other hand, 
there may be unintentional humour, which is perceived as amusing by the hearer 
although the humorous intent was absent in the speaker’s production. In that 
case, for humour to be ultimately successful, the speaker will need to 
acknowledge and accept humour and join in the paratelic state.  
Furthermore, humour heavily relies on the circumstances surrounding 
communication, i.e. the pragmatic context (Curcó, 1997; Attardo, 2008; Yus, 
2016). For humorous interaction to be successful, both interlocutors need to 
share mutual assumptions about how the counterpart is construing the speech 
event, so that they can engage in the negotiation, alignment and re-alignment of 
their intersubjective viewpoints (Feyaerts, 2013), drawing upon the different 
elements of the current discourse space, which fully acknowledges the role of the 
pragmatic and discourse dimension in determining whether humour succeeds or 
fails (Veale, 2015).  
7.6 Conclusion 
In the previous sections, I provide a streamlined and simplified model to 
account for humorous communication based on Langacker’s (2001) notion of 
current discourse space and Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) theory on blending 
and conceptual integration networks. In doing so, I join many authors that claim 
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that there are not linguistic mechanisms specific to humour; rather, it can be 
described by the same linguistic principles governing communication at large 
(Bergen & Bindsten, 2004; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Brône et al., 2006; 
Hempelman & Attardo, 2011; Tabacaru, 2014; Veale et al., 2015; Dynel, 2018).  
In addition, I bring together different approaches to humour with a more or 
less explicit cognitive stance, in order to seek similarities and convergence. The 
purpose of this exercise was to distil the essence of the different models and 
notions put forward to find the common denominator, as a way to map out the 
core features of humorous communication. 
Finally, I pondered what it is that renders an instance of communication 
humorous, again by exploring the explanations offered by major authors in the 
field, to conclude that humour is a highly complex and varied phenomenon that 
is hard to categorize. In essence, humour is a cognitive-social phenomenon 
(Feyaerts, Brône, & De Ceukelaire, 2015) based on a pleasurable sudden 
cognitive shift (Morreal, 2009a, 2009b) brought about by a perceived incongruity 
(Forabosco, 2008), which in turn can be manifested through different forms.  
Successful humour requires interlocutors align their construal of a 
communicative event (Canestrari, 2010; Feyaerts, 2013), and that they share or 
can rapidly switch to a playful mode (Forabosco, 2008). The pragmatic and 
discourse context, as represented by the full current discourse space, plays a 
decisive role both in the conceptualisation and expression of humour, as well as 
in its acknowledgment by the hearer (Attardo, 2008; Antonopoulou et al., 2015; 
Yus, 2016).  
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Furthermore, as seen in chapter 6, multimodal cues can also be used to 
prompt such alignment and to signal the humorous intent of a given usage event 
(Attardo et al., 2003; Attardo, 2008; Attardo et al,, 2011; Tabacaru & Lemmens, 
2014); i.e., to signal the paratelic state in which the utterance has been said 
(Bergen & Bindsten, 2015; Tabacaru, 2014; Bryant & Gibbs, 2015; Gibbs et al., 
2018).  
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Chapter 8 
         Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The research presented in this thesis broadly aimed at gaining an insight 
into how spontaneous humour is multimodally conveyed and cognitively 
construed in face-to-face interaction. To that end, a study of prosody, face 
displays and head movements co-occurring with humorous speech was 
conducted, with a view to disentangling the function of such multimodal cues and 
determine whether they could be considered markers of humour. From the 
cognitive perspective of the analysis, I explored construal mechanisms 
underlying humorous utterances, and delved into the creativity implied in 
humorous statements resorting to conceptual blending. The present chapter 
summarises the results and conclusions obtained in my research and outlined 
through the previous chapters, before stating the major findings of the study, both 
with regards to the research questions asked in the introduction, and in terms of 
the contribution made to scientific knowledge on the topic. Finally, avenues for 
future research are also suggested. 
8.2 Summary of the dissertation 
In Chapter 1 the main purpose of the study is presented, subsequently 
translated into the research questions guiding the analysis. The theoretical 
framework underpinning the study is briefly sketched, in order to explain the 
relevance of the multimodal and cognitive paradigm to study humour, as well as 
to provide the rationale for the study, demonstrating the need to fill a gap in the 
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literature, as far as multimodal and cognitive studies of spontaneous humorous 
communication are concerned. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature concerning humour studies, specifically 
focusing on multimodal studies and on linguistic theories from a semantic, 
pragmatic, and cognitive perspective. A comprehensive survey of the literature 
on multimodality and humour is offered, highlighting the conflicting results 
stemming from multimodal studies of irony, and sarcasm (Attardo et al., 2003), 
and the lack of conclusive findings on multimodal markers of non-ironical, non-
sarcastic humour (Gironzetti, 2017). Regarding linguistic studies, common 
ground is found among seemingly disparate theories, especially around the 
notion of incongruity, spelled in different approaches from a clash between 
opposing ideas (Raskin, 1985; Attardo & Raskin, 1991), to a breach of 
expectations with regards to our usual worldview (Giora, 1991; Brône & Feyaerts, 
2003; Coulson, 2005b; Veale et al., 2006).  
Chapter 3 revolves around the literature on multimodality, exploring the 
relation between this multidisciplinary approach and theoretical paradigms, such 
as semiotics, pragmatics, and cognitive linguistics. Given the focus on 
spontaneous humorous communication adopted for the present study, as 
opposed to staged or scripted humour, the next section is devoted to 
multimodality in face-to-face interaction, as a prototypical and inherently 
multimodal form of human communication, in which gestures, prosody, and 
speech interplay. It compiles findings by previous studies, which assign both 
interactional, and discursive functions to gestures, and prosody (Muller, 2013b). 
In addition, gestures may also be representational (Kendon, 2004; McNeill, 
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2013), while prosody typically conveys affective meaning (Brazil, 1997; 
Wennerstrom, 2011).  
Chapter 4 delves into cognitive linguistics, outlining its major tenets to 
demonstrate the validity of combining a multimodal and cognitive analysis of 
communication, drawing mainly on the experiential basis for language advocated 
by cognitive linguists (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 2001; Talmy, 
2000a, 2000b, etc.). Blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) and construal 
mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004) are put forward as core elements of cognitive 
linguistics which can provide an insight into how humour is construed. 
Furthermore, the notion of current discourse space (Langacker, 2001) is 
thoroughly analysed and advanced as a framework to account for communication 
at large, and for humour in particular, in which different humour approaches can 
converge. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the qualitative empirical analysis of the 
sample, composed of 14 interviews from The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, in 
which 109 humorous utterances are identified, on the basis of laughter elicited in 
the audience. The methodology of the study, using Elan, Praat, and SPSS as 
analytical tools, is explained in detail. Annotations have been made in Elan on 
mean pitch and mean intensity values (both for humorous and non-humorous 
utterances), as well as on humour type, construal mechanisms underlying the 
humorous utterances, gestures, and transcription. A breakdown of the different 
humour types, construal mechanisms, and gestures found is included. The most 
frequent humour types are anecdote, irony, and parody. In addition, the outcome 
of the prosodic analysis is outlined, which concludes that no prosodic contrast 
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(Bryant, 2010) between humorous and non-humorous utterances has been 
detected. In other words, humour in the sample is not prosodically marked. Tilts, 
nods, raised eyebrows, and smiles are the most frequent types of gestures 
annotated, followed by head turns and head shakes. As for construal operations, 
the highest number of occurrences are linked to viewpoint, profiling, and 
subjectivity.  
Chapter 6 includes a multimodal analysis of a set of humorous utterances 
extracted from the sample. I have interpreted the uses and functions of the most 
frequently found face gestures and head movements, namely raised eyebrows 
(14.54%), smiles (9.17%), nods (20.36%), head tilts (16.67%), turns (11.86%) 
and shakes (11.86%). The analysis fails to find any correlation between the type 
of gesture performed and the kind of construal mechanism or humour type 
identified in the relevant humorous utterance. Furthermore, although in some 
instances, gestures and speech align to make a certain element of the utterance 
more prominent, and this element happens on some occasions to be key to the 
humorous interpretation of such remark, no recurrent pattern of association 
between gestures and humour has been identified. In conclusion, according to 
the analysis of the examples selected from the sample, it cannot be inferred that 
face gestures and head movements in the interviews studied are used as markers 
of humour. Instead, they can be interpreted as having the same functions as in 
non-humorous communication, which are also recruited to convey humour.  
Finally, Chapter 7 offers a thorough cognitive analysis of several humorous 
instances found in the sample, on the basis of the most frequently occurring 
construal mechanisms ─viewpoint (38.01%), profiling (19.00%), subjectivity 
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(16.94%)─, and their combination with the most frequent humour types 
─anecdote (26.83%), irony (13.82%), parody (13.00%)─. All humorous instances 
are analysed resorting to Langacker’s (2001) current discourse space, as well as 
accounting for the new meaning created through conceptual blending 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). I claim that both notions add to a simplified model 
which can be used to account for humorous communication, in which various 
approaches to humour can converge. In light of the analysis performed, I further 
endorse other authors in advocating that humour does not need specific models. 
It can be explained through the same principles governing non-humorous 
communication (Bergen & Bindsten, 2004; Brône & Feyaerts, 2003; Hempelman 
& Attardo, 2011; Brône et al., 2006; Tabacaru, 2014; Veale et al., 2015; Dynel, 
2018). A final reflection on what renders a given utterance humorous leads me to 
conclude that humour lies in the interplay of different elements within the current 
discourse space, taking the latter as the basic framework for communication in 
face-to-face interaction. 
8.3 Main findings 
8.3.1 Answering the research questions 
8.3.1.1 Are there multimodal cues that contribute to signal the 
humorous nature of an utterance?  
Multimodal cues at large serve to facilitate communication (Ekman, 1982; 
McNeill, 2000; Kendon, 2004; Bryant, 2010; Muller, Ladewig, & Bressem, 2013; 
Attardo et al., 2013; Cienki, 2013b; Ladewig, 2014a; Wagner et al., 2014; 
Tabacaru and Lemmens, 2014; Gironzeti, 2017; etc.). In this capacity, they can 
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be occasionally elicited to convey humorous meaning, enabling the apprehension 
of a given turn as humorous. For example, raised eyebrows, nods or intonation 
can be used to give more saliency to a certain element in an utterance (Flecha-
García, 2010; Ishi et al., 2014; Wennerstrom, 2001). This may help to interpret it 
as humorous, rather than take it at face value. However, this function is not 
directly related to the humorous nature of the utterance per se. Instead, the 
results of the present study point to an ad-hoc use of these multimodal cues to 
convey humour, as they have a more general function linked to information 
structure or discourse management. Multimodal signs may at times be useful to 
stress a humorous element, and to signal a marked form of communication, as 
opposed to uttering some run-of-the-mill statements that are to be taken at face 
value.  
Ultimately, when it comes to spontaneous face-to-face communication, 
according to the results of this study, the humorous character of an utterance 
does not determine its multimodal expression. Instead, the latter will hinge upon 
context and discursive elements, such as the degree of familiarity with the 
interlocutors (Ishi et al., 2014), or the genre shaping communication (Bateman, 
2008), i.e. a humour-prone setting ―a late-night show or stand-up comedy― as 
opposed to a more serious context, like a job interview, for example. In sum, the 
multimodal expression of an utterance, whether humorous or not, will depend on 
the configuration and interplay of the different elements within the current 
discourse space. 
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8.3.1.2 Can they be considered markers, i.e., are they 
consistently associated with humour and do they help to predict it?  
As explained in the answer to the previous question, my claim is that there 
are not multimodal markers of humour, to the extent that markers are defined as 
consistent multimodal cues recurrently co-occurring with humour and which help 
to predict it (Attardo, Wagner, & Urios-Aparisi, 2011). As seen in the analysis of 
various examples in the sample, the same gesture can have different functions, 
even within a single instance of humorous communication, not necessarily linked 
to its humorous nature. In addition, the multimodal cues found are not exclusive 
to humour and do not seem to perform distinct functions when co-occurring with 
humour, as compared to those listed in studies of non-humorous communication. 
In conclusion, I posit that multimodal cues can be recruited to facilitate the 
comprehension of humorous utterances as humorous, not due to the fact that the 
usage event (Langacker, 2001) at hand is humorous, but as part of the usual 
function of multimodal cues as facilitators of communication at large. 
 
8.3.1.3 What are the cognitive mechanisms involved in the 
production of humour?  
The cognitive analysis of the sample studied in this dissertation has 
applied a range of notions from cognitive linguistics. First, Langacker’s (2001) 
current discourse space is used as the basic framework underpinning any 
communicative event, from which meaning is construed and ultimately 
expressed. In addition, a more fine-grained analysis of the online creativity 
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implied in face-to-face humorous communication has been conducted resorting 
to conceptual blending, and showing how the blends construed by each 
interlocutor in a given usage event have in turn an impact on the blend that will 
be elicited by the counterpart in the interaction.  
Finally, a study of humorous utterances has been conducted to try to 
discover the main underlying construal mechanisms. The results of this multi-
layered cognitive analysis lead me to conclude that, as is the case with the 
multimodal expression of humour, no specific cognitive mechanism ―among 
those studied in the sample― can be associated with the construal of humour. In 
other words, despite humour clearly being acknowledged as a marked form of 
communication, to the extent that humorous remarks are not simply to be taken 
at face value, the cognitive processes applied to the production of humour in this 
sample do not differ from those governing non-humorous communication. 
 
8.3.1.4 Where does the humorous nature of an instance of 
communication lie? 
In light of the findings reported above, the question remains as to what 
makes a certain utterance humorous. This is by no means a simple matter. To 
begin with, this study has focused on the production of humour, but has taken 
laughter in the audience as the main indicator to identify humorous utterances, in 
order to avoid bias, and following standard practice in the literature (Morreal, 
1983; Attardo, Pickering, & Baker, 2011; Archakis & Tsakona, 2005; Flamson et 
al., 2011; Tabacaru, 2014; Bryant & Gibbs, 2015).  
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That opens the question of whether humour is linked to the humorous 
intent of the speaker, or to the apprehension of a given instance as humorous by 
the audience. As shown in our study, in some utterances annotated as humorous, 
as they elicit laughter in the audience, the humorous intent on the part of the 
speaker is, at best, questionable. Only the producer of a humorous utterance 
could ultimately confirm whether the statement has been intended to be 
humorous. If we admit the widely-held view in the literature that humour stems 
from a form of incongruity which produces a pleasurable cognitive shift (Morreal, 
1983), then humour would rather lie in the listener’s apprehension, as the 
interlocutor experiencing the cognitive shift. On the other hand, if a certain 
utterance is produced with a humorous intent, a multimodal, cognitive, discourse 
or linguistic analysis focused on the speaker must consider that particular 
instance as humorous, even if humour fails (Hay, 2001).  
In sum, humour is an extremely complex cognitive-social phenomenon 
(Feyaerts et al., 2015), which to be successful requires interlocutors align how 
they view and construe a particular communicative event (Canestrari, 2010; 
Feyaerts, 2013). I argue that the pragmatic and discourse context, as 
encompassed in the current discourse space (Langacker, 2001), plays a decisive 
role both in the conceptualisation and expression of humour, as far as speakers 
are concerned, as well as in the necessary acknowledgment of humour by the 
hearer (Attardo, 2008; Antonopoulou et al., 2015; Yus, 2016). 
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8.3.2 Contribution to knowledge 
To my knowledge, this is the first multi-faceted study conducted on the 
production of spontaneous (not-scripted, not-rehearsed) humorous utterances, in 
which a multimodal and a cognitive approach are combined. Face and head 
gestures, along with various cognitive mechanisms, are analysed and confronted 
to all types of humour found in the sample, not just focusing on one particular 
kind. This study confirms the validity of applying the same frameworks and 
principles used in the research of non-humorous communication to the analysis 
of humorous instances. It convincingly advocates the relevance of conducting 
studies on spontaneous humour, as results may differ widely from those obtained 
in the research of scripted humour, given the major role played by the current 
discourse space (Langacker, 2001), i.e., the large context in which 
communication takes place.  
The fully spontaneous nature of the interviewees’ speech could be 
questioned, as most of them are people used to speaking in public and may 
therefore be seen as merely acting out their public persona during the show. 
However, even if that was the case, their speech could still be considered 
spontaneous to the extent that it had not been previously scripted and rehearsed. 
The research conducted for this thesis aimed at confronting spontaneous 
humorous utterances to those taken from sitcoms, TV shows or stand-up 
comedies in previous literature.  
Regarding the multimodal analysis, the purpose of the study was to look 
into possible recurrent patterns between certain gestures and types of humour, 
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as well as to see whether gestures could be considered markers of humour, with 
functions specific to humorous communication. To do so, the use of the gestures 
found in humorous instances were compared to uses found in the literature for 
non-humorous communication. The research conducted on this sample bears out 
previous studies on the function of gestures, which seems to be the same both in 
humorous and non-humorous communication. Along the same line, this research 
reaffirms the explanatory power of cognitive linguistic notions, such as the current 
discourse space (Langacker, 2001), conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002), and construal mechanisms (Croft & Cruse, 2004), by applying them to a 
marked form of communication such as humour.  
 
8.4 Suggestions for further research 
The present study opens more questions that it helps to resolve, especially 
with regards to the humorous nature of any given utterance. In order to tackle this 
issue, further research into the multimodality and cognitive grounds of humour in 
spontaneous face-to-face interaction, adding also the point of view of the listener, 
is warranted, to gain an insight into how both interlocutors cooperate and may 
align their construal and multimodal expression of a humorous event. Such an 
approach would ideally widen the scope of the study from the individual to all the 
participants in the interaction, in order to gain an insight into how meaning is co-
constructed among interactants at any given point in the current discourse space.  
A further line of enquiry that would shed light into the multimodality of 
humour may entail a similar study but with a larger sample, in which not only face 
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displays and head movements, but also body posture, hand gestures and gaze 
would be annotated, to have a more comprehensive multimodal picture of how 
humorous communication unfolds. In addition, taking whole turns, rather than 
utterances, as the unit of study, may lead to better understanding of the role 
played by different modes and possibly help to detect certain multimodal patterns. 
In light of the above, a more fine-grained analysis of gestures, accounting 
for repetitions, pace and amplitude of movements, etc. might contribute to better 
understanding the functions of specific types of gestures, such as shakes or nods. 
A semi-controlled experimental environment would be needed to conduct such 
analysis. Finally, a step forward in a multimodal study would look into the kinetic 
dynamics of all the interlocutors involved in a usage event.  
Furthermore, multiple coders should ideally be involved in the study of a 
single sample to gain reliability and to reduce subjectivity. Also, research focused 
on outlining a systematic approach on utterance segmentation would greatly 
benefit this type of analyses and allow for better comparability of research 
outcomes.  
Additionally, besides construal mechanisms and blending operations, a 
cognitive analysis can be enriched looking into the relation between the various 
figures of thought identified, e.g., metaphors of metonymic origin, irony based on 
metaphor or metonymy, differences between humorous and non-humorous irony 
on the basis of how the underlying figure is construed, etc. 
Finally, on a different note, more related to my professional field of 
expertise, i.e., interpreting, further research could also look into how humour is 
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transferred from source to target language during interpretation, looking both at 
multimodal cues produced by the original speaker and the interpreter, as well as 
to similarities and differences in the construal of the humorous instance between 
interpreter and speaker, as to how it is rendered in both languages. The study of 
humour conveyed in settings in which English is used as lingua franca can also 
yield interesting insights as far as intercultural communication is concerned. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Communication is inherently multimodal. In addition, we cannot fail but to 
communicate according to patterns of belief, attitudes and behaviours (Poyatos, 
2002). All our experiences of the world within our given culture will determine how 
we construe that world and how we express it through language (Johnson, 1987; 
Langacker, 2001; etc.). Hence, in order to gain an insight into communication 
between human beings, a multimodal perspective and a cognitive approach 
based on embodiment as the basic way in which we relate to the world around 
us is essential. 
Humour is a social phenomenon. As such, an analysis of humour must 
take into account all participants in a communicative event. While engaged in 
interaction, we exchange messages through different modalities. To develop a 
comprehensive theory of interaction, we need to understand how these 
modalities are related, and look into the discourse mechanisms implied in, for 
example, cooperation between interlocutors. Multimodal elements are flexible 
and dynamic, and evolve during interaction. They are linked to our 
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conceptualisation of a particular event and provide clues as to how we construe 
what we mean to convey. Understanding language entails not only decoding 
words, grasping the context of communication, and assuming how interlocutors 
construe such context themselves. It also involves performing visual and motor 
imagery. As a result, a complete understanding of how we interact needs to take 
into account how all multimodal resources available interplay as well as how 
meaning is construed both individually and cooperatively among interlocutors. 
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Annex 1: Prosodic analysis 
 
The following graphs and tables are presented for each interview: 
1. Case summary: number and duration of utterances per type: table and 
graph. 
2. Report on mean pitch and intensity values and standard deviation (SD) 
per type of utterance: table and graph. 
3. Normality tests: histogram and one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. 
4. T-test and/or nonparametric tests as appropriate. 
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INTERVIEW 4: CONDOLA RASHAD 
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INTERVIEW 5: CRISTELA ALONZO 
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INTERVIEW 8: VICE PRESIDENT JOSEPH BIDEN 
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INTERVIEW 11: RIZ AHMED 
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INTERVIEW 13: SIGOURNEY WEAVER 
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INTERVIEW 14: SUSAN SARANDON 
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